The Tejas light combat aircraft is arguably the most impressive achievement of India’s aerospace industry, today. The Mark 1 version is already a capable fighter and after years of being based at Tamil Nadu’s Sulur Air Force Base – far from the danger zones – today two squadrons are being raised near the Pakistan border.

The deployment at a forward air base, where reaction times are often measured in seconds rather than minutes, indicates the IAF’s confidence in the aircraft’s abilities to take on the adversary’s latest jet fighters. The next generation Mark 2 is poised to become an even more advanced fighter, indicating that the Indian armament industry has finally adopted the ladder approach, where more advanced – and innovative – versions of weapons systems are constantly being designed, tested and produced for all branches of the armed forces.

India’s Chandigarh Gang

But there’s a more sober lesson to be learnt from the Tejas story. If the BJP hadn’t won in 2014, the Tejas would definitely have been canned. The ‘Chandigarh Gang’ in cahoots with the Congress would have cancelled the jet, saying it “doesn’t meet the IAF’s stringent requirements”.

RSN Singh, a former military intelligence officer who later served in the Research & Analysis Wing, writes in Canary Trap about the Chandigarh Gang that surfaced as the “mainstay of the international arms lobby” during the decade long UPA rule. “This gang is not necessarily in Chandigarh alone, but nevertheless is centered around it,” Singh writes. “It comprises some retired officers, politicians, journalists and prominent newspapers.”

Tejas’s deployment at a forward air base, where reaction times are often measured in seconds rather than minutes, indicates the IAF’s confidence in the Tejas’s abilities to take on the adversary’s latest jet fighters

The Congress had cancelled the excellent HAL Marut HF-24 – the first operational jet fighter designed and produced by an Asian country. Developed in the 1950s and inducted in 1964, it was killed by the IAF and the Indian government in favour of the MiG-21, a fighter that was notoriously crash prone.

The Marut’s only weakness was that it was underpowered – this was because the government had refused to spend a measly Rs 1.3 crore on a new engine with British assistance. Remember, the Prime Minister who refused to approve this amount used to get his clothes dry-cleaned in London. Jawaharlal Nehru had dispatched an Indian destroyer to symbolically offer flowers in the sea to his lover Edwina Mountbatten.

Austrian aerospace designer Ferdinand Brandner believed that the failure of India to develop a better engine for the Marut was due to pressure from the Soviet Union. Indeed, once India went for the easy option of licensed-producing the MiG-21, the IAF lost all interest in further development of the Marut.

The 1971 War

Despite its limitations, the Marut performed well in the 1971 War. The National Interest writes: “The Marut remained in the thick of the action throughout the thirteen-day war, strafing airfields, bombing ammunitions dumps, and hitting tanks and artillery on the frontlines – flying over two hundred sorties and suffering three losses to ground fire. A strafing Pakistani Air Force F-104 Starfighter destroyed a fourth Marut on the ground while taxiing on the runway at Uttarlai.

Nonetheless, the HF-24s boasted a high serviceability rate and proved quite tough, with several of the jets managing to return the base on just one engine if the other was shot up. Major Bakshi of 220 Squadron even scored an air-to-air kill in his Marut on 7 December 1971, when he pounced upon a Pakistani F-86 Sabre, a Korean War–era jet fighter.”

The failure of India to develop a better engine for the Marut was due to pressure from the Soviet Union. Indeed, once India went for the easy option of licensed-producing the MiG-21, the IAF lost all interest in further development of the Marut

Sanjay Badri-Maharaj writes in Swarajya magazine that the Marut is the story of India’s short-sightedness in engine development, which wrecked the prospects of the promising HF-24 Marut. “It should be noted that while underpowered, the Marut was an excellent weapons platform and though somewhat short on range, its performance characteristics – even with the Mk.703 were not dissimilar to contemporary types like the French Dassault Etendard IVM (which served until 1987) or even the Dassault Super Mystere B.2 (which continued in service until 1996 with Honduras). In contrast, the last Maruts left squadron service in 1985.”

Badri-Maharaj adds that one of the reasons the IAF was never entirely supportive of the Marut project was because its immediate requirements were being catered for by a substantial infusion of Soviet aircraft – the Su-7 for tactical strike and the MiG-21FL/M and MF variants.

“A very realistic and cost-effective proposal to create a strike-fighter based around the Marut airframe and the R-25 engine (the HF-25) received no sanction and while efforts to procure RB-199 turbofans were seriously considered for a Marut Mk.3 – the HF-73 – the project failed to materialise.”

While Soviet weapons were cheap; came with long-term low interest loans; and provided good bang for the buck, India’s defence ties with Moscow led to a dangerous dependence on a single vendor.

The Soviet weapons were cheap; came with long-term low interest loans; and provided good bang for the buck, India’s defence ties with Moscow led to a dangerous dependence on a single vendor

According to a Royal United Services Institute report titled India’s New Armament Strategy: A Return to Self-Sufficiency, by the end of the Cold War, India was 100 per cent dependent on the Soviet Union for ground air defence; 75 per cent for fighter aircraft; 60 per cent for ground attack aircraft; 100 per cent for tracked armoured vehicles; 80 per cent for tanks; 100 per cent for guided missile destroyers; 95 per cent for conventional submarines; and 70 per cent for frigates.

Taking to the sky

In this backdrop, the symbolism of Narendra Modi flying in the Tejas must not be underestimated. It was his Defence Minister, the late Manohar Parrikar, who cracked the whip and told the IAF to better get used to the Tejas because the service was not getting away this time. Parrikar lifted an aircraft that was struggling for 30 years from certain obsolescence.

Having an indigenous aircraft like the Tejas is critical because during war any losses can be quickly replaced. Try getting a Rafale fighter from France in the middle of a war. The French will charge a 50 per cent markup.

When the Tejas proves its mettle in a dogfight or a successful raid into enemy territory, it will generate interest in air forces around the world. This is the way to sell it overseas in substantial numbers

The capabilities developed in the Indian aerospace industry for the Tejas are playing a major role in the development of the AMCA stealth fighter, which may take off by the early 2030s. AMCA too, would have been cancelled, had India opted for the Russian Su-57, but in fact it’s become a priority project of India’s aerospace sector.

But the real test of a weapons system comes in a real life conflict. India needs to spark a border war with Pakistan and use the Tejas to hit enemy targets and aircraft to demonstrate its capabilities. There is no better way to test your weapons.

Only when the Tejas proves its mettle in a dogfight or a successful raid into enemy territory will it generate interest in air forces around the world. This is the way to sell it overseas in substantial numbers. France did this with the Rafale in 2011 in Libya. Russian sales of its weapons took off after it destroyed ISIS strongholds in Syria in 2015.

The Americans of course are the masters of using war as PR for their latest weapons. So why should India be a saint? At any rate, India has had many warrior saints and they would approve of hard nose realpolitik.

– The writer is a globally cited defence analyst. His work has been published by leading think tanks, and quoted extensively in books on diplomacy, counter terrorism, warfare and economic development. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda