“ ……………… I, Shriman Inder Mahendra Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj, Shri Hari Singh Ji, Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State, do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession, and……. I, hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India………”
Instrument of Accession to India, Signed by the Maharaja Hari Singh on 26 October 1947.
The above instrument of accession, signed by Maharaja Hari Singh of the erstwhile Kashmir state, amply testifies that legally, the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir, as it had existed on or before October 26, 1947; had become an integral part of India. It was in accordance with the provisions of Indian Independence Act of June 1947, as passed by the British Parliament.
The said act had given full powers to Princely states to merge with either of the two dominions, India and Pakistan or stay independent. There were some 562 Princely states, outside the direct rule of British Crown. Therefore, Pakistan had no legal claims on its territories. Despite this legality, Pakistan continues to be in illegal occupation of its territories, known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), since October 26, 1947.
Deliberately or otherwise, India has not made any deliberate and sincere efforts to regain this lost territory from Pakistan. Its feeble attempts to involve the UNO for settlement of dispute, based on a wrong advice given by Lord Mountbatten, itself speaks of India’s insincerity in regaining this lost land.
It is to be noted that in the first place, if India had fully accepted the accession of Kashmir, it had no business to seek settlement of the dispute by UNO, under a wrong Charter. At best, it could have asked the UNO to evict the aggressor. Secondly, if it was doubtful about full accession of the state, then it had no legal right to go to UNO.
Deliberately or otherwise, India has not made any deliberate and sincere efforts to regain this lost territory from Pakistan. Its feeble attempts to involve the UNO for settlement of dispute, based on a wrong advice given by Lord Mountbatten, itself speaks of India’s insincerity in regaining this lost land
This responsibility devolved upon then Maharaja of Kashmir. But there are no doubts about the full legal accession of the state to India and as such Pakistan is certainly in illegal occupation of Kashmir’s territories. It was the legal, moral, and national duty of any Government of India since October 1947, to take back from Pakistan this lost territory of the state of Kashmir.
Off and on, over the last 78 years, rants have been heard in India of re-taking PoK. Sometimes one wonders whether it was only a “strategic Tomfoolery” and lacked sincerity. Some say, according to a secret clause of the Shimla Agreement of July 1972, that it was agreed between Z A Bhutto and Indira Gandhi that the LoC (Line of Control) would be recognised as IB (International Border).
In fact, it is the most popularly advocated solution of the Kashmir dispute by Indian peaceniks, who splurge on Indian taxpayers’ money pursuing “Track Two” diplomacy. This is why, they say that India had allowed Z A Bhutto to place Gilgit-Baltistan, directly under Federal Government of Pakistan, who named it as FCNA (Federally controlled Northern Areas) in 1974. India had not protested. This was one big blunder of the Indian political leadership, aided and abetted by military generals.
Therefore, Indian cries of retaking PoK, as history suggests, seems half-hearted. To understand the issue better, it is desirable to note some historic slip-ups on the part of the Indian Government, to exploit available options. In the past, India had got many opportunities but they were abandoned due to lack of political will and strategic vision. Of course, military Generals, too, share the blame because they could not impress upon the political leadership to finish the job. Operation Sindoor has come and gone and not even an effort was made.
There are rumours that cash strapped Pakistan might lease out or has already leased out Gilgit Baltistan (G-B) to China. There are reports of Chinese troops in Skardu and surrounding areas since 2010. It is a known fact that Pakistan has most of its assets like railway tracks, international airports, and expressways etc., already mortgaged to China under CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) deal. It won’t be a big surprise if Pakistan repeats another Shaksgam Valley, when it had ceded some 5180 sq. kms territory to China in 1963.
Off and on, over the last 78 years, rants have been heard in India of re-taking PoK. Sometimes one wonders whether it was only a “strategic Tomfoolery” and lacked sincerity. Some say, according to a secret clause of the Shimla Agreement of July 1972, that it was agreed between Z A Bhutto and Indira Gandhi that the LoC (Line of Control) would be recognised as IB (International Border)
China has been eyeing on this region for long, because of Fresh water port of Gwadar and mineral wealth of Balochistan. It had reached CPEC agreement of 62 billion USD with Pakistan in 2015. It is said that it has already spent around 30 billion USD on this project, which lay in a limbo now due to ongoing Balochistan insurgency. It is a different matter that even USA is also interested in the region. No wonder, that Pakistan Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Saeed Munir had got special lunch invitation US President in June 2025.
The importance of Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) to India cannot be underestimated. It is a tragedy that India had never realised its strategic importance since 1947. It had many a lost opportunities to grab it. It is only after Galwan face in June 15, 2020, with China, that G-B has come on our strategic radar.
China, with the lollipop of CPEC project, worth $62 billion or more, has not only grabbed Gwadar port on the Persian Gulf but also G-B of PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir). In any ongoing or future military conflict, China would use PoK (Pakistan territory) for its offensive designs against India at will. In this scheme of things, G-B and Skardu City would play a vital role. It may be, therefore, noted that, besides Pakistan Army and China would never allow Pakistan to settle the Kashmir issue.
G-B region is very important to China because of the 3000 km long Karakoram Highway, which is going to be China’s economic lifeline for trade with the rest of the world. It is a new “Silk Route” of China. Gilgit-Baltistan adjoins Xinjiang region of China and is very significant for China’s battle for global supremacy. At no cost, China would allow Indian dream of re- possessing Gilgit Baltistan. This pronounced intention of India worries China and is expressed in its recent aggression, from May 2020 onwards, on the LAC against India.
G-B is a strategic location, from military point of view, as it outflanks any move against Ladakh from the West. It is separated from China’s occupied Aksai Chin by a small swathe of territory of India’s Siachen Glacier and land mass of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). China has been reportedly deploying some 10,000-15,000 troops in Gilgit-Baltistan since 2011. It can bring-up more troops from the Xinjiang region by using Karakoram Highway. What is more, the Skardu airfield would be a cornerstone of an air war against India.
Indian cries of retaking PoK, as history suggests, seems half-hearted. To understand the issue better, it is desirable to note some historic slip-ups on the part of the Indian Government, to exploit available options. In the past, India had got many opportunities but they were abandoned due to lack of political will and strategic vision
Reports indicate that China has also stationed some 40 J-10 aircrafts at Skardu, which could play an important role in an aerial war with India in Eastern Ladakh. Skardu is just 100 kms from Leh town. Besides, a Chinese IL-78 has also been detected in Skardu. IL-78 is an air refueller for fighter aircrafts. There should be no doubts that Skardu would be used not only as a launching pad for land operations but also as an air base by China in any future conflict.
Skardu airbase could offset the Chinese disadvantage of longer distances of its airbases in Tibet and Kashgar of Xinjiang. Skardu airbase was upgraded in 2019 by Pakistan and it was used by Pakistani JF 17s on their way to the PLAAF base at Hotan for a joint exercise.
China has only two airbases i.e. Ngari (Gar) and Hotan in Xinjiang both, being over 300 kms away from the scene of action. Kashgar is some 625 kms from Galwan. All these airbases have a runway of less than 4000 meters which could affect their payload capacity.
Hotan airfield can maintain many combat assets. However, due to its location at an altitude of higher than 4,000 feet, it is extremely tough for “fighters to take off with a full weapons load and fuel.” Herein lies the necessity and importance of Skardu airfield.
Besides, the use of airfield of Skardu, China needs water resources of Gilgit-Baltistan for its microchip industry, used in enhancing 5G capacity. Earlier, China imported this from Taiwan but it has been now stopped. Therefore, it wants to start manufacturing of microchips in Xinjiang, which adjoins Gilgit-Baltistan. And microchip production needs water extensively.
In view of the needs of its microchip industry, China has also agreed to finance and build Diamer-Bhasha Dam. It is located on the Indus River in northern Pakistan between Kohistan district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Diamer district in Gilgit Baltistan. The dam will have a gross storage capacity of 8.1-million-acre feet (MAF) and power generation capacity of 4,500 MW; it will be constructed at a cost of over 1,400 billion Pakistani rupees.
Unfortunately, right from the day of J&K accession to India in October 1947, India’s politico – military leadership has not understand the importance of Gilgit Baltistan. Though British conspiracy allowed Gilgit to be taken over by Pakistan on October 31, 1947 through a rebellion by Gilgit Scouts under British officer Major WA Brown, but Skardu Garrison of 6th Battalion of J&K State forces resisted for 10 months till August 14, 1948.
The siege of Skardu Garrison was led by Chitral and Gilgit Scouts after December 1947. Major Sher Jung Thapa, at Leh, was promoted as Lt Col and sent to Skardu on December 3, 1947. It meant that the route was open and the garrison should have been reinforced in December of 1947. But it did not happen.
Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa kept requesting for reinforcements but they never came. Three feeble attempts were made between March to April 1948. But they were not forcibly done and the garrison was left on its own. Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa kept holding Skardu Garrison till August 14, 1948, when lack of ammunition and rations forced him to surrender.
There are rumours that cash strapped Pakistan might lease out or has already leased out Gilgit Baltistan (G-B) to China. There are reports of Chinese troops in Skardu and surrounding areas since 2010. It is a known fact that Pakistan has most of its assets like railway tracks, international airports, and expressways etc., already mortgaged to China under CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) deal
Question also arises as to why strong efforts were not made to reinforce and save the garrison. Historians say that Nehru had followed the advice of his friend and guide on Kashmir, Sheikh Abdulla. He had told that his influence was only confined to the Kashmir Valley and as such no major efforts were made to strengthen Skardu or capture Gilgit-Baltistan. If it was done, the history of Gilgit-Baltistan and PoK would have been different.
Shaksgam Valley would not have gone to China and we would have been knocking on the doors of Xinjiang region, which was occupied by China in 1949. What is more, China’s construction of G219 Highway (Tibet Highway) to Lhasa would have been under our observation and we would have interfered. Today, Gilgit is the biggest launch pad for Pakistan to initiate offensive in Ladakh.
Again, another opportunity came-up during the Indo-Pak war of 1971. India had captured Turtuk in 1971. Why did it not pursue the offensive further into Gilgit-Baltistan to capture Skardu? It could have been easily done with much lesser efforts. India missed the golden opportunity due to lack of strategic vision of its leaders. In fact, Pakistani author Tariq Ali, in his book “The Duel” quotes Indra Gandhi as to how she had scuttled Field Marsha SHFJ Manekshaw’s proposal to capture PoK, after the fall of Dacca. By now, India’s Nehruvian love affair with China was long over, after the 1962 war. Capture of Gilgit would have given it an advantageous position against China’s military adventure.
Then, in 1986, Operation Trident had provided a golden opportunity to annex Skardu. But the operation fizzled out on January 1, 1987, when Pakistan’s ambassador to India, met and cried to Rajeev Gandhi, then Indian prime minister. Rajiv Gandhi ordered Arun Singh, then minister of state for defence, to stop it. It is noteworthy that Arun Singh and Gen Sunderji had planned this operation along with Lt Gen Hoon. It would have succeeded because Pakistan was ill-prepared. It was in retaliation of this that Pakistan intruded into Kargil in 1999. Skardu is just West of Gultari, which was the hub of Pakistan’s Kargil misadventure.
Unfortunately, a youthful prime minister and his uncouth bureaucratic advisors did not understand the significance of Gilgit-Baltistan. Our political leadership has been the biggest failing since 1947. Only Indra Gandhi stands out with some strategic vision. Even Atal Bihari Vajpayee lacked this vision. He was more poetic in his approach with neighbours than being practical.
During the Prime Ministership of Manmohan Singh, a strange thing happened. An ex-foreign secretary of India, Shyam Saran revealed in his book that in 2006, Indian Government, under Manmohan Singh, had almost agreed for a deal with Pakistan on withdrawal of troops from Siachen. However, then NSA, M K Narayan had vetoed it. As per then COAS, General JJ Singh, even Army had questioned this deal.
Unfortunately, a youthful prime minister and his uncouth bureaucratic advisors did not understand the significance of Gilgit-Baltistan. Our political leadership has been the biggest failing since 1947. Only Indra Gandhi stands out with some strategic vision. Even Atal Bihari Vajpayee lacked this vision. He was more poetic in his approach with neighbours than being practical
What a blunder it would have been, had India withdrawn? In one stroke, Pakistan would have occupied it and linked up with China in the Shaksgam Valley. When would our politicians understand that China and Pakistan honour NO pacts and agreements? Does one have to list those pacts and treaties here? It is lack of strategic vision of our political leadership and failure of the generals to educate them to grasp the strategic advantage of Siachen-DBO area and Gilgit-Baltistan. Siachen was being vacated dud to financial effect.
In the interest of national security, financial cost is irrelevant. Such costs are the national premium of security insurance. Present regime should also understand this. Cutting defence budget is harmful for the nation. One would like to quote what General Douglas MC Arthur, chief of the US Army in 1931 had told President Franklin Roosevelt, who had declined to reconsider cut in the defence budget. General McArthur while leaving President’s office, turned back and said, “Mr President! When in the next war, an American soldier with enemy bayonet in his abdomen, cries his last wail, I do not want the name to be Mc Arthur but Roosevelt.”
It is no gain saying the fact that President Roosevelt accepted his advice and rejected the cuts. I hope Indian generals understand this and muster the courage to tell the ruling political establishment that the blood of Indian soldiers in any future war would be on their hands.
It is a fallacy that economic growth leads to military strength and peace. The economic growth and the process of peace flows out of the barrel of a gun and not through treaties and agreements. Crisis makes a nation strong and united; peace heralds many an evil. To make the “Gun” stronger, a rapid economic growth is the crying need. Rhetoric alone and appeasement of enemies would not achieve whatever is the national objective. India must talk less and do more
It is yet to be decided as to whose hands were reddened with the blood of the 20 soldiers on the Galvan valley scuffle of June 15-16, 2020? Was it those who reduce the defence budget or those who signed appeasing agreements in 1993, 1996 and 2013? Indian defence budget ought to be protected from the continuing evil effect of Arun Jaitley thinking. Time for Generals/Air Marshals/Admirals to stand up to bureaucracy and politicians and be counted, lest the blood of the soldiers smears their hands.
It is a fallacy that economic growth leads to military strength and peace. The economic growth and the process of peace flows out of the barrel of a gun and not through treaties and agreements. Crisis makes a nation strong and united; peace heralds many an evil. To make the “Gun” stronger, a rapid economic growth is the crying need. Rhetoric alone and appeasement of enemies would not achieve whatever is the national objective. India must talk less and do more.
-An ex-NDA and Wellington Staff College graduate, Col Rajinder Singh is a renowned author and security analyst. He has authored four books, two individually and two in collaboration. His best-selling books are Kashmir – A Different Perspective and The ULFA Insurgency. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
