Signed on January 27, 2026, the security and defence partnership between the European Union and India was intended to bring greater structure to a relationship that had until then remained largely bilateral and fragmented. It was built around a gradualist logic: expanding strategic dialogues, developing joint exercises, and establishing coordination mechanisms across a wide range of areas, from maritime security to hybrid threats.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis has profoundly altered the scope of that ambition. It no longer allows for a slow, incremental build-up. Instead, it imposes an immediate stress test in an environment defined by fragmented actors, competing initiatives, and strategic uncertainty. In this context, the central question is no longer simply whether the partnership can be implemented internally, but whether it can connect effectively to external operational frameworks — particularly the ad hoc European coalitions now emerging around France and the United Kingdom.
Hormuz: A Reality Check for the EU-India Partnership
The January 2026 EU-India partnership covers a broad spectrum of issues: maritime security, cyber, critical infrastructure, and hybrid threats. It forms part of a broader effort to progressively institutionalise a strategic relationship that had until now been driven primarily by bilateral cooperation, particularly with France.
The Hormuz crisis changes the nature of the equation. It transforms a long-term cooperation framework into a mechanism that could potentially be mobilised in the context of an acute crisis. The Strait represents a systemic point of vulnerability: a significant share of global energy flows passes through it, making it a major strategic lever in the event of conflict.
For India, that vulnerability is immediate and tangible. New Delhi has intensified diplomatic efforts to secure the passage of its vessels, while also taking part in multilateral discussions on freedom of navigation. India’s Ministry of External Affairs has confirmed that it remains in contact with regional actors to help guarantee the security of maritime flows, illustrating a pragmatic and multi-channel approach.
The January 2026 EU-India partnership covers a broad spectrum of issues: maritime security, cyber, critical infrastructure, and hybrid threats. It forms part of a broader effort to progressively institutionalise a strategic relationship that had until now been driven primarily by bilateral cooperation, particularly with France
The situation exposes a central tension. The EU-India partnership was designed to structure cooperation over time. Hormuz, by contrast, demands immediate responses in an environment where other formats — coalitions, national initiatives, and ad hoc arrangements — may end up taking precedence.
The Franco-British Initiative: Europeanisation Through Flexible Coalitions
The initiative launched by France and the United Kingdom on April 17, 2026, represents the main European attempt to respond to the crisis. Its objective is to prepare a multinational mission aimed at guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Strait, within a strictly defensive framework.
The initiative does not fall within the institutional framework of the European Union. Instead, it is built around an ad hoc coalition model, characterised by flexible and voluntary participation, and focused on specific operational functions: securing maritime routes, mine counter measures, escorting commercial vessels, and coordinating with economic actors.
Think tank analyses have highlighted this functional dimension. According to Chatham House, such a coalition would not be capable of “reopening” the Strait by force, but it could help stabilise the situation by reassuring shipping companies and insurers, while maintaining a credible naval presence.
French media outlets, meanwhile, have emphasised the still largely declaratory nature of the initiative. Its implementation would depend on de-escalation and a minimum degree of international consensus — conditions that, for now, do not appear to be in place.
Despite these limitations, the initiative points to a broader shift. It suggests that future European action may increasingly rely on flexible coalitions led by states capable of rapid initiative, rather than on strictly EU-centred mechanisms.
The EU-India partnership was designed to structure cooperation over time. The Strait of Hormuz, by contrast, demands immediate responses in an environment where other formats — coalitions, national initiatives, and ad hoc arrangements — may end up taking precedence
India and Flexible Coalitions: A Strategic Convergence
India’s position towards this initiative is particularly revealing. New Delhi has been invited to take part in discussions and has participated in several international meetings on the security of the Strait, including within formats led by the United Kingdom.
However, this participation remains carefully calibrated. India continues to favour an autonomous approach, combining naval presence, bilateral diplomacy, and limited multilateral engagement.
This posture reflects a pragmatic and sector-based approach to cooperation with partners such as the European Union, centred on clearly identified areas of shared interest (particularly maritime security, defence industrial cooperation, and emerging technologies) rather than on any broader logic of institutional integration.
The Hormuz crisis reinforces this trend. India has shown clear interest in international initiatives, while appearing determined to avoid any commitment that could constrain its room for manoeuvre or expose it to escalation dynamics.
In this context, ad hoc coalitions offer a particularly attractive framework. Their flexibility allows for targeted participation without requiring a broader political commitment. India could therefore contribute to specific functions, such as maritime domain awareness, crew security, or technical coordination, all while preserving its broader strategy of “multi-alignment”, rooted in strategic autonomy and designed to multiply partnerships without entering into lasting alignments.
The initiative launched by France and the United Kingdom on April 17, 2026, represents the main European attempt to respond to the crisis. Its objective is to prepare a multinational mission aimed at guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, within a strictly defensive framework
Towards a Hybrid Architecture? A Still-Conditional Scenario
The Hormuz crisis is forcing a reconsideration of the EU-India partnership, although any transformation would remain highly conditional.
One possible scenario is that of a decoupling. In such a configuration, ad hoc coalitions, which are more flexible and more reactive, would become the primary instruments of action, while the EU-India partnership would remain confined to a role centred on dialogue and coordination.
A second scenario, arguably more plausible but still uncertain, would involve a form of hybridisation. The EU-India partnership could then function as a strategic framework, facilitating intelligence-sharing, convergence in threat assessments, and diplomatic coordination. Ad hoc coalitions, such as the one envisaged by France and the United Kingdom, would provide the operational layer, mobilised when political conditions allow.
Several limitations, however, would need to be taken into account.
First, the Franco-British coalition itself remains far from operational. Any deployment would depend on a durable ceasefire and a minimum degree of international consensus, both of which remain highly uncertain at this stage.
Second, India’s participation would remain shaped by its own strategic balancing. New Delhi would likely favour limited and carefully defined contributions, avoiding any commitment that could be interpreted as a formal alignment.
The emergence of ad hoc European coalitions suggests that future cooperation may increasingly rely on a hybrid architecture, combining institutional frameworks with flexible operational arrangements. Such an evolution appears broadly compatible with India’s strategic culture, which is rooted in autonomy and flexibility
Under these conditions, any articulation between the EU-India partnership and ad hoc coalitions could only be gradual and partial. It would rely on modular forms of cooperation, tailored to the political constraints and strategic sensitivities of each actor.
The Strait of Hormuz is acting as a revealing moment. It does not immediately transform the EU-India partnership into an operational mechanism, but it does expose the conditions under which such a partnership could become actionable.
The emergence of ad hoc European coalitions suggests that future cooperation may increasingly rely on a hybrid architecture, combining institutional frameworks with flexible operational arrangements. Such an evolution appears broadly compatible with India’s strategic culture, which is rooted in autonomy and flexibility.
At this stage, however, this convergence remains largely hypothetical. It will depend as much on the evolution of the crisis itself as on the willingness of the various actors to embrace a form of cooperation that is fragmented, pragmatic, and politically adaptable.
–The writer is a defence and security industry consultant with varied experience of working with medium and large companies majorly in European market. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
