New Delhi: Pakistan’s satellite surveillance programme has undergone a dramatic transformation in the past 16 months, with six launches taking place in rapid succession, according to a report. This pace is unprecedented for the country’s historically slow-moving space agency SUPARCO, which had managed only nine launches in the previous six decades.
The sudden acceleration has raised concerns about external support, particularly from China, which has been closely aligned with Pakistan in space and defence cooperation. The launches have included Earth-observation satellites such as PRSC-EO1, PRSS-2, HS-1, PRSC-EO2 and PRSC-EO3, all of which have been placed in orbits favouring South Asian coverage.
The choice of orbit is particularly revealing. While most Earth-observation satellites use Sun-synchronous orbits to ensure consistent lighting and global coverage, Pakistan’s PRSC-EO3 was placed in a 38° inclined orbit with a RAAN of 334°. This sacrifices global coverage but dramatically increases revisit rates over latitudes between 20°N and 40°N, which include Pakistan, India and Kashmir. Operating at around 554 km altitude, PRSC-EO3 can pass over Jammu and Kashmir multiple times a day, enabling Pakistan to build a dense stream of imagery.
Analysts have described this as consistent with a multi-modal ISR constellation, capable of supporting real-time tracking and precision-guided strikes. Although these satellites are presented as civilian assets for agriculture, disaster management and telecommunications, their military applications are undeniable.
Experts emphasise that virtually all Earth-observation satellites are dual-use, and commercial imagery can be purchased or tasked by foreign governments to monitor Indian sites. The recent West Asian conflict highlighted how commercial providers can restrict imagery at the request of their home governments, while Iran’s IRGC reportedly tasked a Chinese-built satellite to monitor US bases. This underscores the strategic value of owning and operating satellites directly, as Pakistan now does.
China’s role in Pakistan’s space revival is central. The two countries have increasingly shared information and capabilities, with Pakistan reportedly relying on Chinese constellations such as Yaogan and Gaofan.
These satellites provide advanced reconnaissance, including high-resolution imagery, ocean surveillance and all-weather monitoring. China has also extended BeiDou’s military-grade navigation data to Pakistan since 2018, enabling precise targeting for missiles, aircraft and naval platforms. Indian officials note that Pakistan has shifted entirely to BeiDou, eliminating dependence on GPS.
The partnership has effectively given Pakistan access to some of the most advanced space-based surveillance capabilities in the world. The pace of Pakistan’s launches is striking when compared with mature programs. The European Space Agency averages six to seven launches annually, while India maintains around six orbital launches a year. Pakistan’s ability to match this pace despite its limited infrastructure suggests significant external assistance.
The launches of PAUSAT-1 and PRSC-EO1 within three days in January 2025, followed by successive missions every few months, mark a dramatic departure from the past. A former ISRO official likened it to a person with walking disabilities suddenly defeating Usain Bolt, implying that Pakistan’s progress cannot be explained without external support.
India’s own setbacks in strategic satellite missions have compounded the challenge. In January 2026, ISRO failed to place EOS-N1, a hyperspectral imaging satellite designed to detect camouflaged weapons and monitor border movements, into its intended orbit. This followed the failure of EOS-09 (RISAT-1B) in May 2025, which was equipped with synthetic aperture radar for high-resolution imaging under adverse weather conditions. India’s navigation program NavIC also suffered a setback with the failure of NVS-02 in January 2025.
Critics argue that ISRO has focused too heavily on high-profile science missions such as Chandrayaan and Gaganyaan, neglecting urgent strategic requirements in space.
The implications are clear: Pakistan, with Chinese support, has built a surveillance architecture that prioritises frequent coverage of South Asia, particularly Kashmir. India, meanwhile, has struggled to maintain its own strategic satellite capabilities.
Experts warn that information dominance is critical in modern conflict, as demonstrated during Operation Sindoor and the US-Iran confrontation. The only way to counter surveillance is through surveillance, and India must urgently expand its own constellation of satellites to match the capabilities of its neighbours.
The developments highlight a shifting balance in space-based intelligence and reconnaissance in South Asia. Pakistan’s rapid progress, enabled by Chinese technology and cooperation, has placed India under constant surveillance. Unless India accelerates its own strategic space programme, it risks losing the upper hand in future conflicts where information superiority will be decisive.
