Absolute self-reliance in defence production is a misconception. Except for China, which is now largely self-sufficient after successfully reverse-engineering many technologies it imported from Russia (earlier USSR) and other countries like Ukraine over the last couple of decades, most other countries, including the United States (US), are not fully self-reliant. Much of this stems from the world’s dependence on a very limited supply of critical minerals (CMs), some of which are rare earth elements (REEs).
According to a 2024 US Government Accountability Report, the US imported more than 95% of the REEs it consumed, and from 2019 to 2022, almost three-quarters of these imports came from China. France, the second-largest exporter of arms, accounting for 9.8% of global exports in 2021-25, relies for CMs on its own recycling initiatives and bilateral agreements with countries like Malaysia, Mongolia, Brazil, South Africa, and Sweden, as domestic mining within mainland France is grossly inadequate. This is true of other major arms-manufacturing countries like Russia and Germany.
CMs such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel are non-fuel minerals or materials whose supply chain is prone to disruption because of their limited availability, lack of domestic processing capabilities, and geopolitical risks. Some of the CMs, such as tantalum and tungsten, lack equally efficient substitutes. Within the broad category of CMs, a group of 17 chemically similar metallic elements like neodymium, yttrium, and cerium is classified as REEs, as these are essential for high-tech applications, including permanent magnets for electric vehicles and wind turbines.
Contrary to what the nomenclature suggests, REEs are quite abundant in the earth’s crust, but they are not typically found in concentrated deposits, making their extraction difficult. According to a Department of Atomic Affairs Press release issued on March 12, 2026, India holds the world’s third-largest REE resources, but these are lean with respect to grade and tied to radioactivity, making their extraction a long, complex, and expensive process. Moreover, heavy REEs like yttrium are not available in economically extractable quantities.
While India has facilities for mining, separation, refining, etc., and also the capability of metal extraction, industrial-scale facilities for extraction from alloys, magnets, etc. are non-existent. In these circumstances, despite adequate availability of REEs, production capacity is limited due to the absence of mid-stream and downstream industries in the value chain. This should be a matter of concern for India as CMs are crucial for clean energy transition, advanced electronics, infrastructure and telecommunications, and aerospace and defence.
A 2024 US Government Accountability Report says the US imported 95% of the rare earth elements it consumed, and from 2019 to 2022, almost three-quarters of these imports came from China. France relies on its own recycling initiatives and bilateral agreements with countries such as Malaysia, Mongolia, Brazil, South Africa and Sweden, as domestic mining within mainland France is grossly inadequate
In June 2023, a committee constituted by the Ministry of Mines identified a set of 30 CMs, following which the Union Cabinet approved a National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM) on January 30, 2025, “to secure a long-term sustainable supply of critical minerals (including REEs) and strengthen India’s CM value chain encompassing all stages from mineral exploration and mining to beneficiation, processing, and recovery from end-of-life products.” Since then, there has been a flurry of activity.
Under the NCMM, guidelines were issued on November 14, 2025, for funding pilot projects for the recovery of CMs from fly ash, red mud, etc., and a project of the Non-Ferrous Technology Development Centre (NFTDC) related to REE separation from multiple feedstocks was approved. A Rare Earth Permanent Magnet Plant (REPM) was also set up at Vizag for indigenous production of permanent magnets for use in atomic energy and defence.
A ₹1,500 crore Incentive Scheme was launched on October 2, 2025, to promote CM recycling, and another ‘Scheme to Promote Manufacturing of Sintered Rare Earth Permanent Magnet’ was launched on November 26, 2025, to establish 6,000 Metric Tons per Annum of integrated Rare Earth Permanent Magnet (REPM) manufacturing. The Ministry of Mines formulated a policy in December 2025 for Exploration of CMs in New Projects and Recovery of CMs from overburden, dumps, and tailings of existing mines. A Joint Venture company, Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL), was created to acquire overseas mineral assets like Lithium, Cobalt, REE, etc.
Not to be left behind, Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD), a constituent unit of the Department of Atomic Energy, is carrying out exploration and augmentation of REEs along the coastal / inland / riverine placer sands as well as in hard rock terrains in several potential geological domains of the country. By July 2025, AMD had identified the existence of CMs/REEs in parts of Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and Rajasthan. The Geological Survey of India has also augmented resources of REE ore at various cut-off grades in 34 exploration projects.
India’s efforts to minimise its vulnerability in CMs are not restricted to domestic initiatives. It has become a member of the Critical Minerals Partnership, which is “an international agreement between governments and industries to secure, diversify, and responsibly develop supply chains for essential minerals like lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements.” The country is actively participating in the Pax Silica grouping and engaging with countries such as the US, Australia, Argentina, the UAE, Zambia, Peru, Chile, France, Uzbekistan, and the UK to build a resilient CMs supply chain.
These developments are heartening, but where does India stand regarding the availability of defence-specific CMs like Titanium, Vanadium, and Platinum Group Elements that are used in the manufacturing of armour, fighter jets, and precision weaponry? The first Defence Production Policy of 2011 and the draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy 2020 did not focus on CMs. The currently in-force Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020, or its revised draft of 2026, which is yet to be finalised, also does not prioritise it.
India’s efforts to minimise its vulnerability in critical minerals are not restricted to domestic initiatives. The country is actively participating in the Pax Silica grouping and engaging with countries such as the US, Australia, Argentina, the UAE, Zambia, Peru, Chile, France, Uzbekistan and the UK to build a resilient CMs supply chain
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) does not have a directorate dedicated to securing India’s strategic interests in CMs, though its Directorates of Materials and Futuristic Technology Management do seem to be engaged in developing, processing and extraction technology for CMs like titanium, tungsten, and nickel, supply chain resilience and technology integration with futuristic defence assets. It is unlikely that, besides focusing on the technology for mining and processing of CMs, securing the supply chain, and creating sufficient CM stockpiles, these also fall within DRDO’s purview.
It is instructive that China’s dominance in the CM sector is largely on account of decades of government support and strategic investment in building the country’s extraction, processing, and refining capabilities. India is moving in that direction. The Department of Mines may have factored in the needs of the defence industry while identifying the country’s CMs vulnerability and taking steps to address it, but considering the imperatives of self-reliance in defence production, MoD needs to take stock of the measures taken by other ministries and decide whether some focused leg up is required to ensure availability of defence-specific CMs, so that the vulnerability that besets India’s quest for achieving self-reliance in defence production could be minimised. It would be ideal for the MoD to formulate its own policy on securing the supply chain of CMs and REEs that are crucial for the defence industry and integrate that policy with the existing R&D, production and procurement ecosystems. What lends a sense of urgency to this task is that China controls the refining and processing of most of the world’s critical minerals. A small nudge from the Standing Committee on Defence would help.
–The writer is a former Financial Advisor (Acquisition), Ministry of Defence. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
