In the heart of South Asia lies a dynamic and complex struggle for water resources. The region, comprising countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan, is home to over a fifth of the world’s population but faces considerable water scarcity, overuse, and pollution challenges. The water demand has been escalating due to rapid population growth, industrialisation, urbanisation, and climate change, making hydro-nationalism — a form of water-based nationalism — an urgent necessity for the region’s future. It involves prioritising water resources as a national issue, highlighting water disputes, and promoting national policies to safeguard and control water resources, often at the expense of regional cooperation. This article delves into the importance of hydro-nationalism in South Asia, examining the challenges, historical context, and the role of inter-country water conflicts.
Hydrological Significance in South Asia
South Asia is home to some of the world’s most significant river systems: the Indus, the Ganga, the Brahmaputra, and the Mekong. These rivers are crucial lifelines for agriculture, drinking water, sanitation, and industry. The Indus River, flowing from the Tibetan Plateau into Pakistan, is vital for millions. The Ganga, one of India’s holiest and most utilised rivers, is essential not just culturally, but also for irrigation and power generation. Similarly, the Brahmaputra, which flows through China, India, and Bangladesh, is vital for agriculture in these countries. The basin of the Ganga and Brahmaputra provides food security for hundreds of millions. However, abundant water resources are unevenly distributed, both geographically and temporally. This creates competition and rivalry between nations and local populations, exacerbating tensions and fuelling hydro-nationalism.
The Hindu Kush-Himalayan region, which serves as the water tower for much of South Asia, is experiencing rapid glacier retreat due to global warming. This melting of glaciers initially increases the river flows, but in the long run, it is expected to reduce water availability, especially in India and Pakistan
Water Disputes: A History of Conflict
Hydro-nationalism in South Asia has its roots in long-standing historical and geopolitical tensions over Transboundary Rivers. The partition of India in 1947 divided the Indus River basin between India and Pakistan, which has led to several decades of conflict over the control and distribution of water. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, sought to manage these tensions by allocating specific river systems to each country. Despite its success in reducing immediate tension, the IWT has not fully resolved the growing strain as India’s increasing use of the eastern tributaries of the Indus River has led to rising friction with Pakistan, which relies on the Indus system for over 90 per cent of its irrigation. The dispute over the Ganga River between India and Bangladesh is another example of the challenges of hydro-nationalism. The Farakka Barrage, constructed by India in 1975, diverts Ganga water to the Hooghly River, a vital waterway in West Bengal. Bangladesh, downstream, has expressed concerns over reduced water flow, which impacts its agriculture, livelihoods, and flood management.
Climate Change and Water Scarcity
The looming challenge of climate change has exacerbated existing water tensions. The Hindu Kush-Himalayan region, which serves as the water tower for much of South Asia, is experiencing rapid glacier retreat due to global warming. This melting of glaciers initially increases the river flows, but in the long run, it is expected to reduce water availability, especially in India and Pakistan where glaciers feed major river systems. This scenario will amplify competition for water resources, necessitating the adoption of hydro-nationalism to safeguard national interests. Rising temperatures and changing rainfall patterns have also led to droughts and flooding in South Asia. The ongoing water crisis in regions like Rajasthan in India and Sindh in Pakistan is a direct result of decreased rainfall and groundwater depletion, leading to tensions between neighbouring states within the countries as well as across borders. The urbanisation of cities like Dhaka and Karachi has further stretched local water resources, leading to increasing competition among urban and rural sectors for access to water.
Will hydro-nationalism lead to greater conflicts or encourage better cooperation? While there are examples of successful treaties like the Indus Water Treaty, they are exceptions rather than the rule. The future of water security will depend on balancing national interests with regional cooperation
Transboundary River Management and Political Tensions
While some efforts have been made to cooperate on transboundary river management, South Asia’s geopolitical landscape is fraught with political tensions. The perennial water issues between India and Pakistan are a prime example. For India, the management of water resources is not just an environmental concern but also an instrument of power. For Pakistan, the control over the flow of water is a vital national interest. This dynamic has led to a situation where water resources are no longer seen as neutral assets but as political tools. Other nations in the region, like Nepal and Bhutan, have entered into similar bilateral agreements with India on river management. Nepal, for instance, has entered into treaties with India concerning the Mahakali River. However, the reliance on Indian infrastructure and assistance for water management often leads to dissatisfaction and perceived inequality, which further fuels nationalism. In Bangladesh, the management of the Ganga and the Brahmaputra has been a point of political contention with both India and China, especially as China has plans to develop its portion of the Brahmaputra. With the construction of dams upstream, China’s activities on the Brahmaputra have caused unease in India and Bangladesh, heightening the focus on hydro-nationalism as countries seek to assert their claims over water.
South Asian nations must move beyond conflict and explore cooperative solutions that balance the needs of all stakeholders while ensuring the equitable distribution of water resources. Without this shift, the future of South Asia may be marred by water wars and further exacerbation of regional tensions
The Way Forward: Regional Cooperation or National Control?
The need for hydro-nationalism in South Asia is evident, but the question remains whether this approach will lead to greater conflict or encourage better cooperation. While there are examples of successful treaties like the IWT, they are exceptions rather than the rule. The future of water security in South Asia will depend on balancing national interests with regional cooperation.
On the one hand, regional bodies like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) could play a role in mediating water disputes and promoting sustainable practices. However, the effectiveness of such bodies is limited by the region’s historical mistrust and political rivalry. National policies driven by hydro-nationalism may dominate, but they could be coupled with frameworks for joint management, scientific data sharing, and climate adaptation strategies to ensure that water resources are utilised sustainably.
Conclusion
Hydro-nationalism is not just a matter of politics or territorial control; it is a necessity for the survival and development of South Asian countries. As water resources dwindle, managing these precious assets becomes a central pillar of national security. However, South Asian nations must move beyond conflict and explore cooperative solutions that balance the needs of all stakeholders while ensuring the equitable distribution of water resources. Without this shift, the future of South Asia may be marred by water wars and further exacerbation of regional tensions.
The writer is Special Advisor for South Asia at Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea. He is a regular commentator on the issues of Water Security and Transboundary River issues in South Asia. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
