The central paradox of the Yemen war is that a militarily weaker actor can gain strategic leverage by exploiting what its stronger adversary cannot afford to lose. The Houthis have endured years of military pressure while Yemen’s economy and public services have deteriorated. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has the resources to sustain a prolonged conflict but far greater economic and strategic stakes in preventing one. The contest is therefore not simply about territorial control; it is about which side can better absorb the costs of a war that neither has been able to resolve.
Yemen has paid a devastating price since the conflict escalated in 2014. Per capita income has collapsed, and more than two million children under five suffer from acute malnutrition. Yet the Houthis continue to fight, extracting resources from civilians and maintaining control over much of the country’s population. The Saudi Arabia-led intervention launched in 2015 failed to dislodge them from their strongholds. A United Nations-brokered truce in 2022 reduced major fighting but left the underlying political rift unresolved. The wider regional confrontation has now helped reignite the conflict.
The latest escalation illustrates the Houthis’ strategy. Their advance along Yemen’s Red Sea coast in September threatened the approach to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital passage linking the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia-backed Yemeni government forces subsequently launched a counteroffensive, recovering much of the territory lost near the strait and advancing towards Mokha. Yet the battlefield position remains contested, while Houthi pressure around Taiz has intensified. Neither side has demonstrated that it can translate military advances into a decisive outcome.
The Houthis do not need to defeat Saudi Arabia conventionally to gain leverage. They need to sustain enough disruption to make the costs of continuing the war appear greater than those of negotiating
The conflict has also reached Saudi Arabia’s economic heart. On October 10, a missile attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport killed at least 12 people and injured more than 300, according to reports. Airlines cancelled flights and international travel was disrupted. Three days later, a missile reportedly struck an office tower within the headquarters complex of Saudi Aramco in Dhahran, damaging its upper floors. Saudi authorities described the resulting fire as limited and reported no casualties. Even with these qualifications, attacks on an airport and an energy company’s headquarters demonstrate the potential reach of the conflict.
The significance of such attacks extends beyond their immediate physical damage. Missiles and drones can force costly defensive responses, unsettle investors and make businesses reconsider their exposure. Saudi Arabia possesses sophisticated air-defence systems, including THAAD and Patriot batteries, but sustained attacks put pressure on interception capacity and readiness. The combination of drones and missiles complicates defensive calculations, while the disparity between the cost of offensive weapons and that of interceptors can work in the attacker’s favour. The operational question is not simply whether Saudi Arabia can intercept incoming weapons, but how long it can sustain an intensive defence without diverting resources from other priorities.
Yemen’s internationally recognised government, represented by the Presidential Leadership Council led by Rashad al-Alimi, cannot reverse Houthi gains. Its opponents include tribal groups, Islamists, local militias and southern separatists whose objectives differ
This is where the Houthis’ strategy intersects with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030. Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify its economy, attract foreign investment and establish Riyadh as a centre for finance, tourism and international business. These ambitions depend on perceptions of security and predictability as much as on capital expenditure. The World Petroleum Congress proceeded in Riyadh despite the airport attack, but flight cancellations and alternative travel arrangements complicated participation. The episode illustrates the reputational costs of insecurity: an event need not be cancelled for a security crisis to undermine the confidence it is intended to cultivate.
The asymmetry is clear. The Houthis have shown considerable tolerance for isolation, deprivation and military pressure, although the costs fall heavily on the population they govern. Saudi Arabia cannot insulate its economic transformation from persistent insecurity. A prolonged conflict risks weakening investor confidence, disrupting aviation and energy operations, and diverting attention and resources from diversification. The Houthis do not need to defeat the kingdom conventionally to gain leverage. They need to sustain enough disruption to make the costs of continuing the war appear greater than those of negotiating.
The United States, Britain, Israel and Saudi Arabia have used military force against Houthi targets at different stages of the conflict. Further strikes could invite retaliation against Saudi infrastructure and intensify disruption to regional energy supplies and maritime traffic
Riyadh’s difficulties are compounded by the weakness and fragmentation of the forces opposing the Houthis. Yemen’s internationally recognised government, represented by the Presidential Leadership Council led by Rashad al-Alimi, lacks a unified military instrument capable of independently reversing Houthi gains. Its opponents include tribal groups, Islamists, local militias and southern separatists whose objectives differ. Some seek to restore central authority; others prioritise regional autonomy or southern independence. Saudi money, weapons and air support cannot reconcile these competing ambitions. Territorial gains will remain fragile without a viable political arrangement to consolidate them.
Nor does expanded air power offer an assured solution. The United States, Britain, Israel and Saudi Arabia have all used military force against Houthi targets at different stages of the conflict, yet the movement has survived. Further strikes could damage launch sites and infrastructure, but they cannot alone create a legitimate and coherent Yemeni state. A wider campaign could also invite retaliation against Saudi infrastructure and intensify disruption to regional energy supplies and maritime traffic.
Diplomacy therefore remains necessary, though its terms are difficult. Saudi Arabia has pursued negotiations with the Houthis, but talks become harder when either side believes the balance is shifting in its favour. Houthi leaders may now judge that their ability to threaten Saudi infrastructure strengthens their bargaining position. Riyadh, however, must consider whether concessions that reduce immediate attacks might encourage further demands later. A settlement that secures a ceasefire without addressing Yemen’s fragmented political order could postpone rather than prevent another war.
For India, the consequences extend well beyond the Gulf. Instability around Bab el-Mandeb threatens a major trade route between Asia and Europe. A conflict that neither Saudi Arabia nor the Houthis can decisively win can impose substantial costs on India without directly involving it
For India, the consequences extend well beyond the Gulf. Instability around Bab el-Mandeb threatens a major trade route between Asia and Europe. Disruption can increase freight and insurance costs, force ships to take longer routes and affect energy prices. The security of Indian nationals and the uninterrupted movement of commercial shipping are also directly at stake. A conflict that neither Saudi Arabia nor the Houthis can decisively win can therefore impose substantial costs on India without directly involving it.
The strategic lesson is that military superiority does not automatically confer political advantage. Saudi Arabia has greater resources, but its economic ambitions make prolonged disruption costly. The Houthis have fewer assets, but can exploit that vulnerability. A sustainable settlement will require Riyadh to balance territorial objectives against the costs of an open-ended war, while the Houthis must recognise that military leverage cannot indefinitely compensate for Yemen’s devastation. For India, the conflict underlines a wider reality: security in the Gulf is inseparable from stability in the Red Sea and the resilience of the maritime routes on which its trade depends.
The writer commanded 15 Punjab in Lebanon under United Nations Flag, commanded 27 Sector as DIG in Churachandpur and was Brigadier Operational Logistics in HQ Western Command. He is currently an analyst on geopolitics, international and defence affairs. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda
