India-Türkiye relations have reached a new low, with New Delhi adopting a calibrated diplomatic distancing strategy in response to Ankara’s perceived support for Pakistan. This downturn is rooted in Türkiye’s political, ideological and military actions that have repeatedly undermined India’s core security concerns, especially after India’s precision counter-terror strikes following the Pahalgam attack, Operation Sindoor. Not only did Ankara brand India’s operation as “provocative,” but it also seemingly deepened its defence engagement with Pakistan during heightened Indo-Pak tensions. This further aggravated New Delhi. In response, India has taken a series of steps, from delaying the diplomatic credentials of the incoming Turkish Ambassador to reviewing trade, security, academic, and cultural ties. This reset underscores that India’s strategic patience has its limits and that partnerships must be anchored in mutual sensitivity and respect.
The immediate trigger for Türkiye’s renewed hostility was an interview of retired Greek Ambassador Leonidas T. Chrysanthopoulos published in The Sunday Guardian on 1 June. The ambassador, who also served as Consul General to Ankara, advocated stronger India-Greece strategic cooperation to counter Turkish provocations, including joint naval and military exercises in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Seas and people-to-people linkages. Although non-official, the interview unnerved Ankara, and there was a series of articles criticising the Greek ambassador’s approach and endorsement of a regional realignment that may act as a bulwark against Türkiye. This overreaction reaffirms Türkiye’s geopolitical insecurity and its unwillingness to accept any cooperation that challenges its perceived zone of influence.
Post-Operation Sindoor: Türkiye’s Provocative Stance
India’s Operation Sindoor was an open, declared, precise and limited counter-terror mission targeting nine terror hideouts in Pakistan-occupied territory and a few regions of Pakistan. It was a focused, non-escalatory measure, avoiding any civilian or infrastructural damage. Yet, Türkiye termed it “provocative” in its official statements, aligning once again with Pakistan’s narrative. This was not merely rhetorical but indicated that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be shaped by neo-Ottoman Islamic identity politics rather than realpolitik. If this is not enough, Turkish drones, ammunition, and advanced ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) technologies have also reportedly found their way into Pakistan’s military inventory.
Additionally, if at all Ankara intended to project neutrality, it would have postponed its high-level military intelligence delegation sent to Pakistan amidst peak tensions with India in late April. It was reported that on 30 April, Türkiye had sent a high-level military intelligence delegation headed by Lt Gen Yasir Kodioglu to Pakistan. On the contrary, Türkiye justified it as a “pre-scheduled” visit, an argument that rings hollow given the prevailing geopolitical climate. Diplomacy often demands symbolism, and postponing that visit would have sent a more responsible message. Türkiye did not make any effort of such kind.
Türkiye’s Military Support to Pakistan and Strategic Posturing
Türkiye’s military linkages with Pakistan are no secret. From supplying the Bayraktar TB2 drones to co-producing MILGEM warships through the PN-MILGEM Corvette project, Ankara has nurtured a military-industrial alignment with Islamabad. By late April, that is, when the India-Pakistan tensions were rising, cargo ships flagged under Turkish companies took halts in Pakistan under the garb of “refuelling,” raising suspicion of covert military exchanges. Such moves during a high-alert military phase between India and Pakistan signal Türkiye’s calculated intent to bolster Pakistan’s capabilities.
Open-source intelligence (OSINT) trackers while analysing flight path data have indicated that one or possibly as many as six C-130E Hercules aircraft landed in Karachi suggesting a significant transfer of military equipment to Pakistan. The supplies reportedly included Bayraktar TB2 drones, Songar and Yiha drone systems, T-155 Firtina self-propelled howitzers, and MAM-L smart micro munitions, among other advanced weaponry. There are indications that Turkish defence exports to Pakistan have crossed US$6.6 million in the last three years and that it is on the rise.
India’s Diplomatic and Political Pushback
India responded with a mix of quiet diplomacy and calculated assertiveness. The clearest sign was the indefinite postponement of the presentation of credentials by the incoming Turkish Ambassador, Ambassador Ali Murat Ersoy, who had to return to Ankara without completing the diplomatic formalities. This is no ordinary snub. India has also placed on hold several bilateral institutional dialogues and has cut back on defence and counter-terrorism cooperation mechanisms.
On the trade front, Indo-Turkish bilateral trade has witnessed a substantial decline. In the fiscal year 2024–25 (till April), trade fell by over 37 per cent compared to the previous year. Trade between the two countries stood at nearly US$10.43 billion. Several Indian airports, following advisories from the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), have reviewed security cooperation agreements involving Turkish companies, including the suspension of Celebi Aviation’s clearance over national security concerns. Türkiye’s state-sponsored news outlets such as TRT World, Anadolu Agency, and others have been blacklisted on Indian digital media platforms for spreading anti-India content. Indian regulatory bodies have also flagged and banned Turkish-linked social media accounts disseminating disinformation.
