Traditionally, the Indian Armed Forces have prepared for conventional warfare primarily against Pakistan. Our military doctrines and war games have largely focused on “Red Land,” a term often used to refer to Pakistan. Meanwhile, China, colloquially nicknamed “Chandal Desh,” seldom featured prominently in our strategic equations. Consequently, the operational plans and deployments of most of our Infantry and Armoured formations were predominantly oriented toward the Western Front.
The Northern Command remained relatively dormant, with sporadic incidents of minor incursions by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces. These incidents were typically resolved through Red Flag meetings between military commanders from both sides.
PLA Incursions Post-April 2020
This dynamic changed dramatically in April 2020 when PLA forces unilaterally violated prior agreements and confidence-building measures, occupying significant disputed territories in seven major areas along the LAC in Ladakh. For almost four years now, the Indian Armed Forces have been engaged in a tense standoff on the Northern Front, maintaining an eye-to-eye deployment with PLA forces.
Recently, progress has been made towards disengagement in areas like Depsang and Demchok, with both sides agreeing to coordinated patrolling. These efforts aim to reduce the risk of conflict escalation and foster stability along the contested border.
Changes in Military Doctrine Towards a Two-Front Scenario
India has a long history of conflicts with the PLA, and unfortunately, 23 disputed and sensitive areas remain unresolved along the 3,488 km-long LAC, despite the façade of good neighbourly relations. In light of these challenges, the Indian Armed Forces have revised their military doctrine and war-gaming strategies to address threats on two fronts—the Northern and Western sectors—necessitating permanent troop deployments in both regions. This has led to a redefined operational role for certain formations, along with their redeployment to ensure the security of these critical fronts.
As the saying goes, “Geopolitics is a science least understood by many.” No sooner had India adjusted to these changing realities, it found itself facing a complex “two-front scenario.” This has compelled military planners to transition from an “offensive” approach to an “offensive defence strategy.” With the current force levels, the Armed Forces are left with limited options, focusing primarily on containing adversaries and adopting a largely defensive posture.
India’s security calculus is increasingly defined by the challenge of managing potential threats on two fronts: its western border with Pakistan and its northern border with China. This dual pressure, combined with regional instability, requires a reassessment of military doctrine to effectively safeguard national interests
Further complicating the security landscape is the deteriorating political situation in neighbouring Bangladesh and Myanmar, particularly along India’s Northeastern borders. This adds another dimension to the already overstretched Armed Forces, which are heavily engaged along the Northern and Western fronts.
It is, therefore, imperative to critically analyse the current geopolitical dynamics in the subcontinent and assess their security implications.
Strategic Significance of North East
Northeastern India comprises the Seven Sister States, with 99 per cent of its 6,387 km border constituting international boundaries shared with Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, and Bhutan. This region accounts for almost 40 per cent of India’s total land borders with neighbouring countries, making it strategically critical to the nation’s defence architecture. Of particular importance is the Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck,” which is just 23 km wide and serves as the vital link connecting the Seven Sisters with mainland India.
On 5 August 2024, a significant political upheaval occurred in Bangladesh. The Awami League government, led by Sheikh Hasina, was dismantled, with Hasina seeking political asylum in India. Mohammad Yunus, a prominent Bangladeshi economist, entrepreneur, and civil society leader, assumed the role of Chief Adviser to the Interim Government.
The new government, heavily influenced by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami cadres, has exhibited an anti-Indian stance. This shift is evident in recent incidents targeting Hindu minorities, which have been widely condemned by India. The deteriorating relationship between the two nations is concerning, especially given the 4,096 km border shared with Indian states such as West Bengal, Meghalaya, and Tripura.
Bangladesh has a history of hosting terrorist bases, and recent intelligence reports indicate that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has re-established its presence in the country. The ISI is reportedly training Rohingyas in the Naikhongchhari sub-district of Bandarban in the Chittagong division and Islamist terror groups in Brahmanbaria, near Tripura, and inside Khadimnagar National Park in Sylhet, near Meghalaya.
Northeastern India, bordering Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, and Bhutan, holds immense strategic significance. The region’s porous borders, coupled with political turmoil in neighbouring countries and the presence of armed groups, create a volatile security environment
In response, the Border Security Force (BSF) has moved battalions closer to the zero line to prevent potential infiltration by extremists and refugees. The Indian Army has also redeployed units at four key locations along the Bangladesh border: Petrapole in North 24 Parganas, Changrabandha in Cooch Behar, Fulbari in Jalpaiguri, and Hili in South Dinajpur.
The current geopolitical situation in Bangladesh suggests a pivot towards China and Pakistan, underscored by the arrival of arms and ammunition shipments from these nations. This alignment poses a serious security challenge for India, necessitating heightened vigilance by the Indian Army. Ensuring preparedness for any contingency and the flexibility to reposition forces along the border will be crucial in safeguarding India’s security interests.
Political and Security Situation in Myanmar
Following the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 by the ruling Junta, violence has escalated across the country. Currently, rebel forces control more than 75 per cent of Myanmar’s borders, including significant areas along the Indian border. Over 2.5 million people have been displaced, with more than 100,000 fleeing to India and Thailand.
The unification of the “Three-Brotherhood Alliance” — the Arakan Army (AA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) — and the launch of Operation 1027 have significantly weakened the Junta’s control. Reports indicate substantial Chinese support to these rebel groups in the form of weapons, ammunition, and drones. A full-scale offensive is ongoing in Shan, Kayin, Rakhine, and Chin states.
The Arakan Army’s offensive in Rakhine State has raised security concerns for both Bangladesh and India. Fierce fighting around Ann and the capture of Myanmar Army’s Western Military District Headquarters have bolstered the Arakan Army’s position. This development has also displaced thousands of Rohingyas into Bangladesh, creating a humanitarian crisis.
The Arakan Army, after capturing Rihkhawdar on Myanmar’s border, is now just 10 km from Mizoram’s border town of Zokhawthar. Mizoram’s 510 km porous border with Myanmar, which lacks adequate fencing, poses a significant security risk. This challenge is exacerbated by the ongoing political instability in both Manipur and Mizoram.
India’s Concern
The rise of the Chin National Army (CNA), a rebel group in Myanmar’s Chin State, has become a serious concern for India due to its shared ethnic ties with the populations of Mizoram in India and Chin State in Myanmar. With the capture of nearly all military outposts in the region, the CNA poses a direct threat to India’s security.
The ongoing influx of refugees from Myanmar’s Sagaing Region has exacerbated the Meitei-Kuki divide in Manipur. Since the military coup in Myanmar, over 60,000 nationals from the neighbouring country have sought refuge in India, particularly in Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. Alarmingly, reports suggest that approximately 900 militants have crossed into Manipur from Myanmar over the past year.
The military coup in Myanmar has led to widespread conflict, with rebel forces controlling border areas to a great extent. This instability has spilled over into India, with an influx of refugees and heightened militant activity
Both Meitei and Kuki militant groups in Manipur reportedly have access to advanced weaponry, including M-16 rifles, M-4 A1 carbines, AK-47 rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, and drones. Intelligence reports estimate that Meitei militant groups possess around 2,000 weapons, while Kuki groups have close to 3,000.
In a society heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry, achieving peace remains an elusive goal. Disarming these groups is imperative for restoring stability in the region and addressing the growing threat posed by cross-border militant activities.
Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project
India is deeply concerned about the fate of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP), which establishes direct connectivity between Kolkata and the Port of Sittwe in Myanmar. The project comprises three key segments: a 539 km waterway from Kolkata to Sittwe, a 108 km riverine link from Sittwe to Paletwa, and a 110 km road route to Aizawl in the Indian state of Mizoram.
The KMTTP significantly reduces the distance between Kolkata and Sittwe by approximately 1,328 km (825 miles), easing logistical constraints and decreasing reliance on the narrow and vulnerable Siliguri Corridor. Strategically, the project offers an alternate route to India’s Northeast, bolstering connectivity and enhancing strategic security.
However, the project faces a critical threat following the capture of Paletwa township near the Mizoram border by the rebel Arakan Army (AA). This has led to concerns that the KMTTP has “almost died,” jeopardising India’s investments and strategic objectives in the region.
Border Management
The internal conflict in Myanmar and the growing presence of armed rebel groups present significant security challenges for India. These developments have contributed to an alarming rise in drug trafficking and the smuggling of sophisticated arms and ammunition across the border.
The India-Myanmar border spans 1,643 km and remains entirely unfenced, posing significant security challenges. Recent directives from the Home Ministry have initiated fencing along a 30 km stretch, but this endeavour faces substantial obstacles. The sentiments of border communities, coupled with logistical challenges arising from poor road connectivity between the hinterland and the border, complicate the task. Additionally, the Mizoram Government’s lack of cooperation has further delayed progress on this critical project.
The Assam Rifles, a paramilitary force under the operational control of the Indian Army, is tasked with securing the entire India-Myanmar border. Unlike the Border Security Force (BSF), which manages India’s other international borders using Border Observation Posts (BOPs), Assam Rifles operates from Company Operating Posts (COPs).
Out of 46 Assam Rifles battalions, only 15 are deployed for border security, with the remaining 31 focused on internal security duties. This deployment leaves considerable gaps along the border, enabling infiltration and other cross-border activities.
The current border management framework necessitates a comprehensive review. A potential solution is to deploy BSF battalions along the India-Myanmar border to strengthen security. A robust strategy would involve:
- Establishment of BOPs: Approximately 470 BOPs (spaced 3.5 km apart) would need to be set up, requiring at least 32 BSF battalions.
- Fencing the Border: Implementing a long-term fencing strategy to enhance border security.
- Improved Infrastructure: Strengthening road connectivity to facilitate logistics and effective monitoring.
- Collaboration with State Governments: Ensuring the cooperation of state authorities, particularly in Mizoram, to streamline operations.
Managing India’s extensive borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar requires a comprehensive and focused approach. Current border security measures are inadequate, necessitating increased deployments, improved infrastructure, and stronger inter-agency coordination
The Invisible Hand
Amid the ongoing turmoil in Manipur, whispers of an “invisible hand” orchestrating unrest have gained traction. Videos circulating online suggest possible involvement of external actors, including the United States, with reports of Starlink connectivity allegedly being utilised by militant groups.
China’s influence in the region is unmistakable, particularly in Myanmar, where its economic and strategic stakes are substantial. The Myanmar-China Gas Pipeline, a 793-kilometer-long energy conduit, underscores these interests. Starting at Ramree Island in Myanmar, the pipeline traverses Rakhine State, Magway Region, Mandalay Region, and Shan State before terminating in Ruili, China. The presence of Chinese footprints, both economic and political, is seen as a complicating factor in resolving conflicts in the region.
Myanmar holds immense strategic value, owing to its abundant natural resources and pivotal geographic location. As the fourth-largest country in rare earth elements, it boasts significant deposits of Dysprosium and Terbium, critical for advanced technologies. Additionally, its oil and gas reserves further enhance its resource wealth.
Geopolitically, Myanmar sits at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean, connecting vital sea routes such as the Malacca Straits and the Strait of Hormuz, while the Bay of Bengal links the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This strategic positioning has drawn the United States’ attention, as it seeks to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region.
The National Unity Government (NUG), Myanmar’s shadow government headquartered in Washington, plays a crucial role in the ongoing conflict. Backed by the People’s Defence Force (PDF)––a coalition of rebel groups––the NUG has steadily gained ground against the Military Junta. With an estimated strength of 100,000, albeit not fully armed and trained, the PDF now controls most of Myanmar’s border regions, marginalising the Junta’s influence.
As the NUG consolidates its hold over these strategic areas, it reveals the active involvement of external forces in shaping Myanmar’s trajectory. Indeed, “the invisible hands are certainly visible now.”
Considering the volatility of the internal situation in Bangladesh as well as in Myanmar, we have a total border stretch of 5739 kms to be managed. This will require a re-think in our present strategy of border management. It is high time that we start analysing the requirement of “One Border One Force.” Border management needs to be treated as a specialist domain managed by professionals rather than being dealt with in a cavalier fashion. Enmeshing of technology with boots on ground is the need of the hour. Ideas pertaining to right-sizing of forces have to be shown the door. The North Eastern region of India, increasingly becoming a geopolitical flashpoint, demands immediate attention as it emerges as a “new frontier of war.”
-The author retired as Major General, Army Ordnance Corps, Central Command, after 37 years of service. A management doctorate and expert on defence modernisation, he is the author of four books, including the Amazon bestseller “Breaking the Chinese Myth,” and a frequent media commentator. He is affiliated with several leading defence and strategic studies institutions in New Delhi. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
