India’s latest defence procurement announcement carries the kind of number that immediately attracts attention: ₹1.10 lakh crore. On September 7, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) to a package of capital acquisition proposals for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Approximately 98 percent of the approved procurement is expected to come from Indian industry.
But the more important question is not whether ₹1.10 lakh crore is a large amount. It plainly is. The harder question is whether this money will translate into usable military capability, technological autonomy and a defence-industrial base capable of delivering at speed.
That distinction matters because an AoN is not a contract, let alone an inducted weapon system. It is an in-principle administrative approval that begins a much longer process involving acquisition procedures, technical evaluation, trials, negotiations, contracting, production and eventual induction. The distance between announcing a procurement package and putting equipment in the hands of soldiers, sailors and air warriors can therefore be substantial.
The ₹1.1 lakh crore package is consequently best understood as a test of India’s procurement system as much as a test of its defence budget.
What Exactly is Being Bought?
The nature of the package is revealing. It is not dominated by a single headline platform such as a fighter aircraft, aircraft carrier or ballistic missile. Instead, it is a broad collection of capabilities intended to strengthen mobility, surveillance, battlefield engineering, electronic warfare, aviation and maritime self-reliance.
Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) is not a contract. It is an in-principle administrative approval that begins a much longer process involving acquisition procedures, technical evaluation, trials, negotiations, contracting, production and eventual induction
For the Indian Army, the approvals include Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance vehicles, High Mobility Vehicles, self-propelled mechanical mine layers, Advanced Light Helicopters (ALHs), trawl tanks and the Sarvatra Bridge System. Press Information Bureau
These are not necessarily glamorous acquisitions, but they address important functions.
CBRN reconnaissance vehicles are designed to detect, identify, monitor and mark contaminated areas. High Mobility Vehicles improve logistics and mobility, particularly in difficult terrain. Mechanical mine layers provide faster minelaying capability, while trawl tanks and bridge systems enable formations to cross difficult terrain and obstacles. ALHs, meanwhile, provide the Army and Air Force with a versatile rotary-wing platform for missions across different terrains and operational conditions.
The significance is that modern military effectiveness is built not merely around offensive weapons but around the support architecture that allows fighting formations to move, survive and sustain operations.
For the Indian Navy, the package includes Arudhra radars and the design, development and subsequent procurement of Marine Gas Turbines. Arudhra is intended to replace existing air-route surveillance radars at naval air stations, while the Marine Gas Turbine programme explicitly aims at reducing dependence on foreign vendors.
The latter may ultimately be one of the more strategically consequential components of the package. Engines and propulsion systems are among the areas where technological dependence can constrain strategic autonomy. Developing domestic capability in marine propulsion therefore potentially delivers something more valuable than another procurement contract: engineering knowledge and control over a critical subsystem.
The package’s nature is revealing. It is not dominated by fighter aircraft, aircraft carriers, or ballistic missiles; instead, it is a broad collection of capabilities intended to strengthen mobility, surveillance, battlefield engineering, electronic warfare, aviation and maritime self-reliance
For the Indian Air Force, the package includes proposals intended to improve the war-fighting capability of fighters, transport aircraft and helicopters, along with Ground-Based Multi-Purpose Jammers and the Defence Forces Secure Access Card system. The jammer is designed to disrupt adversary radars, while DEFSAC replaces paper-based identity and access systems with interoperable RFID-enabled smart cards.
Together, these acquisitions point towards a military that needs not only platforms but mobility, electronic warfare, surveillance, secure access and battlefield support.
The 98 Percent Question
The most politically and industrially significant figure is probably not ₹1.10 lakh crore but 98
percent. The government’s stated objective is that approximately 98 per cent of these acquisitions will come from Indian industry. That is a substantial signal of intent and could provide a large, predictable market for Indian defence companies, public-sector enterprises, private manufacturers and their supply chains.
Yet this is also where the first major caveat arises. Indian procurement is not necessarily synonymous with Indian technology.
A weapon system can be manufactured or assembled in India while still depending on foreign engines, sensors, seekers, electronics, specialised materials or software. An Indian company can therefore be the contractual supplier without India necessarily possessing complete technological control over the product.
That distinction is critical. If 98 percent of the expenditure is routed through Indian companies but critical components remain imported, India may achieve localisation without complete indigenisation.
Recent analysis of the procurement push has similarly pointed to indigenous technology, intellectual property, vendor capacity and delivery schedules as the harder tests of self-reliance.
The government’s stated objective is that 98% of the acquisitions will come from Indian industry. If 98% of the expenditure is routed through Indian companies but critical components remain imported, India may achieve localisation without complete indigenisation
The real measure of Aatmanirbharta should therefore be more granular: Who designed the system? Who owns the intellectual property? Who controls the source code? Can Indian companies repair, modify, and upgrade it independently? And can the domestic supply chain continue producing critical components during a prolonged conflict or international disruption?
Those questions are more difficult than counting the percentage of contracts awarded domestically. The package’s greatest strength may also be its limitation. The diversity of the package is a strength because it addresses several operational gaps simultaneously. But it also creates an enormous execution challenge.
Six different categories of Army equipment alone involve different manufacturing ecosystems. Add naval radars and gas turbines, Air Force electronic warfare systems and aviation requirements, and the procurement pipeline becomes institutionally complex.
Each acquisition involves service headquarters, acquisition authorities, testing agencies, manufacturers, component suppliers and, in some cases, research and development organisations.
The danger is familiar: money can move faster than procurement systems.
An AoN today does not guarantee an operational capability tomorrow. Requirements can change. Trials can fail. Technical specifications can be revised. Vendors can struggle with capacity. Contract negotiations can take time. Production lines can face shortages.
In defence, delay has a particular cost because technology itself is moving rapidly. A system that takes many years to enter service can arrive in a threat environment considerably different from the one for which it was originally designed.
An AoN today does not guarantee an operational capability tomorrow. Requirements can change. Trials can fail. Technical specifications can be revised. Vendors can struggle with capacity. Contract negotiations can take time. Production lines can face shortages
The central challenge, therefore, is not merely spending more but spending faster without compromising quality and spending smarter without allowing procedural delays to destroy operational relevance.
Can Indian Industry Absorb the Scale?
There is another uncomfortable question: does the Indian defence-industrial ecosystem have sufficient capacity to absorb such a large procurement pipeline?
India’s defence production has been expanding, with the industry becoming more capable and exports growing. But the ecosystem remains uneven. Large public-sector companies and established private firms have greater production capacity, while many smaller suppliers remain dependent on limited orders, testing infrastructure and long acquisition cycles.
A sudden expansion of domestic procurement can therefore produce two very different outcomes. The optimistic outcome is the creation of a deeper industrial ecosystem: more investment, stronger MSMEs, greater economies of scale, better testing infrastructure, more R&D and the development of globally competitive Indian defence companies.
In defence, delay has a particular cost because technology itself is moving rapidly. A system that takes many years to enter service can arrive in a threat environment considerably different from the one for which it was originally designed
The less desirable outcome would be concentration of large orders among a relatively small number of prime contractors, with critical components continuing to originate abroad. The government therefore has to ensure that the ₹1.1 lakh crore pipeline does not simply create Indian primes, but Indian supply chains.
The Technology Gap Remains the Real Battlefield
The most important limitation of the package is that it cannot by itself solve India’s deeper technological gaps. The country’s defence ambitions increasingly involve advanced aircraft, propulsion, sensors, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and space capabilities. These require long-term R&D rather than one-time procurement.
This is why the Marine Gas Turbine programme deserves attention. The Ministry of Defence explicitly links its design and development to reducing foreign dependence. If such programmes succeed, the payoff extends beyond the immediate purchase. India gains engineering competence that can feed into future platforms.
That is the difference between buying capability and building capability. The former fills an immediate gap. The latter changes what the country is capable of producing ten or twenty years later.
India’s defence ambitions increasingly involve advanced aircraft, propulsion, sensors, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and space capabilities. These require long-term R&D rather than one-time procurement
From Spending to Strategic Power
The ₹1.10 lakh crore package should therefore neither be dismissed as another large defence purchase nor celebrated simply because 98 percent is earmarked for Indian industry. Its real significance lies in what it could become.
The package addresses practical operational needs: mobility, CBRN reconnaissance, engineering, helicopters, radars, propulsion and electronic warfare. It simultaneously creates a sizeable domestic market. But its success depends on whether procurement is converted into timely induction and whether domestic sourcing develops into genuine technological capability.
India’s defence challenge is no longer simply a shortage of money. It is the harder problem of conversion: converting money into contracts, contracts into equipment, equipment into operational capability, and procurement into technology. That is why the ₹1.1 lakh crore question is ultimately not about the size of India’s defence cheque.
The real test begins after the announcement. India does not need merely a bigger defence-industrial market. It needs a defence ecosystem capable of designing, producing, sustaining and upgrading military technology when the strategic environment demands it
It is about the quality of the capability that cheque produces. If the package results in faster delivery, stronger domestic supply chains, indigenous propulsion and sensor technologies, deeper private-sector participation and greater ownership of intellectual property, it could represent a meaningful step from defence procurement towards defence power.
But if the headline figure produces long procurement cycles, imported critical components and domestic assembly without technological ownership, India will have spent more without necessarily becoming proportionately more self-reliant.
The real test, then, begins after the announcement. India does not need merely a bigger defence-industrial market. It needs a defence ecosystem capable of designing, producing, sustaining and upgrading military technology when the strategic environment demands it. That is the standard against which the ₹1.1 lakh crore package should ultimately be judged.
–The writer is Assistant Professor, ICFAI School of Liberal Arts, ICFAI University, Jaipur. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