India has taken a series of steps, from delaying the diplomatic credentials of the incoming Turkish Ambassador to reviewing trade, security, academic, and cultural ties. This reset underscores that India’s strategic patience has limits and that partnerships must be anchored in mutual sensitivity and respect
Tourism and Educational Ties Take a Hit
Public sentiment in India has also turned firmly against Türkiye. Until 2023-24, over 3.3 lakh Indian tourists visited Türkiye annually. This number has seen a drastic decline, with travel agencies reporting that the vast majority of Indian travellers are now choosing Greece, Croatia, Italy, and the Balkans instead. The symbolism is powerful. Indians no longer see Türkiye as a cultural or tourist haven but as an unfriendly state.
The chill has extended to academia as well. Premier Indian institutions both central and private, such as Jawaharlal Nehru University, Jamia Millia Islamia, Maulana Azad National Urdu University, IIT Roorkee, Chandigarh University, Lovely Professional University, and Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj University have either refused to sign new MoUs with Turkish universities or stalled existing agreements. Academic diplomacy, once a modest bridge between the two countries, has suffered an unmistakable freeze.
One of the direct consequences of these academic disengagements will be the curbing of the influence of Diyanet, Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs, which has quietly expanded its presence in India through educational scholarships targeted exclusively at Muslim students. These scholarships, masked as cultural or religious outreach, have raised alarms in Indian security circles for allegedly promoting Ankara’s ideological worldview among Indian youth. Currently, six Diyanet-linked centres operate across India, and with the academic ties weakening, India is now better positioned to monitor and curtail any attempts at ideological indoctrination that run counter to the country’s pluralistic and secular ethos.
Balkan Outreach and Regional Realignments
India is now recalibrating its Mediterranean and Balkan outreach. Strengthening ties with Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania is not just reactive diplomacy but a proactive strategy to diversify partnerships in Europe’s strategic south. Since last year, India has already started to strengthen its Mediterranean outreach given its India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) centrality. New Delhi has launched the India-Mediterranean Initiative (IMI) along with its European partners. While most of these approaches are IMEC-centric, it will help bolster bilateral relations with European Mediterranean partners. In that context, India-Greece defence ties are expanding, with planned joint naval drills in the Eastern Mediterranean. The erstwhile Greek ambassador’s interview, though independent, catalysed public debate on the importance of Indo-Hellenic cooperation to check Turkey’s revisionist tendencies. In that context, Ankara’s defensive posturing underscores the very need for this regional realignment.
Indian companies are also exploring investment opportunities in Balkan infrastructure, tourism, and energy sectors, further underlining the strategic shift away from Türkiye. In short, economic calculations are not on Türkiye’s side. Indian medical tourism, student flow, and business visits make up a significant share of Ankara’s soft power income. With tourism numbers crashing and educational partnerships dissolving, Turkey faces a considerable economic blow, an estimated loss of over $400 million in potential revenue annually from Indian engagement alone.
The US Missile Deal to Türkiye: A Cause for Concern
Amidst India’s diplomatic distancing of Türkiye, the US decision to supply US$304 million worth of AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM missiles as a geopolitical reprieve for Ankara, has become a cause for concern for India. While it is speculated that the quality and scale of missile systems being provided to Türkiye will differ substantially from what the US supplies to Israel or other core NATO allies; yet there are concerns about Türkiye diverting these missiles or critical components to Pakistan through clandestine means. Ankara’s consistent backing of Pakistan, particularly at forums like the OIC, has only deepened India’s distrust.
India has made its concerns known through diplomatic backchannels. India’s seven all-party parliamentary delegation, sent to various capitals following Operation Sindoor, has flagged these risks and urged Western capitals to re-evaluate their strategic commitments to Türkiye. The delegation has also urged Ankara to press Islamabad to take credible and verifiable action against cross-border terrorism emanating from its territory. India’s message this time is unambiguous. Bilateral relationships must be built on mutual sensitivity. It expects its global partners, including Türkiye, to act responsibly.
Retired Greek Ambassador Leonidas T. Chrysanthopoulos’ interview unnerved Ankara and there was a series of articles criticising the Greek ambassador’s approach and endorsement of a regional realignment that may act as a bulwark against Türkiye. This overreaction reaffirms Türkiye’s geopolitical insecurity and its unwillingness to accept any cooperation that challenges its perceived zone of influence
Key Takeaways
If Ankara seeks to maintain relevance in an evolving global landscape, it would benefit from recalibrating its foreign policy approach from one driven by ideological affinities to one informed by strategic pragmatism. Continued support for Pakistan, while rooted in religious, historical and political considerations, offers limited returns in the current geopolitical context, particularly if it comes at the expense of relations with India, an emerging global actor and a principal voice for the Global South. Türkiye must choose realism over rhetoric.
India’s expanding influence as both a regional and emerging global player necessitates that it be approached through a lens of strategic engagement rather than historical biases. In an era increasingly defined by strategic autonomy and multipolar alignments, the capacity to forge balanced and interest-driven partnerships will shape the contours of future diplomacy. Türkiye’s choices in this regard will determine whether it remains tethered to legacy positions or adapts constructively to a more interconnected and plural international order. India’s responses so far suggest a firm, calibrated posture that aligns with its national interests and public sentiment.
The writer focuses on contemporary Middle Eastern affairs and is the author of 'India and the Gulf: A Security Perspective'. She is also a subject matter expert at the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies.
