The Turning Point: The gruesome terrorist attack at Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, which claimed the lives of 26 innocent civilians, proved to be a watershed moment in India’s policy towards Pakistan. In the past, India relied on kinetic means such as surgical strikes after Uri in September 2016 and the post-Pulwama Balakot Strike in February 2019. But the cowardly Pahalgam massacre shifted this calculus fundamentally, as the previous retaliatory strikes failed to curb Pakistan alias ‘Terroristan’.
Unlike in the past, the character of the Pahalgam attack, targeting innocent tourists, shows that it aimed at projecting Kashmir as a region again on the boil. Secondly, the aim was also to flare up the communal faultlines in India by selectively killing the non-Muslims. It reflects Pakistan’s grand agenda being pushed through its intelligence agency ISI and terror modules, including TRF alias LeT.
Connecting the dots drew a clear picture. Besides the digital evidence – Pakistani ISI Chief visited Bangladesh in February 2025 – Murshidabad follows; Pakistani Army Chief’s Islamist and anti-India rants; Pakistani Army losing credibility and taking a beating from BLA and TTP so need to play India diversionary card; Kashmir moving towards enduring peace and overwhelming tourism. Pakistan’s Defence Minister and Dy PM have confessed to collusively abetting with terrorism. It was a high visibility high-impact attack preplanned and executed during a high-profile visit.
Understanding India’s Response Strategy
Post-Pahalgam, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) laid out a clear three-point implementation agenda:
- Holding the Indus Waters Treaty in Abeyance: India placed the treaty in abeyance, pending concrete and verifiable action by Pakistan against terrorist groups operating from its soil. This affects Pakistan’s access to the waters of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers — critical lifelines for its agriculture and economy.
- Diplomatic and Economic Isolation Measures: India revoked visas for Pakistani nationals, closed the Wagah-Attari border for trade and civilian movement, and expelled diplomats and military attaché tuning down the staff. These moves compound Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation and economic vulnerability.
- Enhanced Military Preparedness: The Indian Armed Forces have been placed on heightened alert, particularly along land, maritime, and international borders, with a focus on quick-response capabilities and punitive strikes. The aim is to stretch the adversary and strike at will in an escalatory matrix retaining the levers, as per the chosen option with effect and consequences dovetailed.
This strategy signals that India’s patience with Pakistan’s duplicity has worn thin and that its costs will now be systematically imposed.
Holding the treaty in abeyance effectively halts all treaty-related responsibilities between India and Pakistan. It signals a new phase in India’s engagement with Pakistan, rooted in punitive retribution below war. India said continuous terror activities orchestrated from across the border compromise India’s rights under the water-sharing arrangement
The Diplomatic Strike
In a decisive move, the Indian government in addition to other punitive diplomatic actions formally announced ‘HOLDING IN ABEYANCE OF THE INDUS WATERS TREATY (IWT)’, effectively halting all treaty-related responsibilities between the two nations. This signals a new phase in India’s engagement with Pakistan — one rooted in punitive retribution below war, cloaked in the preservation of national security, and exploiting strategic leverage.
The notification was delivered by Water Resources Secretary Debashree Mukherjee, who underlined that continuous terror activities orchestrated from across the border compromise India’s rights under the water-sharing arrangement. In a letter to her Pakistani counterpart Syed Ali Murtaza, she wrote: “The obligation to honour a treaty in good faith is fundamental to a treaty. However, what we have seen instead is sustained cross-border terrorism by Pakistan targeting the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.” This means India does not need to comply with the treaty’s terms, including sharing river data or allowing Pakistani inspections of Indian infrastructure in J&K and Ladakh.
Earlier, India sent a formal notice to Pakistan in September 2024 seeking the ‘review and modification’ of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) under Article XII (3), signalling its intent to renegotiate the old agreement. So it’s an ‘escalatory’ response to Pakistan’s proxy war with a clear message: Blood and Water cannot flow together.
The decision is not a knee-jerk reaction; it is a carefully calibrated and executed decision aimed at reshaping India’s response to cross-border terrorism. Post URI 2016, it was revealed that a large amount of India’s share of water was flowing into Pakistan because India could not store it. The silting has considerably reduced the water storage capacity of India’s big dams.
Thus, the Jal Shakti Ministry incorporated this strategy for the last 5-6 years and made a blueprint plan to implement it in phases. India has ceased sharing hydrological data with Pakistan, a crucial resource for the latter’s flood and drought management.
Having been caught off guard and now on the back foot, Pakistan said in a statement issued after a National Security Committee meeting, “Any attempt to divert water against the Indus Water Treaty would be considered an act of war….”
The Treaty in Nutshell
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 under World Bank’s mediation, allocates the Eastern Rivers – Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi – entirely to India, with large storage dams, including Bhakra, Pong, and Ranjit Sagar. India uses nearly 96% of the water from these rivers. However, Pakistan has full control over the Western Rivers – Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab – whereas, India is only allowed to use their runoff for power generation and limited water storage under the treaty, primarily for drinking and irrigation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and Ladakh. Pakistan’s 80% of agriculture depends on these Western Rivers for irrigation, contributing 21% to its GDP.
India does not fully utilise its share of water, with around 2 million acre-feet from the Ravi flowing into Pakistan. After the 2019 Pulwama attacks, India announced plans to divert water from the Eastern Rivers to Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan through inter-basin projects. Current projects (names withheld) in these areas for power and irrigation, and the additional link project aim to prevent excess water flowing into Pakistan.
The treaty was envisioned as a symbol of cooperation and goodwill between India and Pakistan. However, Pakistan has been exploiting it to further its interests while undermining India’s security. The international community must recognise that the treaty is a critical component of India-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s continued support for terrorism and its blatant disregard for human rights and international laws must be factored into any discussion on the treaty.
India has ceased sharing hydrological data with Pakistan, a crucial resource to tackle floods and drought conditions. Having been caught off guard and now on the back foot, Pakistan said in a statement issued after a National Security Committee meeting, “Any attempt to divert water against the Indus Water Treaty would be considered an act of war”
The Effects of Holding the Treaty in Abeyance
As India implements this bold shift, a critical question emerges: What will be the immediate and long-term fallout for Pakistan, and what more must India do to consolidate this strategic pivot?
Short-Term Impact on Pakistan
The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty delivers an immediate psychological blow to Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Islamabad had long considered the IWT inviolable — a rare success story in an otherwise bitter bilateral relationship. The treaty being held in abeyance shatters that confidence. The short-term consequences include:
- Water insecurity: Pakistan’s sowing season, particularly for wheat and cotton, could be disrupted if India recalibrates upstream water management. Being a water-scarce nation with a low groundwater table and an essentially agrarian economy, Pakistan will feel the heat.
- Non-Sharing of Hydro Data: This will blind Pakistan from planning the water flow whether due to floods or famine. It will have the fear of the unknown and also the inability to take timely countermeasures.
- Desilting at Will: The treaty constrained desilting to monsoon season only. The glaciated silt resulted in a drastic reduction in available storage capacity than planned and constructed. Desilting will reduce the water flow to Pakistan and also optimise India’s water storage and hydropower generation capacity which has remained suboptimal.
- Internal Political Pressure: A water crisis will lead to a food, water and energy crisis, and could stoke public anger against Pakistan’s civilian government and military establishment, both already struggling with economic turmoil.
- Defence Impact: The Pakistani military flood strategy and filling up the canals will have increasing challenges, making the Indian offensive more tenable.
While India cannot immediately fully halt river flow without sufficient storage infrastructure, it can still inflict discomfort through managed diversions, project acceleration, and regulatory tightening under the on-hold treaty framework. Further coordination with Afghanistan on constructing hydro projects on the Kabul River, which contributes substantially to the Indus in Pakistan, will be a geopolitical squeeze.
Long-Term Strategic Implications for Pakistan
If the treaty held in abeyance leads to suspension over the coming years, Pakistan will face severe cumulative challenges. However, India must invest resources and time to fast pace its storage reservoirs/ dams and diversionary channels in due course.
- Agricultural Decline: Roughly 90% of Pakistan’s agriculture depends on the Indus river system. Even minor disruptions can drastically impact food security, exacerbate rural poverty, and fuel instability, particularly affecting Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh states, home to the elite, politicians, and military brass.
- Economic Collapse Risk: Water shortage will cripple various industries such as textiles and food processing – mainstays of Pakistan’s exports – worsening its balance-of-payments crisis.
- Geopolitical Vulnerability: With no direct leverage over Indian actions, Pakistan may be forced to seek external mediation. But given its terror links, sympathy is unlikely to be overwhelming.
The move also undermines Pakistan’s long-standing diplomatic strategy of compartmentalising terrorism and dialogue. Water is now firmly linked to peace or the lack thereof.
India cannot fully halt river flow immediately without sufficient storage infrastructure, but can still inflict discomfort through water diversion, project acceleration, and regulatory tightening. The coordination with Afghanistan on constructing hydro projects on the Kabul River, which contributes substantially to the Indus in Pakistan, will be a geopolitical squeeze
What More Must India Do?
While the decision to hold the treaty in abeyance is momentous, it is insufficient. India’s strategic approach must now focus on institutionalising the new reality across multiple fronts.
Fast-Track Hydropower and Storage Projects: India must accelerate projects on the Western Rivers (names withheld) ensuring maximum legal utilisation under the IWT’s original clauses (India is permitted ‘non-consumptive use’ for hydropower); build new storage infrastructure in Jammu and Kashmir to trap monsoon/glacier flow surplus; implement modern river management techniques to optimise seasonal diversions towards eastern basins like the Sutlej, and ensure periodic de-siltation to enhance capacities, to bring about unpredictability of release to Pakistan in controlling floods or famine.
Create a Legal and Diplomatic Firewall: Prepare a strong case under Article XII (3)** of the IWT for permanent treaty modification or abrogation, citing ‘fundamental change of circumstances’ under international law. The climate change impacting water availability and population growth has changed the context and construct. Bring about an international consensus about Pakistan’s terror complicity and explain India’s actions as self-defensive, not aggressive.
Strengthen Internal Capacity: Enhance dam safety, water regulation, and disaster management capabilities, ensuring Indian infrastructure upgrades can withstand Pakistani sabotage attempts (including cyberattacks on water data systems). Further against China, India being a middle riparian and China an upper riparian with regards to Brahmaputra flow, adequate countermeasures must be taken against the Pak-China collusive approach in this regard.
Conclusion: Pressure and Poise
India must manage the IWT treaty, presently held in abeyance, strategically giving Pakistan space to reform while retaining escalation dominance if provocations continue. This balance between pressure and poise will be crucial. The objective is not merely punitive but transformational to force a strategic rethink within Pakistan’s deep state and make their cost of misadventure cost prohibitive. The effect must remain in the hard disk of their memory forever.
Yet the heat must be felt across the length and breadth of Pakistan as a nation and levers retained in the Indian arsenal. Further, this action does not preclude the kinetic military options for an integrated response on all fronts. Pakistan must know the limit of Indian tolerance and the fury of all the instruments of its national power.
The author, a PVSM, AVSM, VSM has had an illustrious career spanning nearly four decades. A distinguished Armoured Corps officer, he has served in various prestigious staff and command appointments including Commander Independent Armoured Brigade, ADG PP, GOC Armoured Division and GOC Strike 1. The officer retired as DG Mechanised Forces in December 2017 during which he was the architect to initiate process for reintroduction of Light Tank and Chairman on the study on C5ISR for Indian Army. Subsequently he was Consultant MoD/OFB from 2018 to 2020. He is also a reputed defence analyst, a motivational speaker and prolific writer on matters of military, defence technology and national security. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda
