The Canadian Armed Forces face many challenges in equipment renewal. At the same time, the government and the Department of National Defence continue to push an ever-growing list of aspirational programmes in the hope of one day restoring Canada’s military standing.
Recognised by allies, politicians, and domestic commentators alike, Canada’s troops are in a calamitous state. Strangely, little is being done to resolve the problem. The Canadian Armed Forces continue to play the role of poor relation in the NATO family. Among the major equipment that must be renewed, artillery is considered to be the number one priority.
This comes after analysis and lessons from the Ukraine conflict, where artillery is the dominant force on the battlefield — both in defensive and offensive scenarios. In this context, it has been acknowledged that traditional, slow-towed M777 howitzers are no longer suitable.
Much talk has been made of upgrading Canadian artillery capabilities, and yet, the Defence Planning Update (DPU) of May 2024 casts doubt on this — as David Pugliese pointed out in Esprit de Corps back in June:
There are references to proposed equipment projects but the details and timelines are still lacking. The DPU outlines a variety of spending initiatives that will roll out over the next 20 years. But as noted in last month’s Esprit de Corps, whether these projects actually materialize is another question.
Pugliese observes that all statements up to now have been speculative:
The government has stated it will provide the Army with the ability to accurately strike targets with greater effect from greater distance. ‘We will explore options for modernizing our artillery capabilities.’ Notice the use of the word ‘explore.’
Concerns have been expressed within the armed forces because neither the Indirect Fires Modernisation programme for artillery equipment by 2030, nor the Urgent Operational Requirement plans for the immediate acquisition of artillery equipment for the Canada-led NATO brigade in Latvia have been financed
The Problem of Indirect Fires
The issue is that neither the Indirect Fires Modernisation (IFM) programme, the major replacement for artillery equipment by 2030, nor the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR), the immediate acquisition of artillery equipment for the Canada-led NATO brigade in Latvia — have been financed to date.
This is a concern raised by voices within the armed forces. Brigadier-General S Hunter, noted last May the priority given to self-propelled (SP) howitzers, at the same time acknowledging the lack of budget allocation:
The Indirect Fire Modernisation (IFM) project continues at pace as one of CCA’s Top 3 procurement priorities, and the VCDS has supported the SP Howitzer UOR in principle (understanding funding will need to be identified).
In the same publication, Colonel KLA Bouckaert goes to great lengths to underscore the importance of these as-of-yet unfunded capabilities:
One of the most striking take-aways is the need for advanced artillery capabilities […] In the event of the invocation of an Article 5 response, Canadian soldiers and supporting allies would be at significant risk of adversary rocket and artillery strikes without any ability to return fire and defeat threats.
For self-propelled howitzers, the military decision-makers have several options. The classic armoured tracked solutions such as the K9 and the PZH 2000, or truck-mounted gun solutions are best suited to scout-and-shoot scenarios, examples are the AGM from KNDS or the combat-proven CAESAR from Nexter
She notes that this deficiency reduces the deterrent effect and credibility of NATO’s multinational brigade in Latvia, before going on to detail key requirements of any future Canadian artillery systems. Her comments underscore the sizeable capability shortfall:
[Artillery must be] suited to a battlespace characterized by greatly increased areas of operation, massed fires supported by UAS [Uncrewed Aerial Systems], hugely responsive counter-fire capabilities and digitized fires. The current threat is demanding that the RCA be incredibly mobile to increase its strategic projectability and survivability.
Despite these concerns, there are indications that the artillery programme associated with the UOR may have been entirely scrapped. If true, this decision likely stems from practical considerations, as procurement could become infeasible by 2026, when the Latvia battlegroup is expected to reach full operational capacity.
Running Out of Options
Whatever the case, the Canadian Armed Forces find themselves in an unenviable position. There is a lack of guns needed for current operations: donations of M777 howitzers to Ukraine have created a hard-to-fill gap. On top of this, any attempt at producing additional guns within the timeframe would prove challenging, given the minimum order sizes required for direct procurement. Though it would be well-received by the manufacturer, BAE, this path would be anything but an ideal purchase from the Canadian perspective.
So, what alternatives are left — beg, borrow, steal?
In an interview from 2023, the head of the Canadian artillery Lieutenant General Joe Paul stressed that he considered the Eastern European theatre to be “an amazing laboratory where the Army can fine-tune and test.” He was speaking about equipment acquired through the UOR – which Priority 1 artillery is not a part of – but testing would also serve to deepen knowledge of what is available on the market, now and in the near future.
One option could be to take a page out of the private sector’s book and go the way of a test case. More precisely, the Royal Canadian Artillery could procure what is required for the Latvia brigade, but do so as a trial run for future IFM purchases. Given the “current fiscal reality,” this option is likely to appeal to military commanders, for whom cash is in short supply.
Another option would be that allies are willing to loan assets, which could be very valuable as a test “per se”, and for the sake of interoperability, for instance, considering available artillery assets in the Baltic states.
Notably, for the IFM programme, a full-scale test phase has the added benefit of saving time in a delicate selection process, one that is consistently criticised by politicians for its inefficiency. The latest case under scrutiny was the delay in delivery of light utility vehicles — a particularly grievous example, given the relatively low technical complexity of the purchase.
As the Canadian Armed Forces navigate funding restrictions and procurement inefficiencies, a trial run could offer a pragmatic solution that aligns with fiscal realities. Eventually, Canada’s ability to enhance its artillery capabilities will be pivotal for national defence and in reinforcing its credibility within NATO
Going the path of a test phase could offer an opportunity for Canada to turn to its partners and inject insights from Ukraine into this process. Certainly, that would allow an assessment to be made between the current artillery offerings on the market.
In terms of self-propelled howitzers, military decision-makers have several options to choose from. There are the classic armoured, tracked solutions, such as the K9 and the PZH 2000, coming with additional logistical weight and associated costs. Or there are the truck-mounted gun solutions, best suited to scout-and-shoot scenarios: examples being the AGM from KNDS on the KMW side – models still under development – the Czech Zuzana, or the combat-proven CAESAR from Nexter, for which feedback from Ukraine remains positive.
Regardless of the choice made, lessons from current conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, underscore the urgent requirement for modern artillery systems that facilitate greater mobility and precision. As the Canadian Armed Forces navigate funding restrictions and procurement inefficiencies, a trial run could offer a pragmatic solution that aligns with fiscal realities, while ensuring readiness for future operations. Ultimately, Canada’s ability to enhance its artillery capabilities will be pivotal, not only for national defence, but also in reinforcing its credibility within NATO.
–The writer is a defence and security industry consultant with varied experience of working with medium and large companies majorly in European market. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
