Introduction : Pakistan, a country intricately tied to the Indus River for survival, faces a growing internal crisis threatening its unity with the escalating water dispute between Punjab and Sindh provinces. While India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in April 2025 has drawn global attention, the inter-provincial water conflict, often dubbed the Punjab-Sindh Water War, poses a more immediate and dangerous threat. This crisis, rooted in resource scarcity and historical grievances, risks fracturing Pakistan’s social and political fabric, making it a hidden catastrophe with far-reaching implications.
The Indus River system, fed by Himalayan glaciers, irrigates over 16 million hectares of farmland, supporting 80% of Pakistan’s agricultural output, which employs 40% of the workforce and contributes 24% to GDP. However, climate change, population growth, and mismanagement have pushed Pakistan’s water resources to the brink. The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) reports that 80% of Pakistanis face ‘severe water scarcity’ for at least one month annually, with the country ranking 14th among 17 nations at ‘extremely high water risk’. The Indus Basin, providing 78% of Pakistan’s water inflows, faces a projected decline in flows over the next 50-75 years due to glacial retreat, exacerbating tensions over water allocation.
The Indus River system, fed by Himalayan glaciers, irrigates over 16 million hectares of farmland in Pakistan and supports 80% of the country’s agricultural output, which employs 40% of the workforce and contributes 24% to GDP. However, climate change, population growth, and mismanagement have pushed Pakistan’s water resources to the brink.
The Roots of the Punjab-Sindh Dispute
The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord lies at the heart of the conflict, allocating 48% of the Indus River’s 144.8 billion cubic feet (BCF) to Punjab, 42% to Sindh, 7% to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 3% to Balochistan. While the accord addresses excess water distribution, it lacks mechanisms for shortages, fuelling disputes. Sindh, the lower riparian province, accuses Punjab, the upper riparian, of over-extracting water through barrages like Guddu and Sukkur, particularly during low-flow periods. Balochistan, too, has raised concerns about Sindh withholding its share, creating a complex inter-provincial standoff.
In February 2025, Punjab’s government, backed by army chief General AsimMunir, launched the Green Pakistan Initiative (GPI), including plans for canals to irrigate the arid Cholistan region. Sindh has fiercely opposed this project, arguing it will divert critical Indus water, further reducing downstream flows. Posts on X highlight Sindh’s dire situation, with a reported 62% water shortage and parts of the Indus drying up. Environmentalists warn that reduced flows at the Kotri Barrage have caused seawater intrusion in the Indus Delta, degrading fertile lands and displacing communities.
The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord lies at the heart of the conflict. It allocates 48% of the Indus water to Punjab, 42% to Sindh, 7% to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 3% to Balochistan. Sindh, the lower riparian province, accuses Punjab, the upper riparian, of over-extracting water through barrages. Balochistan has also raised concerns about Sindh withholding its share.
Data and Disparities
The data reveals stark contrasts between the provinces. Punjab, with an average rainfall of 360 mm (1901–2021), receives 25% more precipitation than the national average, while Sindh’s 168 mm is 42% below it. Punjab’s dominance in water-intensive crops like sugarcane, occupying over 825,000 hectares compared to Sindh’s 275,000 hectares, exacerbates water stress. Sindh’s arable land faces waterlogging and salinity, with farmers reporting 20-25% harvest losses due to water shortages.
The dispute transcends technical disagreements, tapping into historical grievances. Sindh’s sense of marginalisation dates back to the One Unit scheme of the 1950s, which centralised power and sidelined regional voices. Major dams like Tarbela and Mangla, primarily benefiting Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, have deepened this distrust. The Cholistan Canal project, supported by the military, is perceived as another instance of Punjab’s dominance, fuelling resentment. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), initially supportive of the GPI, faced backlash in Sindh, highlighting the political volatility of water issues.
Why This Is More Dangerous Than IWT Abeyance
The Punjab-Sindh water war is more perilous than India’s IWT suspension because it directly undermines Pakistan’s national unity. India’s ability to disrupt Pakistan’s water supply is limited by infrastructure constraints — its dams are designed for hydropower, not large-scale diversion — and geopolitical risks, including potential flooding in its own territories and international backlash. Conversely, the internal conflict pits province against province, fuelling ethnic tensions and risking violent unrest in a nation already strained by insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The military’s involvement further complicates the situation, intertwining water politics with Pakistan’s fragile civil-military balance.
The economic stakes are immense. Reduced water flows in Sindh have slashed harvests by 20-25% in areas like Kotri, threatening food security. Groundwater depletion, with water tables in border regions like Rahim Yar Khan dropping from 20 to 80 feet in two decades, compounds the crisis. Punjab’s irrigation projects, while economically promising, risk deepening inequality, as Sindh grapples with salinised lands and displaced farmers. Environmentally, the degradation of the Indus Delta threatens biodiversity and livelihoods, with long-term consequences for Pakistan’s coastal communities.
Without equitable water distribution, Pakistan faces intensified food insecurity, mass displacement, and potential unrest. Pakistan’s government, provinces, and civil society must act swiftly to ensure the Indus River remains a lifeline for all Pakistanis, not a source of division. Failure to do so could turn this crisis into a national catastrophe.
Pathways to Resolution
Resolving this crisis requires a multi-faceted approach:
- Revise the 1991 Water Accord: The accord must be updated to include clear mechanisms for managing shortages, such as proportional reductions during low-flow periods. Independent audits of water flows at key barrages, supported by real-time monitoring technology, can ensure transparency and compliance.
- Promote Water-Efficient Technologies: Pakistan must invest in drip irrigation and laser levelling, which can reduce water use by up to 40% compared to traditional flood irrigation. Pilot programmes in Punjab have shown success, and scaling these to Sindh could alleviate pressure on the Indus.
- Shift Agricultural Practices: Reducing cultivation of water-intensive crops like sugarcane, which consumes 1,500-2,000 mm of water per season, is critical. Incentives for drought-resistant crops like millet or sorghum, coupled with subsidies for smallholder farmers, can ease water demand and support Sindh’s vulnerable agricultural sector.
- Strengthen Institutional Governance: The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) must be empowered as a neutral arbiter, with representatives from all provinces and independent experts. Regular, transparent dialogues can rebuild trust, addressing Sindh’s grievances and ensuring Balochistan’s concerns are heard.
- Implement the National Water Policy: The 2018 National Water Policy, which emphasises climate adaptation, water quality, and gender inclusion, needs robust enforcement. Investments in wastewater recycling and desalination plants in Sindh could reduce reliance on the Indus, while community-led water management can empower marginalised groups.
- Engage Communities and Mitigate Climate Impacts: Grassroots initiatives, such as water user associations, can foster cooperation between provinces. Climate adaptation measures, like restoring wetlands in the Indus Delta, can mitigate seawater intrusion and protect ecosystems, ensuring long-term sustainability.
Conclusion
The Punjab-Sindh water war is not just a regional dispute; it is a defining challenge that tests Pakistan’s resilience as a nation. While India’s IWT suspension poses an external threat, the internal conflict is far more dangerous, as it risks fracturing the country along ethnic and provincial lines, undermining social cohesion and economic stability. The stakes are immense: without equitable water distribution, Pakistan faces intensified food insecurity, mass displacement, and potential unrest. By revising the Water Accord, embracing sustainable technologies, and fostering inclusive governance, Pakistan can transform this crisis into an opportunity for unity and resilience. The government, provinces, and civil society must act swiftly to ensure the Indus remains a lifeline for all Pakistanis, not a source of division. Failure to do so could turn this hidden crisis into a national catastrophe, with consequences that echo far beyond Pakistan’s borders.
The writer is Special Advisor for South Asia at Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea. He is a regular commentator on the issues of Water Security and Transboundary River issues in South Asia. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
