Doctrine is a statement of intent that sets out how a force intends to fight and defines the capabilities it must develop. It tells a force what it must be able to do, enabling a government to decide what to equip it with. By that test, the Land Warfare Doctrine 2026, released by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on October 23, does what a good doctrine should. It honestly assesses the changing battlefield, keeps the soldier at the centre, and commits the Army to capabilities that fit the wars it may actually have to fight.
A note on method. The detailed operational provisions are not public, so this article works from official summaries and press reports.
A Doctrine Written for the Real Threat
The Army plans for two land fronts, a long stand-off with China in Ladakh, and proxy terrorism from the west. The 2018 doctrine already spoke of hybrid warfare and multi-front operations. The new edition offers a clear view of how multidomain conflicts will be fought in a contested environment and the capabilities needed to deter and prevail. It reportedly draws on conflicts where unmanned systems, persistent surveillance, contested communications, and information warfare decide outcomes. It emphasises fusion warfare, an integrated, interconnected kill web, and contested survivability. It is also the first edition since Operation Sindoor in May 2025. Turning those lessons into doctrine within about a year and a half marks a quick-learning institution.
The Army plans for two land fronts, a long stand-off with China in Ladakh, and proxy terrorism from Pakistan. The northern and western fronts demand different forms of deterrence, even if they must be managed simultaneously
The doctrine also keeps the man behind the machine central. Reports say it places considerable emphasis on empowering the soldier and on human leadership, a reassuring signal in an age when armies are tempted to believe that technology alone will carry the day. Machines extend what a well-led soldier can do. They do not replace judgement, courage, or the trust between a commander and his men.
Deterrence On Two Fronts
The northern and western fronts demand different forms of deterrence, even if they must be managed simultaneously. Along the northern border, India must deny an adversary a quick military advantage through persistent surveillance, defensible positions, resilient logistics and dominance through the ability to reinforce under pressure. Against Pakistan, the challenge includes deterring terrorism and responding to aggression beneath the nuclear threshold. Credible punitive options require more than political resolve; they depend on reliable intelligence, precision strike capability, escalation control and the capacity to sustain operations. Operation Sindoor underlined the importance of connecting political intent with military options. The test now is to ensure that doctrine, force development and operational preparedness remain aligned with that requirement.
The Capabilities That Follow
The reported pillars are man-unmanned teaming, an empowered soldier, human leadership, resilient logistics, the ability to fight in contested conditions, indigenisation and a whole-of-nation approach. Here is what I believe they build in practice.
Precision fires matter most when backed by munitions in quantity, dispersed stocks, forward repair and supply lines that can survive being watched
The first is surveillance and decision dominance. Man-unmanned teaming gives a small unit eyes over the next ridge and a shorter path from sensor to shooter. That compression of the decision loop is the real measure of multi-domain capability, and the doctrine puts it where it belongs, at the heart of how the Army fights. Yet a connected battlefield is not necessarily an effective one. More sensors and faster data flows will deliver an advantage only when information is reliable, communications are resilient, and commanders can act before the opportunity disappears. A kill web must also survive disruption, spoofing and the loss of individual nodes. The objective is not connectivity at any cost, but decision superiority that can be sustained under attack.
The second is protection from the sky. Other land forces are reaching the same conclusion: a formation without counter-drone cover is simply a target. By emphasising contested environments, Indian Army doctrine lays the groundwork for layered counter-drone and integrated air defence at every brigade and unit level. In addition, in the non-kinetic domain, particularly in cyber and electronic warfare, both defensive and offensive measures must be upgraded.
The third is reach, resilience and endurance. Precision fires matter most when backed by munitions in quantity, dispersed stocks, forward repair and supply lines that can survive being watched. The doctrine’s emphasis on logistics tells the force that sustainment is part of fighting, not a service behind it.
The fourth is the ability to fight when networks fail. If communications and navigation are jammed, junior leaders must still know their commander’s intent and act on it. The Army is already backing this with a five-year roadmap for multi-domain training, a three-level AI skills programme for officers, and a plan to make drone handling a secondary skill across the force. Their value will depend on how well they are integrated into collective training and unit battle drills.
The Army has set a standard for how a Service articulates its thinking. The natural companion is a published National Security Strategy, which should have preceded it
The fifth is strategic communication and information warfare, part of the cognitive domain, which may be the weakest capability link at present.
Behind all five stands of industry, Aatmanirbharta and the whole-of-nation approach give the Army a path to wartime endurance and invite domestic industry to build for a customer that has now clearly stated its needs.
The Void Above the Doctrine
The Army has now set a standard for how a Service articulates its thinking. The natural companion is a published National Security Strategy, which should have preceded it. India has had its nuclear doctrine since 2003 and now has a fresh land warfare doctrine. A strategy at the apex would provide the same clarity to the whole. The idea is not new. The Defence Planning Committee was formed in 2018 under the National Security Adviser to do this, and both the Kargil Review Committee and the Naresh Chandra Task Force urged such a document. The Chief of Defence Staff has said a de facto framework already exists. But a framework that lives in a few offices cannot discipline a budget, align the three Services, tell industry what to build, or tell an adversary where the red lines run. For a Whole of Nation approach, a National Security Strategy remains the unifying factor.
Recommendations: Turn Intent into Delivery
First, translate the doctrine into a time-bound implementation plan, with a designated lead authority for each major capability and clear delivery milestones. The plan should link doctrine to force structure, training, procurement, infrastructure and operational readiness. Progress should be reviewed annually against measurable outcomes, including performance under degraded communications, counter-drone protection, equipment availability, logistics endurance and the ability to sustain operations during disruption. Delays and capability gaps should trigger corrective action and reprioritisation. Without this accountability, the doctrine risks remaining an accurate diagnosis of future warfare rather than a programme for preparing the Army to fight it.
The doctrine must be translated into a time-bound implementation plan, with a designated lead authority for each major capability and clear delivery milestones
Second, set measurable standards for drone proficiency, counter-drone protection, electronic-warfare resilience, cyber warfare, cognitive warfare and operations under degraded communications. Test them in field exercises, not only in classrooms.
Third, develop a joint framework for deep precision strike that brings missiles, rockets and unmanned systems into a coherent operational architecture, with cyber and space support where appropriate. This requires clarity on command relationships, target validation, intelligence support, deconfliction and escalation control. A permanent joint structure should be considered against clearly defined operational requirements, rather than created as an end in itself. Investment must also extend to reliable guidance, secure communications, indigenous microelectronics and the ability to produce and replenish munitions at scale. Hypersonic weapons and AI-enabled systems merit sustained development, but their value must be judged against operational utility, affordability, technical maturity and the wider force’s ability to employ them effectively.
Fourth, upgrade Defence Cyber Agency and Defence Space Agency to integrated commands with independent budgeting and procurement routes for desired capability building.
Fifth, assess endurance alongside weapon performance. War reserves, repair turnaround, alternative supply routes and industrial surge capacity must be tested, not assumed.
There is a need to set measurable standards for drone proficiency, counter-drone protection, electronic-warfare resilience, cyber warfare, cognitive warfare and operations under degraded communications
Sixth, institutionalise joint and whole-of-nation exercises involving all three Services, relevant ministries, state governments, infrastructure providers and defence industry. Lessons must lead to assigned corrective action.
Seventh, publish an unclassified version of the doctrine, withholding sensitive operational detail. Professional scrutiny by serving personnel, veterans, researchers and industry can expose assumptions and improve implementation without compromising security.
The larger requirement is a published National Security Strategy that connects military doctrines to national objectives. It should establish national priorities, clarify the relationship between military preparedness and other instruments of state power, and guide long-term investment across the three Services and relevant civilian agencies. Such a document need not disclose operational plans or sensitive capabilities. Its purpose is to provide a common strategic direction against which individual service doctrines, force development plans, and resource decisions can be judged.
Conclusion
The Land Warfare Doctrine 2026 points in the right direction. It recognises that soldiers must work with machines, formations must survive in a watched and contested battlespace, and that logistics, industry and national coordination shape combat power. Its value will depend on the decisions that translate doctrine into capabilities.
The writer, a PVSM, AVSM, VSM has had an illustrious career spanning nearly four decades. A distinguished Armoured Corps officer, he has served in various prestigious staff and command appointments including Commander Independent Armoured Brigade, ADG PP, GOC Armoured Division and GOC Strike 1. The officer retired as DG Mechanised Forces in December 2017 during which he was the architect to initiate process for reintroduction of Light Tank and Chairman on the study on C5ISR for Indian Army. Subsequently he was Consultant MoD/OFB from 2018 to 2020. He is also a reputed defence analyst, a motivational speaker and prolific writer on matters of military, defence technology and national security. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda
