In October 1947, the Rajindra Sikhs Infantry, now 15 Punjab, returned to India after six years of combat in Burma, Java, Sumatra and the North-West Frontier Province. Having fought in both World Wars, the battalion had earned the reputation Har Maidan Fateh — victory on every battlefield. Its soldiers were looking forward to a well-earned period of rest. Instead, within days, they were called back to war. Their next battlefield was Jammu and Kashmir. Within a year, they would fight their way through one of the world’s most forbidding mountain passes and, in doing so, help secure the defence of Ladakh.
The urgency of the moment was captured in a late-night telephone call received by Maharaja Yadavindra Singh, the ninth and last ruling Maharaja of Patiala, from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru: “I request you to send RSI to save the honour of J&K.”
Pakistan had concentrated around 20 Lashkar battalions, each roughly 1,000 strong, for an incursion into the Kashmir Valley on October 22, 1947. The invading forces comprised Pashtun tribesmen, Razakars and other irregulars. The crisis compelled Maharaja Hari Singh to sign the Instrument of Accession on October 24. V K Krishna Menon received the signed document on October 25, and it was accepted by the Governor General on October 26.
During the mopping-up operation, soldiers of 15 Punjab encountered a manned enemy gun position. Fixing bayonets, they assaulted it, killing most of the crew and capturing five men and a 3.7-inch howitzer, the only prize of its kind captured during the J&K operations
On October 27, 1 Sikh, the nearest available battalion, was flown into the Valley. Three days later, 15 Punjab was committed to operations under Lieutenant Colonel Bikram Dev Singh Gill. Its advance party, led by Major Sukhdev Singh, reported to Maharaja Hari Singh on November 1, carrying a letter from Maharaja Yadavindra Singh. The remainder of the battalion was airlifted to Jammu on November 3. Its subsequent flag marches helped restore confidence among the civilian population.
On November 11, the battalion came under 50 Para Brigade and subsequently 268 Brigade. It captured the Beri Pattan bridge on November 16 and, in December, seized tactically important hills around Akhnur and Chhamb.
From January to March 1948, 15 Punjab moved to Naushera under Z Brigade and subsequently shuttled between Naushera and Akhnur under 50 Brigade. Maj Gen Kulwant Singh, Commander JAK Force, aptly nicknamed it “Mobile Patiala” — a fitting description of a battalion constantly moved to meet operational demands.
On March 18, Brigadier Usman again called upon its services. In the operation to recapture Jhangar, 15 Punjab earned the battle honour Jhangar, along with two Maha Vir Chakras and five Vir Chakras. Its reputation as a dependable assault battalion was now firmly established.
But while the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir continued, the strategic situation in Ladakh was becoming increasingly precarious.
Major Prithi Chand and 40 soldiers of 2 Dogra had taken up the defence of Leh. With Zojila cutting the land route, an airstrip became essential. A trial landing by Air Commodore Mehar Singh and General Thimayya took place on May 24, 1948. In August, one company each of 2/4 Gorkha Rifles and 2/8 Gorkha Rifles was flown into Leh, while mules carrying their logistics trekked from Manali.
With Zojila secured, the road to Dras was open. The soldiers then told their brigade commander that they wanted to celebrate Gurpurab at Dras after capturing it. They kept their word
Colonel Parab, commanding 2/8 Gorkha Rifles, became Commander Leh Brigade, with the two battalions under his command. Together, they established strong defensive positions along the Indus.
The vulnerability of Ladakh was stark. By May 10, Pakistani raiders had occupied Zojila, Kargil, Gurez and Dras. Skardu had fallen earlier in 1948, and Leh was their next objective. The only practical land link between Leh and Srinagar ran through Zojila. The pass therefore became the key to the defence of Ladakh.
On May 11, 15 Punjab was specially airlifted for the capture of the 11,575-foot pass. The battalion was neither acclimatised nor equipped with adequate snow clothing. From June to July, its soldiers fought not only an entrenched enemy but also an environment that was itself a formidable adversary.
Zojila — literally the “Pass of Blizzards” — was a semi-arctic battlefield. Temperatures could fall to minus 50 degrees Celsius, while avalanches, howling winds and blizzards made movement and survival exceptionally difficult. Annual snowfall of 50 feet was considered normal. With winter approaching in October, the military problem was therefore not simply to capture the pass, but to do so before winter rendered it impassable. Failure would have made the defence of Leh increasingly untenable.
The Army Commander consequently decided to employ Stuart tanks of 7 Cavalry in support of 15 Punjab. Moving tanks into such terrain was itself an extraordinary logistical undertaking. They were brought from Akhnur and winched across several bridges. On October 15, 11 tanks reached Baltal after their turrets had been removed.
Meanwhile, two companies of Madras Sappers widened the track from Baltal to Zojila, making the unprecedented armoured assault possible.
The battalion’s reputation endured long after the Kashmir operations. In December 2007, 15 Punjab won the Force Commander’s Citation as the best battalion among the 17 European contingents serving under the UN flag in Lebanon
Surprise was to be as important as firepower. The highly trained Gilgit Scouts of the Pakistan Army occupied dominating heights between 11,000 and 14,500 feet. After extensive planning by Lieutenant Colonel Sukhdev Singh and Brigadier K L Atal, approval was given for a surprise night attack.
On the night of October 31-November 1, during a severe snowstorm and blizzard, with temperatures around minus 20 degrees Celsius, soldiers of 15 Punjab crawled forward for six hours in darkness. They eventually broke through the Zojila defences after fierce close combat.
The infantry assault was followed by 11 Stuart tanks, their crews walking behind them as they advanced. Lieutenant General Thimayya rode one of the tanks to influence the battle at the front. The operation was also supported by two regiments of 25-pounder guns, a regiment of 3.5-inch guns and Tempest aircraft.
The appearance of tanks on terrain the defenders had considered impassable came as a devastating surprise. The assault shattered the enemy’s defensive positions and opened the way towards Dras.
During the mopping-up operation, soldiers of 15 Punjab encountered a manned enemy gun position. Fixing bayonets, they assaulted it, killing most of the crew and capturing five men and a 3.7-inch howitzer — the only prize of its kind captured during the J&K operations.
With Zojila secured, the road to Dras was open. The soldiers then told their brigade commander that they wanted to celebrate Gurpurab at Dras after capturing it. They kept their word.
The significance of 15 Punjab’s achievement extends far beyond regimental history. The battle for Zojila demonstrated that the defence of Leh depended on more than holding the town itself. It required control of the geographical corridor connecting Ladakh with the Kashmir Valley
The 14-month war produced an extraordinary regimental record. 15 Punjab became the only Indian Army battalion to win eight Maha Vir Chakras and 18 Vir Chakras in a single war, with minimum casualties. As the battalion began its return to Patiala after its long campaign, the Army Commander remarked to the national media: “I have never seen such soldiers who go through toughest times so cheerfully.”
The battalion’s reputation endured long after the Kashmir operations. In December 2007, 15 Punjab won the Force Commander’s Citation as the best battalion among the 17 European contingents serving under the UN flag in Lebanon.
The significance of 15 Punjab’s achievement extends far beyond regimental history. The battle for Zojila demonstrated that the defence of Leh depended on more than holding the town itself. It required control of the geographical corridor connecting Ladakh with the Kashmir Valley.
The episode remains a powerful reminder that, in high-altitude warfare, geography can make a single mountain pass the hinge on which the security of an entire region turns. 15 Punjab recognised that strategic reality — and fought through it. ‘Khalsa Ji Ki Fateh’.
The writer is an Indian Army veteran. He commanded 15 Punjab in Lebanon in 2007 and a Brigade/Sector in Manipur as DIG in 2013. He later served as Brigadier Operational Logistics, Western Command, and is currently an analyst on strategic and geopolitical affairs. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda
