India’s military communications increasingly depend on space. Satellites connect ships, aircraft, troops and command centres across distances where terrestrial networks may be unavailable, damaged or vulnerable. In a conflict, that connectivity can shape how quickly forces share information and coordinate. Often, the intensifying strategic competition in space – is described as a new Cold War – but the control of these links is a matter of national security, not just technological ambition.
India’s position is best understood as a drive for operational sovereignty: the capacity to communicate through systems that remain available under Indian control, while reducing dependence on foreign providers and technology. The aim is not complete isolation. Rather, India is trying to combine domestic infrastructure with partnerships, under rules that preserve its ability to decide how essential services are used.
From Reliance to Dedicated Systems
India’s military satellite network has developed incrementally. The Indian Navy through GSAT-7, launched in 2013 became the first arm of the Indian tri-service with a sovereign communications infrastructure. GSAT-7A, launched in 2018, strengthened communications for the Air Force and also supports Army requirements. The Indian Navy’s launch of GSAT-7R, also known as CMS-03, in November 2025 was a replacement for GSAT-7, extending India’s dedicated satellite communications capability at sea.
So far, the Army however, has lacked a dedicated communications satellite and has relied in part on the Air Force’s GSAT-7A. A satellite specifically for the Army, GSAT-7B, is expected to be launched around mid-2028, according to officials cited in an October 2026 report. Designed to provide beyond-line-of-sight communications for troops, formations and military platforms, it would address a long-standing gap. Meanwhile, the planned launch’s reported delay from November 2027 to mid-2028 also illustrates that sovereignty in sensitive areas depends on delivery, not mere announcements.
India is advancing its military space capabilities to establish operational sovereignty, ensuring secure and independent defence communications while reducing reliance on foreign technology
These systems are not simply orbital relays. Military communications satellites can enable secure voice and data links between dispersed units and command structures. For the Navy, that means connecting ships, submarines, aircraft and maritime operations centres across a vast area. For the Air Force, satellite links support communications among airbases, radar stations and airborne assets. The Army’s future satellite is intended to improve connectivity across remote and difficult terrain, including border areas.
The Wider Strategic Contest
In the wider strategic context, the stakes are rising as modern militaries are increasingly becoming dependent on using space-based services for communications, navigation, surveillance and intelligence. These services can be disrupted without a satellite being physically destroyed, by jamming, cyberattacks, interference with ground infrastructure or interference with a provider’s control systems can all undermine access. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates the operationally important role of the satellite communications – and how attacks on satellite-related infrastructure can have effects beyond the battlefield.
India faces particular strategic pressures from its geography and security environment. The Indian armed forces operate along contested land borders and across the Indian Ocean, a wide area in which, communications must be linked to widely distributed forces. Space-based communications can help bridge distances and provide an alternative when cables, towers or other terrestrial networks fail. But satellites and their ground systems are themselves potential points of vulnerability. Building more assets may improve capability while also increasing the number of systems that must be protected.
Through initiatives like the 2025 Joint Military Space Doctrine and a planned 52-satellite Space-Based Surveillance programme, India is integrating space deeply into national defence planning
India’s policy response combines military investment with institutional development. The move toward more formal integration of space into defence planning was mentioned in the Joint Military Space Doctrine, released in 2025. In addition, India is also formulating a National Military Space Policy. Separately, the third phase of the Space Based Surveillance programme approved in 2024, plans 52 dedicated military satellites over three years, with ISRO and private companies sharing construction and launch responsibilities. The communications satellites launched so far differs from these surveillance satellites, but together promoting both together indicate a broader effort to build a more capable Indian military space architecture.
Sovereignty is More than Owning Satellites
Owning a satellite does not guarantee uninterrupted service. Ground stations, software, secure terminals, launch vehicles, specialist components and skilled personnel are all part of the system. Though India has made progress in developing its own rockets and satellite capabilities, yet for some high-technology components, including semiconductors and transponders it remains dependent on foreign suppliers. Previous launch difficulties also compelled India to rely on international partners to place communications satellites in orbit.
This creates a practical tension. International cooperation can provide access to expertise, launch services and commercial networks, helping India move faster or fill capability gaps. But reliance on an external provider may carry strategic risks if access can be restricted or altered during a crisis. The experience of Ukraine, where commercial satellite services played a significant role in wartime communications, has taught to other countries, both the value of private networks and the importance of decisions made by providers.
Achieving true strategic space sovereignty requires a resilient, multi-layered architecture combining military satellites, civilian networks, anti-jamming measures and active space diplomacy
This concern is reflected in India’s approach to commercial satellite broadband systems. The government has established security conditions for operators, including requirements related to domestic gateways, routing of Indian traffic and monitoring near borders and coastlines. These measures seek to bring communications services operating over Indian territory within a framework of national oversight. Though foreign commercial systems may offer scale and coverage that domestic providers cannot immediately match. The policy challenge is to gain those benefits without making critical communications dependent on decisions taken elsewhere.
Building Resilience, Not Just Capacity
A sovereign communications stronghold must be resilient: able to continue operating even after disruption, switch between systems and restore service quickly. That calls for a layered architecture. In such a scenario, dedicated military satellites can provide protected links, while terrestrial networks and commercial services can add capacity and alternative routes. Redundancy across satellites, ground stations and operators reduces the chance that one failure will sever communications. To achieve this cybersecurity, anti-jamming measures and secure user terminals are equally important.
India must also coordinate its military and civilian priorities. Satellite networks support disaster response, remote connectivity and essential services as well as defence communications. In emergencies, civilian infrastructure may assist military operations, while the same systems may need to serve communities and public authorities. Clear rules for access, prioritisation and continuity could help avoid confusion during crises and make investments more useful in peacetime.
-The writer is a New Delhi-based senior commentator on international and strategic affairs, environmental issues, an interfaith practitioner, and a media consultant. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda
