The above statement of the Prime Minister of Israel indicates how badly Israel was outsmarted and surprised by the Hamas terrorist attack in the early hours of October 7, 2023. The statement reveals anger and shock. It was not only the acknowledgement of the failure of its intelligence apparatus but also of the redundancy of its technology-based ‘defence policies’.

It seems Israel has been smarting under its technological excellence for years, which has invoked a sense of complacency. It had, thus, made some calculated ‘miscalculations’, which should be a lesson for others, particularly India. The universal fact that ought to be acknowledged is that technology was a product of the human brain; it was an aid but not a replacement.

The biggest lesson of the Hamas attack is that no defences are ever impregnable— whether you have a ‘Concrete Fortress’ or ‘Technological Fortress’. Technology is only a ‘Force Multiplier’ and not ‘the Force’ itself. It ought to be dovetailed into the strategy of war-making rather than making itself a prime instrument of war. The old adage still holds well that it was not the machine but the man behind the machine who matters.

“This morning, on Shabbat and a holiday, Hamas invaded Israeli territory and murdered innocent citizens, including children and the elderly. Hamas has started a brutal and evil war.”

— Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister on X.

The biggest fallacy of 20th-century war-making is that technology can replace human beings! It cannot. Air Defence plans, totally dependent upon technology, such as the Patriot (Phased Array Tracking Radar for Intercept On Target) system of the United States of America (USA) or S-400/500 of Russia, or more importantly, the Iron Dome of Israel, are never foolproof.

This is more evident from the Hamas rocket attack. It was the obvious failure of the Iron Dome in the face of bursts of missiles/rockets being fired. It could not prevent most rockets from sneaking through the air defence system. Latest reports suggest that Israel has suffered some 600 dead and over 2000 injured. This indicates that most rockets got through the Iron Dome.

Another issue which crops up is the limitation of technology to provide foolproof surveillance. It brings in the need for the coupling of human intelligence with technological devices. Well-trained manpower is essential to interpret and infer the information coming through technological gadgets. This could be underground sensors or radars.

Even defences based on concrete material or obstacles are not impregnable. It is suffice to know that, in the Second World War, Germans circumvented the Maginot Line, which was a fortress type of defence. In the wake of technologically advanced weapon systems, the ‘Fortress defences’, whether of concrete or a water obstacle, create a false sense of complacency amongst soldiers.

The element of surprise springs from this feeling of complacency prevailing amongst enemy soldiers. This is further evidenced when Egypt breached the Suez Canal on a Yom Kippur Day in 1973, with total surprise. The invincibility of Canal defences proved to be false.

One has to also note how the Hamas’ deception plan’ worked and how surprise was achieved. One does wonder as to how Hamas managed the scale of this op without detection by Mossad. Was it alone, or were other Arab nations involved? There seems to be years of preparation involved. Was Israel and Mossad fooled by peace talks with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), thus allowing Mossad to ignore obvious Hamas activities?

There seems to be some kind of involvement of other Arab nations, willingly or otherwise. Iran and China might be suppliers of equipment and weaponry, but the deception plan to fool Mossad and Israel points towards UAE footprints.

The Hamas deception plan seems to have been worked out meticulously— which included secretly transporting and storing 5000 rockets, preparing them for launch and firing them within 20 minutes. Were Israeli technological devices jammed over a period of time? It seems unlikely because it would have alerted Mossad. Jamming might have taken place hours/minutes before the launch of the operation.

Israel’s technological devices must have had the signatures of Hamas preparing, but it needed interpretation. It should also be noted as to how Mossad’s attention was diverted towards the ‘dream of peace’ by Arab nations. Gliders coming from the Gaza Strip should have been detected. Herein lies a flaw in the makeup of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The regular army had only skeleton headquarters (HQs) or minimum essential manpower, who were totally dependent on technology to respond. ‘Skeleton manpower’ failed to combat hundreds of Hamas Gliders landing on them.

Israel will have to reconsider its policy of a ‘reservist army’. It has to have an adequate ‘Standing Army’. Fixed tenure ‘half-soldiers’ have different priorities than those who take their job seriously. There is an attitudinal disorder because of their concern for the future. But it is not to say that they were less patriotic. The flaw is in the mental conditioning of a person. Tenure-based soldiering works as a routine matter.

The Indian Army, too, modelling on the Israeli philosophy of soldiering, ought to revisit its policy of ‘temporary soldiers’ (Agniveers) replacing ‘Full-Time Soldiers’. While Israel might have chosen the policy of a ‘reservist army’ due to manpower paucity, India does not have such a shortage. India ought to learn this lesson because it has ‘Hamas Type’ terrorists gathered across Western borders! The Hamas-attack model might give them fresh ideas.

-An ex-NDA and Wellington Staff College graduate, Col Rajinder Singh is a renowned author and security analyst. He has authored four books, two individually and two in collaboration. His best-selling books are Kashmir – A Different Perspective and The ULFA Insurgency. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda