The relations between India and Bangladesh have significantly worsened following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in August 2024. This upheaval, which resulted from the ‘monsoon revolution’ driven by student protests, has dented the bilateral relationship, leading to strained diplomatic ties with dire consequences. The turn of events in the wake of a violent coup orchestrated by the military has exposed new fault lines, both internally and externally in terms of Bangladesh’s foreign relations.
Dr Yunus-led Bangladesh government’s anti-India stance has raised concerns in New Delhi over the rise of Islamist forces and the targeting of Hindu minorities. Although Bangladesh’s ties earlier leaned toward India, shifting political dynamics opened the door for Pakistan and China to have greater influence, indicating Bangladesh is returning to dark times to become East Pakistan 2.0.
The Rise of Extremism under Dr Yunus
The Bangladesh government has deep ties with pro-Pakistan fundamentalists. The family of Dr Yunus had possible connections with the Pakistani army during the 1971 Liberation War, and several advisors are linked to past collaborators. This government’s rise to power, marked by undiplomatic remarks about India, suggests a strategy of fuelling anti-India sentiment to consolidate its base.
The government has also released individuals who were involved in insurgency in India’s NE region, further escalating tensions. With institutions dismantled, minorities are subjected to unprecedented atrocities under this lawless regime. The government’s handling of the Matarbari Port, a key economic initiative, has been hindered by its lack of stability.
Further, safe zones for Rohingyas and the increased flow of weapons to terrorist groups have added to regional instability. The radicalisation of youth and government-sponsored extremism can lead to a dangerous turn.
The Enlarged Footprints of Pakistan and China
While India has traditionally been an ally of Bangladesh, the Yunus government is strengthening its strategic relationship with Pakistan and China. It may be considered an acceptable choice but simultaneous distancing from India and taking an anti-India stand is unacceptable. This shift could disturb the regional security balance, particularly in the context of India’s strained relations with both China and Pakistan. A third collusive force will not be acceptable.
Dr Yunus-led Bangladesh government’s anti-India stance has raised concerns in New Delhi. This government’s undiplomatic remarks about India suggest a strategy of fuelling anti-India sentiment to consolidate its base. It has also released individuals involved in insurgency in India, further escalating tensions
Pakistan’s Shadow in Bangladesh Landscape: Pakistan has exploited the current political dispensation in Bangladesh as an opportunity to expand its anti-India and pro-Islamist influence. The relaxation of visa requirements for Pakistani citizens by Bangladesh and Pakistan’s diplomatic forays indicate signs of a new bonhomie between the two nations.
This bonhomie is driven by shared religious and ideological interests, particularly among Islamist factions in Bangladesh, which have gained influence under the Yunus regime. The role of ‘Terroristan’ as an Islamist ally to such groups complicates relations with India, deepening concerns at the growing Islamist forces in the subcontinent. It could threaten India’s internal and external security domains.
China’s Expanding Influence: China’s powerplay in Bangladesh on the military, political and economic development has expanded significantly. China has invested heavily in Bangladesh’s infrastructure projects, including key ports and railways, creating expanding dependencies.
This relationship is seen as being boosted by the new regime. For Bangladesh, China offers both economic benefits and reduced dependence on India. The unseen danger for Bangladesh lies in the Chinese debt trap engulfing Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. India perceives any strengthening of strategic ties between Dhaka and Beijing as a direct challenge to its national security interests in the immediate neighbourhood. It could add volatility to its NE states and borders.
Sectarian Tensions and Domestic Challenges
In Bangladesh, the Hindu population has seen a dramatic shrinkage to 8% today. This possibly could be due to a design. Recent upsurge in violence against Hindu minorities, including attacks on temples and desecration of deities are indicative of ethnic cleansing and human rights violations.
The government-backed extremist forces in Bangladesh are now threatening the secular foundation of the state pushing for constitutional changes to impose Islamic laws. Indian media has amplified these incidents, often framing them as evidence of rising Islamist forces under Yunus’s regime.
However, the Yunus government remains in denial mode, dismissing such reports as politically motivated and anti-Bangladesh. Yet even US President-elect Donald Trump and UK lawmakers have raised concerns about the interim government failing to curb the violence or safeguard minority rights. The fact is that the rise of Islamist groups exploiting the political instability has resulted in a surge in ethnic violence, which has created fissures in the India-Bangladesh relations.
The arrest of Hindu monk Chinmoy Krishna Das on sedition charges has further underscored the new regime’s unsecular outlook. These internal sectarian divisions pose a significant challenge for the Yunus government, which must balance competing demands from religious factions, all while managing growing external pressures from neighbouring powers such as India, Pakistan, and China.
Economic Fallout and the Impact on Regional Trade
The political crisis in Bangladesh has also disrupted trade with economic fallout, particularly with India. Many exporters, mainly from Kolkata, face financial uncertainty because of accumulating unpaid debts on Bangladeshi partners.
Even US President-elect Donald Trump and UK lawmakers have raised concerns about the Yunus government failing to curb the violence or safeguard minority rights. The arrest of Hindu monk Chinmoy Krishna Das on sedition charges has underscored the unsecular outlook of Bangladesh’s new regime
This economic slowdown is also felt by logistics companies and transporters, which depend heavily on the smooth flow of goods across the Petrapole-Benapole border. With Bangladesh’s economy increasingly dependent on Chinese infrastructure investments, and a shift towards Pakistan for political support, the region’s economic dynamics are shifting rapidly, further complicating the trade relationship with India.
India was considering an extension of a loan of about $2 billion to Bangladesh to help the country meet its dues to Indian power companies, including Adani Power, but with the ouster of the Sheikh Hasina government, the talks have been suspended. Bangladesh imports about 10% of its total power requirement from India. While it is trying to reduce this dependency and renegotiate lower power prices, the dependency remains.
The Case for Liberation 2.0
The final option of whether India should intervene in Bangladesh to protect its minorities, particularly Hindus, in light of rising violence and persecution, evokes comparisons to India’s 1971 intervention that led to Bangladesh’s independence. The refugee crisis and human rights violations are also somewhat similar and could escalate, calling for Liberation 2.0.
The expanding footprints of radical Islamist forces pose a direct threat to India’s north-eastern borders, especially in states like Assam and West Bengal, where illegal migration and demographic shifts fuel political and social tensions.
Global norms on humanitarian intervention have evolved. While sovereignty is sacrosanct, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine advocates intervention when a state fails to protect its citizens from atrocities. India, as a regional power, could invoke this principle to justify action.
While the deteriorating status of minorities and the growing influence of extremist forces present moral and strategic concerns for India, direct intervention risks breaching international law, worsening regional tensions, and alienating Bangladesh.
Instead, India should focus on diplomatic pressure, supporting civil society initiatives, and strengthening border security to manage potential refugee flows. By leveraging economic ties and international alliances, India can promote minority rights without destabilising the region or provoking backlash.
India must focus on diplomatic pressure, supporting civil society initiatives, and strengthening border security to manage potential refugee flows. By leveraging economic ties and international alliances, India can promote minority rights without destabilising the region, or provoking backlash
However, India’s policy of non-interference or quest for territory beyond its borders is foundational, yet it must not be mistaken for a weak or soft nation. The strategic message to our neighbour must be loud and clear: ‘Do not ignite the Fire which could engulf you’. The option under extreme provocation remains.
Path Forward: Need for Dialogue and Strategic Engagement
To address these growing challenges, India and Bangladesh must prioritise dialogue and collaboration, focusing on their shared interests and common concerns. The recent Foreign Secretary-level talks must pave the path for further engagement and normalisation of relationships for mutual benefit and regional security.
Yet India’s patience and maturity to deal with the alarming situation must not be taken for granted. The options for other means when diplomacy fails and the situation worsens remain a part of its punitive deterrence arsenal.
The author, a PVSM, AVSM, VSM has had an illustrious career spanning nearly four decades. A distinguished Armoured Corps officer, he has served in various prestigious staff and command appointments including Commander Independent Armoured Brigade, ADG PP, GOC Armoured Division and GOC Strike 1. The officer retired as DG Mechanised Forces in December 2017 during which he was the architect to initiate process for reintroduction of Light Tank and Chairman on the study on C5ISR for Indian Army. Subsequently he was Consultant MoD/OFB from 2018 to 2020. He is also a reputed defence analyst, a motivational speaker and prolific writer on matters of military, defence technology and national security. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda
