americans voted on Tuesday, November 3, for the mid-term elections to the US Senate and the House of representatives, concerned about petrol prices, grocery bills and a war in the Gulf that most of them never wanted.
By Wednesday morning, the big news networks had already decided the Democrats had won the House and, with some surprising flip-flops in states such as Texas, Kansas and Ohio, the Senate. Some races remain to be tallied, and the results will be decided in days. But the direction is quite distinct. Two years have finally been enough to convince voters to keep President Trump in office, but they have taken away the free hand he had so far.
Begin by stating what it is NOT. It’s not a change in government. In America, foreign policy rests with the President, and Trump has not been too interested in sharing it. A Democratic Congress cannot call a ceasefire in Tehran, grab the phone in Moscow, nor rewrite a trade understanding with Delhi. What it can do is manage the cash, bring in the witnesses, and make every adventure cheaper. This is usually sufficient to change behaviour in Washington.
The first to feel the impact would be Iran. Trump started the war on February 28, without congressional approval; Democrats have attempted to pass several votes to force approval. They now have the appropriation pen.
Don’t be surprised if the defence budget and the annual defence authorisation bill become the arena, as Democrats demand that a time limit be imposed on the war. Trump will be able to veto any such law, and there won’t be enough of the two-thirds required to override him on this particular issue.
Congress holds the power of the purse; thus, it could enforce spending limits and rigorous hearings that will squeeze war funding rather than stopping it outright
So, it’s likely to be a squeeze, not a sudden stop: hearings, restrictions on spending and thorny numbers on expenses that are likely to roll in.
For Tehran, this is a mixed gift. Its leadership will read the result as proof that American patience is running thin, and may be tempted to wait things out. That would be a mistake, because a weakened President facing hostile committees can go either way.
He may look for a quick exit he can sell as a win, or he may escalate to change the story. Israel, meanwhile, should expect sharper questions about the scale of American support, the kind that a Republican Congress rarely asked.
Ukraine’s position improves, but not as much as the headlines suggest. Trump has frozen direct aid to Kyiv, and a Democratic majority, joined by Republicans who never liked that decision, can try to restore it.
Analysts believe a fresh aid bill could gather the two-thirds needed to survive a veto. Gregory Meeks, expected to take the House Foreign Affairs gavel, is already behind bipartisan legislation to block Trump’s plan to bring Russian diesel back into global markets.
Kyiv gains stronger bipartisan goodwill and faster weapons legislation, but core diplomatic backchannels and Russia policy remain firmly under White House control
Yet, the White House does not need Congress to run its Russia policy. Back channels to the Kremlin, intelligence sharing and the shape of any peace plan stay in the President’s hands.
Ukraine gets goodwill, oversight and faster weapons bills. It does not get a reversal. Some analysts also worry that a President bruised at home will hunt for a grand bargain with Putin and Xi, leaving Kyiv and Europe to pay for it.
For the wider world, the message is that American power now has a domestic brake. Trump’s request for a $1.5 trillion defence budget, a 67 per cent jump, has already been stopped in the Senate. Congress approved aid that the administration froze, and it will be fought over line by line.
Allies in Europe, the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific will draw a mixed lesson. Washington will be less able to make sweeping moves, and less predictable in its own way, because a divided capital produces stalemate more easily than strategy. China will have noticed. A President short of wins at home may want a deal with Beijing more than he did last month, and Beijing knows it.
India benefits from a friendlier Capitol Hill opposed to arbitrary tariffs and any de-escalation in Iran that lowers oil prices, despite potential criticism on human rights
For India, the picture is more interesting. The sore point is trade. Tariffs on Indian goods went up to 50 per cent in the summer of 2025, and the deal between the two capitals has moved markets and the rupee without yet settling the matter.
Analysts say its fate rests with the White House, not Congress, and they are right. But the room has changed. Congress cannot write India’s tariff rate. Yet, a Democratic House can curb sweeping tariff powers, and a group of American lawmakers has already written to Trump asking him to repair the relationship.
Meeks has said openly that arbitrary tariffs endanger a vital partnership. Delhi now has a friendlier audience on Capitol Hill, and a slightly stronger hand at the table.
The Iran war may matter to India more than any tariff schedule. A country that imports most of its oil, feels every barrel of disruption in its fuel bill, inflation and rising rupee. Anything that shortens the war helps India, even if Delhi will never say so out loud.
Expect the opposite side of the coin too. Democrats have criticised the $100,000 H-1B fee that hit Indian professionals, and a Congress in an oversight mood will also ask its own questions about India’s domestic affairs. A warmer hearing on trade and a sharper one on rights can arrive in the same week.
India must neither wait-out Washington nor assume Democrats are allies; it should leverage Congressional goodwill while finalising bilateral deals directly with the White House
What should Delhi do? Avoid two temptations. The first is to wait for Washington to sort itself out, which could take a year.
The second is to celebrate, as though the Democrats have become India’s advocates. They have not. Their instinct is to defend institutions and values, and India will sometimes find itself on the wrong end of that.
The sensible course is to use the new goodwill in Congress, while closing the real bargain with the White House, to keep energy and defence partnerships spread across more than one supplier, and to keep the Quad moving at its own pace.
Tuesday’s vote changed the audience in Washington. It did not change the decision-maker. India, like everyone else, will need to remember both.
The writer, a PVSM, AVSM, VSM has had an illustrious career spanning nearly four decades. A distinguished Armoured Corps officer, he has served in various prestigious staff and command appointments including Commander Independent Armoured Brigade, ADG PP, GOC Armoured Division and GOC Strike 1. The officer retired as DG Mechanised Forces in December 2017 during which he was the architect to initiate process for reintroduction of Light Tank and Chairman on the study on C5ISR for Indian Army. Subsequently he was Consultant MoD/OFB from 2018 to 2020. He is also a reputed defence analyst, a motivational speaker and prolific writer on matters of military, defence technology and national security. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda
