The Indian Army has an existing fleet of over 2,000 Russian-origin BMP-II vehicles; which will need to be replaced as and when they complete their operational life. Despite all the noise about ‘Aatmanirbharta in Defence’, we are decades away from achieving self-reliant defence in sufficient measure, notwithstanding the poetic sloganeering of Amrit Kaal and what not. Among the many reasons for this, one major reason is that India spends only $2 billion annually on R&D compared to $975 billion by the USA and $575 billion by China.
At the same time, considerable progress has been made in indigenous development of ICVs. Tata Advanced Systems and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) have jointly produced the Wheeled Armoured Platform (WhAP), also called TATA ‘Kestrel’, which was first unveiled during DefExpo 2014 in Delhi. WhAP is an 8×8 amphibious ICV that has performed well in high-altitude trials. WhAP development was taken up to provide a common platform for wheeled APC, ICV with 30 mm cannon, Light Tank with 105 mm main gun, command post vehicle, ambulance, special purpose platform, 120 mm mortar carrier and CBRN Vehicle.
WhAP is designed for modern warfare keeping in mind crew survivability, protection against small arms fire, mobility and protection against concealed explosives. It is equipped with Kongsberg 30-mm cannon, which can be fired remotely. It can fire high-explosive incendiary (HEI), armour-piercing incendiary (API), and armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot tracer (APFSDS-T) rounds with a 30-mm calibre. It has an effective range of 3,000m. The 40-mm grenade launchers are used as a secondary weapon. It can accommodate anti-tank missiles or a 12.7mm machine gun.
Former Vice Chief of Army Staff says, “We tend to stick to the West because the costs are more and thus a larger cut.” The ‘cuts’ are decided in advance and the money reaches the destinations ‘before’ the actual contract is signed.
In October 2019, the MoD cleared production of WhAP and export to friendly countries. The Indian Army reportedly plans to acquire 200 WhAP. The first batch of WhAP was inducted into the Indian Army on April 12, 2022. The ITBP is also being equipped with WhAP. WhAP can carry 2+9 soldiers compared to 3+8 by Stryker. WhAP’s power-to-weight ratio is 25, compared to Stryker’s 17.24. WhAP weighs 24.5 tons compared to 20.3 ton weight of Stryker, but with better power to weight ratio the WhAP is better suited for difficult terrain.
The DRDO began developing the tracked ICV ‘Abhay’ in the 1970s, it announced in 2008 that the Technology Demonstration Programme for the development of Abhay was successful and the technologies developed can be adapted for futuristic ICV and light-tracked vehicle projects. Subsequently, DRDO in collaboration with Larsen and Toubro (L&T) developed the ‘Zorawar’ Light Tank, which used some of the systems developed for Abhay. After successful trials of Zorawar, the first batch of these tanks is to be delivered to the Indian Army shortly.
Now the ground is being prepared for off-the-shelf procurement and co-production of the American ‘Stryker’ ICV in India, which the US has been hard-selling to India since its first offer in 2000. During the Indo-US joint Exercise ‘Yudh Abhyas-2009’ in the deserts of India, the US contingent deployed the Stryker ICVs. Before the visit of the US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan to India on June 17-18 for reviewing the ‘Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), US Secretary of Defence Lloyd J Austin cited the “co-production of armoured vehicles with India” as yet another indicator of the upward trajectory in the bilateral defence partnership during the Shangri La Dialogue (May 31 to June 2) this year.
Media reports of June 17, 2024, stated that India and the US are in an advanced stage of talks for joint manufacture of the Stryker ICVs. The project is envisaged in three phases: one, limited off-the-shelf purchases under America’s foreign military sales (FMS) programme; two, joint production in India, and; three, co-development of futuristic armoured versions of Stryker ICV. The report said while the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is examining the US proposal, the US has offered to demonstrate the mobility and firepower of the eight-wheeled Stryker ICV in high-altitude terrain.
It can be taken for granted that the transfer of technology (ToT) of the Stryker, especially its engine, will not be complete, given that the United States has only approved 80 per cent ToT of the GE 414-F Engine to India, despite declaring 100 per cent ToT.
Subsequent media reports of July 2024 said that the Indian Army is undertaking trials of the Stryker ICV, the Army initially procured around 530 Stryker ICVs, apparently to address the requirement of 10 wheeled battalions of the standard mechanised infantry battalions. It is being propagated that the Army has picked up the Stryker ICV although the indigenous ICV also has the wheeled variant.
The above is happening despite the fact that the Stryker is not even amphibious (which the Army wants) and the Stryker ICV’s Caterpillar C7 350 horsepower engine is underpowered for deployment in mountains and high altitudes. Moreover, the off-the-shelf procurement of the Stryker ICV is being done without any modifications. This amounts to throttling the concept of Aatmanirbharta in Defence and indigenous development of the ICV. There has been no statement by the Army that its existing fleet of BMP-II ICVs needs immediate replacements; so why the off-the-shelf imports of Stryker ICVs?
Why this is happening is well explained by a former Vice Chief of Army Staff who says, “We tend to stick to the West because the costs are more and thus a larger cut.” The easiest way is to put all the blame on the Army while the bureaucrats, on whom the politicians depend, call the shots. No defence deal in India is without underhand dealings. The “cuts” are decided in advance and the money reaches the destinations “before” the actual contract is signed. While the defence secretary continues to be tasked with the defence of India, the services of the defence minister are used to collect whatever finances he can muster for the political party he/she belongs to.
The main question is whether we could meet our operational requirements with the 100 per cent indigenous WhAP ICV and Zorawar Light Tank (that can even be modified further if required) or if we still need joint production of the Stryker.
The Indian Army is also being blamed for another order to import 73,000 SiG-716 assault rifles from the US at the cost of Rs 837 crore. But no one is asking why the AK-203 facility, inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2019, has failed to meet the assault rifle requirements of the Indian Army.
It can be taken for granted that the transfer of technology (ToT) of the Stryker, especially its engine, will not be complete, given that the US has only approved 80 per cent ToT of the GE 414-F Engine to India, despite declaring 100 per cent ToT – why make false promises knowing they will not be kept? What will “actually” be the percentage of indigenous content in the co-produced Stryker ICVs? Can the bureaucracy also explain, that if the GE 414 Engine ToT was only to be 80 per cent, did we even consider the Russian turbofan / augmented turbofan engine for our Tejas Mk-1A and Tejas Mk-II fighter jets?
How the US has upset India’s LCA Tejas schedule has been covered in these columns earlier. It may be recalled that the US offered to relocate the entire F-21 (a revamped F-16) fighter jet production facilities of Northrop Grumman to India in the 1990s; to throttle India’s nascent LCA programme. Is the Stryker offer to stymie Indian efforts for 100 per cent indigenisation and why – to facilitate imports? Finally, the question is can we meet our operational requirements with the 100 per cent indigenous WhAP ICV and Zorawar Light Tank (that can even be modified more if at all required) or do we still need joint production of the Stryker?
-The writer is an Indian Army veteran. Views expressed are personal.
The author is an Indian Army veteran. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
