There are a plethora of articles, post Operation Sindoor, both in Indian and Pakistani media, electronic as well as print, with bizarre articulation of arguments of its success or failure. Some of these authors give the impression of a confused salesman in a chemist shop, where a patient goes to buy a tablet for a headache. The salesman tells the person that the best medicine for headache is to ‘Smash the Head’: If there is no head, there won’t be any headache!
Was the problem solved? No! Instead, the owner of the shop was lying prostrate on the ground with a ‘split headache’. Some authors contend that the “initiator of a military conflict” sometimes has no ‘aim’ or ‘objective’! Does it mean that the war-maker only was smashing ‘own head’ with a view to see his own destruction to follow the principle: if you do not exist, there is no enemy. But it is a pigeon illusion — close the eyes and it won’t see the cat.
I elaborate my points on this thought process of Narratives & Perceptions, Victory & Defeat, Success & Failure, Modern War Philosophy & Last War Templates and (21st Century vis a vis 20th Century) and the role of technology:
The aim of war and its achievement are co-related. How much is achieved, in turn, defines the extent of victory. Degree of achievement defines full or partial victory. Significantly, partial victories lead to full victory eventually
First, modern wars are not popularity contests nor elections in a democracy, where narratives build perceptions and lead to victory. The initiator of war is the ‘judge’ and the ‘prosecutor’. It is he who decides the contours of victory, according to the call of his intentions, which led him to war. The success is measured in terms of damage done and extent of incapacitation enforced on the adversary. War will only be initiated by the aggressor if he is sure of some positive results. It is another matter that he fails to achieve. But it is his prerogative to make this assessment.
Secondly, wars, as history tells us, in whatever period of time, whether pre-historic times or in 10th Century AD or even in 20th or 21st Century do begin with a definite objective. The initiator always thinks of ‘victory’, when he starts it. It is a different matter whether he achieves it or not. Hitler never thought that he would lose the war when he opened up a second front against the Soviet Union. He got inebriated with his initial successes on both fronts. But, was that victory? However, if you consider his initial purpose of gaining ‘Lebensraum’, it was ‘Victory’, if he had stuck to it. It was ‘Aim–plus’ or ‘Military Greed’, which led to the fall of not only ‘Hitler’ but his ‘Third -Reich’.
Therefore, the ‘Aim of War’ and its ‘achievement’ are co-related. How much is achieved, in turn, defines the extent of ‘victory’. In other words, degree of achievement defines ‘full’ or ‘partial’ victory. It is very much required to understand this phenomenon because ‘partial victories’ ultimately lead to ‘full victory’. The war can thus be ‘staggered’, to move bound by bound, from one victory to another, by consolidating the gains of previous victory. This often happens in ‘stalemated conflicts.’ The Cold War between the USA and SOVIET UNION lasted almost 45-46 years after the end of the Second World War — ultimately it ended in the dissolution of the USSR.
Stalemating a military conflict is also a ‘winning strategy’. It is in this context I see the success of Operation Sindoor and Operation Rising Lion. Limited objectives/aims lead to limited successes. In the modern era of the 21st Century, it is most essential to proceed in a progressive manner by consolidating earlier gains. The wars today are not ‘Brute Force’ display but of ‘Brain Force’ usage.
Lesson from Ramayana
It is essential to learn a lesson from Epic Ramayana, where Lord Rama preferred to use his ‘brain’ by adopting an ‘invisible approach’ to kill King ‘Bali’, elder brother of ‘Sugriva’. It was a victory but partial, because the final aim was to fight ‘Raavan’ and defeat him. Epic Ramayana is the best example of a stalemated war between two ‘enemies’, with both achieving partial successes. However, final victory belonged to the one, who was not intoxicated with partial successes. Hitler made the same mistake, what Raavan had made.
History tells us that wars whether in prehistoric times or in 10th Century AD or even in 20th or 21st Century, do begin with a definite objective. The initiator always thinks of victory, when he starts it. It is a different matter whether he achieves it or not
One must note that initial successes cannot be the ‘final victory’. But they are the steps which are carefully taken to reach the ultimate objective. In the 21st Century, technology plays a major role in selecting the objective and purpose of war, as well as requisite means to achieve the said objective. Final Victory is the complete (100%) accomplishment of the purpose of going to war.
Winning a battle but losing the war
An adage goes in military parlance that one may win a battle but lose the war. Even if one agrees with the Pakistani narrative that India had lost 5-6 fighters (though quantity doubtful), it is no indication of Pakistan’s success or victory. Narratives do not decide the outcome of war. They act as a smoke screen to hide the real fact, but for how long?
India might have failed to properly project the extent of its success in Operation Sindoor to a ‘biased and prejudiced world’. But the facts had tumbled out of extreme damage and pain suffered, when General Asim Munir of Pakistan cried aloud at Tampa (USA) Pakistan would take half the world with it, if further pounded by India. It was the first admission of India’s victory in Operation Sindoor.
The false narrative of the victory of the Field Marshal of Pakistan in Operation Sindoor had burst. The world had come to know the truth. False narratives give momentary pleasure but the truth brings out the ultimate joy. History does not judge you by trappings of lies but the legacy one leaves behind. Therefore, one must not draw wrong lessons from Operation Sindoor.
The false narrative of the victory of the Field Marshal of Pakistan in Operation Sindoor has burst. The world has come to know the truth. History does not judge you by trappings of lies but the legacy one leaves behind. Therefore, one must not draw wrong lessons from Operation Sindoor
Wars enter invisible mode
Wars are now getting into ‘invisible’ mode. Technology has affected three major areas, namely, lethality; accuracy and distance. Weapon systems have achieved 100 per cent Kill – probability of an intended target with devastating effect at ranges beyond the visual range. What’s more it also enables weapon systems to engage multiple targets concurrently at much larger distances. Radars/Satellites/ Missiles: MIRV/Drone Swarms; DEW (Direct Energy Weapons, such as Laser Guns and EMP Systems) as well as biological and chemical agents have totally revolutionised war-making. Add to it, real time and instant communication systems, which make target detection and acquisition and engagement a computerised precision. Anything, moving or stationary, single or concentrated, visible to the naked or electronic eye would meet its waterloo. Biological agents like Corona would not give a chance even to realise what is hitting them.
Finally, I conclude my arguments by quoting Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler from their book, ‘War and Anti War’, first published in 1993, which cautioned the world of the emerging form of “Bloody and Brain force Wars”. To quote them, “If war was ever too serious a business to be left alone to Generals, then, today, it is all the more serious to leave it to the uninformed, uninitiated and unaware, whether in uniform or otherwise.”
It was 1993, the book had warned the “uninitiated and uninformed, whether in uniform or otherwise,” not to meddle anymore into war-making, which has more and more become the domain of technical minds. War was no more a charge of the light brigade. It is the charge of the missiles, drones, lasers, Electromagnetic pulses, and biological agents, unseen and unheard.
-An ex-NDA and Wellington Staff College graduate, Col Rajinder Singh is a renowned author and security analyst. He has authored four books, two individually and two in collaboration. His best-selling books are Kashmir – A Different Perspective and The ULFA Insurgency. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
