The Indian Air Force, one of the world’s largest and oldest Air Forces, completes 92 years of glorious service to the nation on the 8th of October this year. As the new CAS (Chief of Air Staff), who took over on the 30th of September, reviews the year ahead, he has significant challenges and some hard strategic decisions to make. While the IAF remains a powerful combat force in the region and continues to modernise, albeit slowly, its combat capability needs to keep pace in terms of optimal force structure and strength to tackle the possible two-front threat posed by China and Pakistan. More importantly, as an emerging global power, India’s military, the IAF in particular, should be capable of protecting our national interests across the world. This means the IAF’s combat and expeditionary capability should reach global proportions in the not-too-distant future.
IAF’s Ageing Fighters and the Challenge of Sustaining Optimal Force Structure
IAF’s fighter strength is now down to 32 squadrons against the authorised strength of 45 combat squadrons. The last of the illustrious MiG 21s will retire in 2025. It also brings us closer to the phase-out beginnings of the next batch of aircraft in their fourth decade of service: Jaguars, Mirage 2000s, and MiG-29s. Despite the operationalisation of the two Rafale squadrons and the continuing induction of the home-grown Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas Mk1/Mk1A, the IAF’s combat aircraft strength will touch a low of 28 squadrons by 2029 before rising with accelerated inductions of the Tejas Mk 1A. As reported, Tejas production plans are under stress due to supply chain problems. If this continues, the IAF could go down to a shocking level of 24 squadrons, almost at par with Pakistan. The fighter issues must be addressed firmly, with strategic foresight to achieve control over critical technologies, materials, and supply chains. Fortunately, IAF’s force structure in other domains such as helicopters, transport aircraft, logistics, communications, Space capabilities, Surface-to-Air missiles, and sensors like radars are reasonably strong and continue to be modernised as well as indigenised.
Budget constraints and the slow and complex acquisition processes have always been significant challenges for the IAF’s strategic planners and decision-makers. However, the IAF must provide innovative solutions to its fighter acquisition challenges. It would be pertinent to make a deep strategic review of the IAF’s fighter aircraft holdings. The IAF’s last MiG-21 squadron would retire by 2025. With the likelihood of the Jaguars, Mirage 2000s, and the MiG-29s being phased out within the next 15 years, the smooth and fast acquisition of new aircraft fleets becomes an issue of significant concern. Under these circumstances, it is essential to take stock of the production and delivery of indigenous platforms, particularly the Tejas and their variants.
Budget constraints and the slow and complex acquisition processes have always been significant challenges for the IAF’s strategic planners and decision-makers. However, the IAF must provide innovative solutions to its fighter acquisition challenges
Tejas: Drivers for a Rapidly Growing Indian Aerospace Industrial Ecosystem
The indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas Mk1, is now in operational service with two squadrons. The IAF placed the first order for 20 IOC Tejas in March 2006, and the order for the second batch of 20 aircraft in FOC status was signed in 2010. These orders were based on the recommendations of the three-member DCAS Committee 2005, of which the author, then PDASR (Principal Director Air Staff Requirements), was a member. The LCA programme had four major technology sub-programmes. These were: 1) the development of fly-by-wire technology for a highly manoeuvrable, longitudinally unstable, relaxed-static stability platform; 2) the development of 4th-generation technology aero-engine – Kaveri; 3) mastering the use of carbon composite technology for the airframe; and 4) development of airborne multi-mode Radar.
The committee recommended delinking the Kaveri engine and the MMR airborne radar from the Tejas programme as their development status needed to catch up. It was likely to slow down the overall development. The engine and radar development are complex challenges requiring more time and independent development trajectory. Accordingly, ADA integrated an advanced and proven airborne radar from Israel, ELTA 2032, and chose the GE 404 IN20 aero-engine as the power plant for the first 40 series production aircraft. These recommendations were critical in accelerating the LCA programme. While the Kaveri engine faced developmental challenges and had to be frozen, the radar development was revived as an AESA radar programme and was accomplished by LRDE (Electronics & Radar Development Establishment, DRDO).
Based on the performance evaluation of the LCA in 2007-08, the committee headed by the author made some critical recommendations for the next lot of aircraft after the first 40 aircraft. Like any developmental programme, the LCA had a few vital shortfalls that adversely impacted its performance. These were higher basic weight (6.5 tons as against 5 tons), high supersonic drag, and low intake efficiency. The committee recommended that these be addressed by developing a Mk 2 version of the aircraft powered by a higher thrust engine with an afterburner thrust of not less than 90 Kn.
The Aeronautical Development Agency accepted these recommendations and selected the GE 414 INS6 engine for the Mk2. Since the GE 414 was a larger engine, the Mk2 required the redesign of the fuselage and the intakes. The manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) made an independent study and recommended Mk 1A, which will reduce drag and basic weight and improve intake efficiency without changing the engine. This would take minimal development time and no change in production infrastructure. The IAF accepted it as an interim solution. At the same time, the Mk 2 plan was redone to a bigger platform with an increased operational radius of action and performance, thus making it to the medium fighter category with an empty weight of close to 17-18 tons.
The above developments impacted the Tejas (LCA) induction timeframes — the two orders of 40 Tejas Mk 1 aircraft comprised 32 fighters and 8 trainers. Two squadrons are operational, with 32 fighters and 4 trainers. IAF has generated significant operational data since 2016 on the Tejas aircraft. Major operationalisation has been achieved with aerial refuelling capability, external tanks, close combat and BVR missile integration, and air-to-ground weaponry, including precision weaponry with target designation pods. Night operational and EW capabilities are proven, and in recent times, the Tejas has acquitted itself well in international exercises.
For General Electric, the OEM of GE 404 and 414 series engines, the focus now is on production of engines for F-35 aircraft and other US aircraft such as the F-18 and F-16. GE 404 engine is considerably low on their priority
The ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza have well-established the overwhelming impact of aerospace power, be it missiles, air-combat platforms, precision weapons, ISR, drones, communications and net-centric warfare, and space-based services. The absence of good air defence or air-attack capabilities is proving lethal, as seen in the case of Ukraine, Hamas, Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Syria. In both these long-drawn-out wars, the importance of supply chain resilience, stock of weapons, and force levels in terms of quantitative and qualitative strengths is of significance.
Achieving Required Force Structure: Strategy Through Driving Indigenous Capability
IAF’s combat squadron strength has remained close to 32 squadrons for over a decade. This would have been lower had the IAF not extended the life of much older MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 fleets by almost a decade. In the meantime, only four squadrons (Two Rafale and Two Tejas) have been inducted. While the significant acquisition of 126 MMRCA was scraped earlier, the decision to acquire 114 MRFA (medium-role fighter aircraft) is also delayed endlessly. The IAF ordered 83 x Tejas Mk 1As (comprising 73 Mk1A and 10 Trainer aircraft) in 2021. This has now been followed by another order for 97 Mk 1As, making the total of 180 aircraft a sizable order for the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer), HAL, providing enormous opportunities for the Indian aerospace industrial ecosystem. However, huge weaknesses are showing up, which need to be addressed effectively.
HAL’s primary weakness has been its inability to control its supply chain completely. This impacts the production and delivery plans. As per the original plan, HAL was to have commenced the delivery of Tejas Mk 1A in 2022 and deliver all 83 aircraft by 2030. This is now behind schedule by more than a year. HAL has expanded its production lines to three (Two in Bangalore and one in Nasik) to produce 24 aircraft per year. Accordingly, it signed the contract with General Electric, American Engine OEM, for 99 x GE 404 IN20 engines for delivery to commence in early 2023 at the rate of 16 engines per year. However, GE will likely supply the first engine only in November this year due to supply chain problems. Besides, the Tejas aircraft is import-dependent for a few other critical items. For example, it has the highest carbon composite content for similar aircraft worldwide. The share of composites in Tejas, in terms of surface area, is almost 90% and is close to 60% in terms of cost. The raw material for the composites is prepreg carbon composite fibre, an expensive export-controlled material that needs to be stored under controlled low temperatures and has a shelf-life limitation of 8-10 months. This implies that the material must be imported in quantities as required for an assured production rate. In addition to this, the Tejas is import-dependent for engine, radar, critical avionics, and critical components such as actuators and engine charge amplifiers. Given the vital need to address IAF combat squadron strengths, it is essential that the production agency, HAL, ensures robust supply chain control.
Turbulent geopolitical events have adversely impacted even major aerospace manufacturers such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Electric, etc. However, it must be remembered that all Western manufacturers prioritise their production schedules and infrastructure for their national requirements and business and geopolitical considerations. For General Electric, the OEM of GE 404 and 414 series engines, the priority now is on production of engines for F-35 aircraft and other US aircraft such as the F-18 and F-16. GE 404 engine is considerably low on their priority. As mentioned earlier, the supply of GE 404 engines is way behind schedule. Now GE says they can supply only ten engines annually as against the 16 per year as contracted, adversely impacting the production rate. Given these critical supply chain problems, the Tejas Mk 1A schedule has slipped by over a year and a half, and the first aircraft is likely not before early 2025. With the additional order of 93 x Tejas Mk 1As, the problem becomes even more critical.
Strategising Plan B: Alternate Engine for Tejas Mk 1A
Robust control over the supply chain is critical for rapidly rebuilding IAF’s force structure. Besides, it is now time for the IAF to adopt strategies that can accelerate indigenisation, establish robust control over the supply chain, and accelerate the development and production of further variants such as Tejas Mk 2, Twin-Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF), and the AMCA. An alternate engine for Tejas Mk 1A could be an essential and easily viable solution. For example, the USAF has used engines from General Electric and Pratt & Whitney for its F-16 aircraft fleets, and a similar supply chain model will be followed for its fifth-generation aircraft, the F-35. Similarly, the IAF could choose the French M-88 engine or the Eurojet EJ-200 as an alternate engine for the Tejas Mk 1A. Adaptability of the M-88 for the Tejas has been established through previous studies. It has the advantage of being in use already with the Rafale aircraft of the IAF. Given that nearly 200 Tejas Mk 1 As are going to be built, this engine strategy of leveraging two sources will make eminent strategic sense to accelerate HAL’s production. It would also strengthen India’s capabilities in aero-engine technologies by way of technology diffusion and in time would enable the completion of the development of the Kaveri engine.
IAF Must Lead Strategy for Indigenisation with Accountability for Results
IAF must also lean on the government and the HAL to rapidly indigenise all critical materials and components to strengthen our aerospace industry and, more importantly, reduce our import dependency. The indigenously developed Uttam AESA radar and the DFCC (Digital Flight Control Computer) are a good achievement. Indigenisation of materials such as carbon composite prepregs, sensors, weapons, and EW equipment is critical. A focused strategy to achieve these early through the Mk 1A production process is a strategic necessity. This will pay rich dividends in accelerating the Tejas Mk 2 programme, which should ideally become the backbone of the IAF from the 2030s, along with the upgraded Su-30s and the Rafales. The naval requirement of a twin-engine Tejas, called TEDBF, could also be adapted for IAF requirements. Thus, both Mk 2 and the twin-engine Tejas have the potential to enable a production run of more than 400 aircraft over the next 20 years. The AMCA, now pitched as a 5.5 generation aircraft, should follow the success of the Mk 2 programmes.
The IAF may need to dump any plans for importing and producing MRFA from outside. Over the last two decades, the long delays in our acquisition process have effectively killed these efforts. There is always a silver lining in every adversity, and that is the now emerging opportunity for the complete indigenisation of India’s fighter aircraft programmes
IAF’s Strategy: Time for Critical Decisions
Given the above possibilities, IAF is at a juncture where it must make critical strategic decisions that will impact its force structure and, more importantly, India’s aerospace industrial ecosystem. This would mean that the following strategic decisions must be taken:
- Accelerate the Tejas Mk 1A production by opting for an alternate engine. Effectively, the Mk 1A fleet will consist of aircraft with GE 404 engines and alternate engines such as the Safran M88 or the EJ 200.
- Accelerate indigenisation of critical components, weapons, sensors, and materials to ensure robust control over supply chain issues.
- Accelerate Tejas Mk 2 towards series production by 2030 and TEDBF by 2032. These platforms should become the backbone of both the IAF and the IN.
- Additional production infrastructure, with the involvement of the private sector, must be established starting with the Mk 1A. HAL alone cannot manage such a monumental task. This is critical if production is to be maintained at a good pace. MRO facilities must be established as separate entities without mixing up with production.
- If the above measures are adopted, AMCA development and maturation will naturally follow with great success.
- These measures are necessary for a compelling and true indigenisation, and production efficiency.
Finally, the IAF may need to dump any plans for importing and producing MRFA from outside. Over the last two decades, the long delays in our acquisition process have effectively killed these efforts. There is always a silver lining in every adversity, and that is the now emerging opportunity for the complete indigenisation of India’s fighter aircraft programmes.
–The writer, a AVSM VM PhD (V) is a former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff for Policy, Plans, & Force Development (DCIDS – PP & FD). He is currently the President of The Peninsula Foundation, a Chennai-based public policy research think tank. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
