Even a limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could put one billion people at risk of starvation and another 1.3 billion at risk of severe food insecurity due to global cooling — a 2013 Princeton Study by International Physicians.
The Pahalgam carnage (April 22, 2025) has occurred. Following this event, Pakistan has declared its intention to resort to nuclear weapons if India launches an attack. Consequently, nuclear clouds loom large over the landmass of South Asia. It is conjectured that General Asim Munir, along with other generals, has dispatched their families to undisclosed foreign locations, and the leadership of the ruling party in Pakistan is reportedly doing the same. This raises the question: does this indicate that Pakistan is preparing for a nuclear exchange? And what if the most “unthinkable” scenario unfolds?
The primary concern for the Indian leadership is how to retaliate against the Pahalgam carnage while effectively averting the nuclear threat. India needs to be cautious that Pakistan’s nuclear strategy of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) echoes the dynamics of the “Cold War” era. Therefore, it is imperative to revisit our nuclear doctrine, our state of preparation, and our desired responses to deny Pakistan the advantage of not only a first strike but also its frequently employed nuclear blackmail.
To gain a clearer perspective, we must consider how India can prevent the recurrence of incidents like Kargil-99, Mumbai – 26/11, Parliament – 2001, and the recent Pahalgam attack on April 22. Indians must confront the ‘unthinkable’, which is the very real probability of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. India cannot perpetually exist under the shadow of “nuclear blackmail.” The potential horror of such an event is beyond imagination.
Indians must confront the ‘unthinkable’, which is the very real probability of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. India cannot perpetually exist under the shadow of “nuclear blackmail.” The potential horror of such an event is beyond imagination
Every commentator from Pakistan proudly asserts Pakistan’s status as a nuclear power, often declaring that this capability has effectively kept India in check. It appears that nuclear blackmail has become their favoured strategy to gain an advantage over India. They seemingly believe they have discovered a permanent solution to counter India’s responses to Pakistan’s persistent provocations along the LoC (Line of Control). This offensive and aggressive stance is precisely what risks instigating nuclear conflict in South Asia.
To the belligerent elements in Pakistan, the use of nuclear weapons may seem like a readily available option. However, this line of thinking and the self-serving conclusion it leads to are fundamentally flawed. Their stated first-use policy would, in fact, compel India to pre-empt such a possibility. Although India is a proponent of a no-first-use policy, it would be capable of assessing Pakistan’s potential use and initiating a pre-emptive response.
In the past, India has engaged in peace talks with Pakistan as a means to prevent nuclear escalation. Unfortunately, this approach has inadvertently conveyed an impression of Indian weakness to strategic planners in Pakistan. They seem to believe they can provoke India without facing significant retribution, and the recent carnage at Pahalgam appears to be a manifestation of this flawed thinking, intended to divert national attention from internal issues and rally public support behind the army.
The critical question is when India’s patience will finally be exhausted, leading it to declare “enough is enough” and prepare to confront Pakistan’s nuclear threat with a pre-emptive counterpoise. Years of ‘talks’ and track-II diplomacy have yielded no middle ground where both nations can meet. Consequently, the two neighbours resemble the parallel banks of a river, destined never to converge, while both face the terrifying prospect of a catastrophic deluge – an ‘irrational nuclear exchange’ – that could devastate them.
Let us delve into the specifics of a nuclear exchange in South Asia. Despite the emphatic pronouncements by the Pakistan army and political leadership regarding the “first use” of nuclear devices to negate India’s conventional military superiority, the advantage actually lies with India due to three key factors vis-à-vis Pakistan. It is Pakistan, in fact, that should be apprehensive about a nuclear exchange because of these advantages held by India:
Second Strike Capability: Hypothetically, even if Pakistan were to carry out a first nuclear strike and achieve surprise, India would still possess the crucial edge of a second-strike capability, a capacity Pakistan lacks. This second strike alone would be sufficient to obliterate Pakistan from the world map. India is among the select five nations with the ability to launch nuclear strikes from Land, Air, and Sea. India possesses a comparable number of nuclear devices, and according to the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) report, it could potentially have more.
Years of ‘talks’ and track-II diplomacy have yielded no middle ground where both nations can meet. Consequently, the two neighbours resemble the parallel banks of a river, destined never to converge, while both face the terrifying prospect of a catastrophic deluge – an ‘irrational nuclear exchange’ – that could devastate them
Eyes in the Space: India has established a robust early warning system that can facilitate countermeasures within minutes, provided we maintain national vigilance. This system can significantly mitigate potential damage. India also possesses the capability to strike Pakistan’s launch pads even before missiles or aircraft can take off. Beyond the S-400 system, India’s DEWS (Direct Energy Weapon System) has the potential to inflict substantial damage.
Geographical Depth: India benefits from a considerably greater geographical and strategic depth, a strategic advantage that Pakistan does not possess. Indeed, Pakistan’s long-standing desire for Kashmir was primarily driven by the aim of securing strategic depth against India. A relevant example is the book “Tribal Raiders in Kashmir” by retired Major General Akram Khan of the Pakistan Army, who is credited with instigating the “Kashmir dispute” by influencing Muhammad Ali Jinnah after the Partition in 1947. Even if Pakistan were to use 6-7 nuclear devices in a first strike, India might suffer the destruction of 7-8 cities. However, should India employ its 10-12 bombs in a second-strike capability, Pakistan would be entirely wiped off the world’s map. Nevertheless, executing a first strike is not a straightforward undertaking, fraught with critical questions of “how much” and “when.” Furthermore, the use of nuclear devices close to the border carries the inherent risk of a “blow-back” effect.
Therefore, India holds a significant advantage. However, let us examine the implications of a nuclear strike. Undeniably, the use of nuclear weapons would unleash global devastation. But let us consider specific aspects of the potential damage and the means of damage prevention in a nuclear exchange. Three critical factors in “nuclear war-making” are: “Dispersion, mobility, and warning system”.
Regarding the dispersion or decongestion of likely targets such as metros and mega cities, China has constructed hundreds of 2-3 km long tunnels in mountainous regions as a strategy to withstand a nuclear exchange. These tunnels are stocked with essential daily necessities for the populace. Similarly, the primary design purpose of the Tube Railway systems in the West includes the explicit function of civil defence, allowing citizens to be directed into these underground networks upon receiving a warning. Effective implementation of such strategies necessitates a robust mobility and warning system.
Consequently, a well-developed public transportation system is crucial. It is important to note that our early warning systems, in the event of a first nuclear strike by Pakistan, could provide a lead time of 10 to 30 minutes. We must enhance this capability by maintaining constant surveillance over underground nuclear silos and mobile launchers. Our objective should be to neutralise these launchers before they can deploy their nuclear payloads. The nation must prepare for both active and passive nuclear defence measures.
Assessing India’s preparedness for A Nuclear Conflict
In the event of a nuclear exchange, whether limited or full scale, how adequately prepared is India to withstand the ensuing effects? To understand the potential damage, we must consider the capacity and destructive ability of a nuclear device. It is crucial to remember that the atom bombs detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a yield of 12 KT (Kiloton) (not 20 KT, which is a misnomer). These devices were air-burst. Undoubtedly, the two cities were caught unawares and lacked any protection systems, leading to their utter devastation. Approximately 78,000 people died instantly, and hundreds of thousands suffered from the long-term effects of radiation. Even today, these sites are believed to have residual radiation.
According to a recent SIPRI report, both India and Pakistan possess a stockpile of 170-172 bombs, with nuclear yields ranging from 1 KT to 45 KT. The majority of devices in both arsenals have a yield of 5 KT to 10 KT. India likely possesses a hydrogen bomb with a yield of 1 MT (Megaton) or greater. Pakistan has also claimed to have detonated a bomb with a larger yield, but this was largely seen as an emotional assertion to seek parity with India.
India enjoys far better geographical and strategic depth, which Pakistan does not have. Hypothetically thinking, even if Pakistan carries out a first nuclear strike and achieves surprise, India still has an edge to carry out the second strike, which is not the case for Pakistan. The second strike itself will wipe out Pakistan from the world’s map
Delivery System: The delivery system for nuclear devices is of paramount importance. This includes missiles and aircraft, and even drones can be adapted to carry TNWs (Tactical Nuclear Weapons). The missiles available to Pakistan for this purpose include the Shaheen-3, which has a range of 2750 km and can reach targets across India, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Pakistan also possesses the Al Hataf-II, with a range of 700-800 km, enabling it to strike targets up to a radial line from Kota to Kanpur by aircraft and potentially up to Nasik to Lucknow by Hataf missiles. The Shaheen-3 can reach targets throughout India. While Pakistan lacks SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles), it does possess SLCMs (Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles), such as the Babur series, with a range of 450-700 km. It is imperative that we decongest from these potentially vulnerable areas.
Effects of a Nuclear Explosion: Empirical studies on the effects of fission devices have identified the following primary impacts:
Heat: The detonation of a 12 KT device will instantaneously raise the temperature at the point of explosion by thousands of degrees Celsius, causing immediate combustion of all materials and initiating widespread secondary fires.
Flash: The visual flash will be akin to the intensity of THOUSAND SUNS—direct observation will result in permanent blindness.
Radiations: The most significant long-term danger to humans comes from radiation exposure. Within a certain radius of the blast, individuals will either be killed outright or severely incapacitated. Survivors will face debilitating health issues, including body infirmities, skin diseases, and various incurable injuries, leading to slow and painful deaths.
Secondary effects: The concussive force of the explosion will cause extensive collateral damage, including the collapse of buildings and the disruption of electricity and water supply systems. Raging fires will consume flammable materials such as plastics and cotton. An EMP (Electro Magnetic Pulse) will severely damage radio communications, rendering mobile and landline communications inoperable. Healthcare and civil services will be severely hampered due to damaged infrastructure and widespread fires.
Protection in a Nuclear Explosion: To understand protective measures, it is essential to first explain the effects of a 12 KT bomb and the corresponding safety zones.
Ground Zero (GZ): The point directly above or below where a nuclear device detonates.
Exposed: Individuals caught in the open during a nuclear detonation are categorised into three types: warned protected, unwarned protected, and unwarned exposed. Those who are warned exposed will have a limited time to take immediate protective actions.
Minimum Safety Distances (MSD): These distances define the radii within which a human being can expect to be safe from the immediate effects of a 12 KT nuclear device. These are categorised into three zones: MSD-1, MSD-2, and MSD-3, also referred to as safety zones 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Totally Unsafe: Any individual within 500 meters of GZ has virtually no chance of survival.
MSD-1 or safety zone one: Extending from 500 meters to 1300 meters from GZ, individuals in this zone can survive if they are wearing nuclear warfare clothing and are within underground shelters or armoured vehicles. Warned exposed and unwarned exposed individuals in this zone will likely perish.
MSD-2 or Safety zone-2: Located between 1300 meters and 2800 meters from GZ, this zone has sub-distances: warned protected individuals up to 2300 meters and unwarned protected individuals up to 2800 meters. Those who are warned and take immediate precautions with protective gear will likely be protected from radiation. Between 2300 and 2800 meters, even unwarned protected individuals have a chance of survival.
MSD-3 or safety zone-3: Spanning from 2800 meters to 3300 meters from GZ, individuals in this zone who are warned but unprotected must take immediate protective measures. Beyond 3300 meters from GZ, unwarned exposed but protected individuals can generally consider themselves safe from the immediate blast effects.
Total Safety: An unwarned, unprotected, and exposed person would need to be approximately 10 km away from GZ at the time of detonation to have a reasonable chance of survival from the immediate blast and thermal effects.
It is crucial to understand that these safety distances primarily relate to immediate radiation effects and do not fully account for radioactive fallout, shock waves, secondary fires, or collapsing buildings due to the blast. Generally, the most severe damage will occur within 3500 meters of ground zero, while significant damage (40-50 percent) can be expected in the area extending from 3500 meters to 10 km.
The intention here is not to instil fear but to inform the public about the potential nuclear catastrophe that looms. It is imperative that India prepares for its nuclear defence. While it is advisable for every individual who can afford it to possess nuclear protective clothing, the government cannot realistically procure and distribute such gear to all citizens. Therefore, individuals must acquire basic protective equipment like oxygen masks. Furthermore, the nation must conduct regular rehearsals for nuclear war drills.
It is imperative that India prepares for its nuclear defence. While it is advisable for every individual who can afford it to possess nuclear protective clothing, the government cannot realistically procure and distribute such gear to all citizens. Furthermore, the nation must conduct regular rehearsals for nuclear war drills
Some immediate measures to be adopted upon receiving a warning of a nuclear strike include:
- Immediately don nuclear protective clothing, including masks and other gear.
- Seal all food items in airtight containers and store them safely.
- Keep a nuclear medicine kit readily accessible for treating potential wounds. A radiometer should be available to monitor radiation exposure.
- If an underground shelter is unavailable, lie flat on the ground, away from buildings and structures.
- Close your eyes and keep them closed until a safety siren is sounded. –After the explosion, wait for the initial shock waves to subside and return (this typically lasts from a few seconds to a few minutes).
- Wash yourself thoroughly with water before touching any part of your body with bare hands.
- During normal peacetime, actively engage with your municipality and city administrative bodies to ensure the establishment of:
- Adequate underground shelters.
- Redundant communication systems.
- First aid kits with necessary medicines for each locality.
- A revitalised city civil defence system.
- Alternative administrative structures in case the existing system is incapacitated. Designated personnel must be ready to assume responsibility for organising relief and evacuation efforts. Each city should have well-functioning “disaster management cells.”
Takeaways
As a nation, we must achieve both mental and physical preparedness to confront the nuclear threat, or even the bluff, posed by Pakistan. Failure to do so will result in our continued vulnerability, allowing Pakistan to persist in its nuclear blackmail to negate our conventional military superiority. Were it not for this blackmail, India would likely have neutralised the terrorist camps in Pakistan multiple times over. We retain the capability to do so, but we must be ready for the unlikely event of a first nuclear strike by Pakistan. We must have a clearly defined bottom line. Do our leaders know this bottom line? I do not have the answer.
The very notion of a nuclear war is terrifying, yet accidents can happen, and an “accidental exchange” cannot be discounted. Therefore, the aim of this analysis is not only to educate the uninformed but also to assess the nation’s and its people’s level of preparedness for self-protection. “Second strike capability,” while crucial, is neither absolute protection nor a guaranteed deterrent against the irrational actions of a determined adversary.
Ultimately, you are the judge of your own chances of survival. I conclude by referencing the Princeton Study of a potential US-Russo nuclear war in 2019: “34.1 million people could die, and another 57.4 million could be injured, within the first few hours of the start of a nuclear war between Russia and the United States triggered by one low-yield nuclear weapon.”
-An ex-NDA and Wellington Staff College graduate, Col Rajinder Singh is a renowned author and security analyst. He has authored four books, two individually and two in collaboration. His best-selling books are Kashmir – A Different Perspective and The ULFA Insurgency. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
