The world is witnessing prolonged wars on two fronts, in Europe and Asia, as conflicts continue in Ukraine and Gaza. Many lessons have been drawn by militaries worldwide, closely following the developments on the war fronts. What is unique about these wars is the unconventional nature of these seemingly conventional battles, especially in Ukraine. The intensity and violence perpetrated by the Ukraine war are reminiscent of theories laid down for modern warfighting to be extremely intense and short-duration conflicts. However, this prolonged war, now entering its third year, makes it the longest active war since World War II.
While these new manifestations in warfighting are fascinating, they may not be entirely of critical concern for the Indian Armed Forces, especially for the Indian Army, because conventional wars remain the most significant concern for the armed forces. However, the geopolitical realities around Indian borders are complex. The warfare in a Grey Zone must have drawn the attention of military strategists and policymakers. A Grey Zone war consists of operations conducted on the canvas between peace and wartime. With massive technological evolution, new concepts involving political interference, election meddling, economic coercion, use of proxies, cyber-attacks, and many such dubious tactics have evolved that give major advantages to an aggressor, especially if it is a technologically superior adversary.
Complex Security Challenges
India faces persistent threats from an unpredictable adversary on its northern border and has undertaken major steps to boost its operational readiness across the LAC. This has resulted in quantified augmentation in new capacity and infrastructure build-up. There has been improved connectivity, better border monitoring mechanisms, and newer landing grounds in forward areas, enabling quick movement of logistics and of course, recalibration of troop deployments.
On average, India has built 856 km of border roads per year in the last five years. All these measures on the ground have been further boosted by the induction of newer platforms and equipment in the border areas. The unambiguous demonstration of military capabilities has been considered an effective means of strategic signalling. A collective outcome has been better stabilisation of LAC, though the unease remains.
If the pattern is analysed threadbare, it can be observed that over the past few years, the threat of a conventional war outbreak around Indian borders has been on the wane, nonetheless, the disturbances remain and witnessed a spike as well at places. The collusive threats along the western and northern borders are a distinct factor in the Indian Army’s allocation of resources and war planning. In more precise terms, the below-conventional threshold conflicts appear more realistic and have been a cause of some concern around India’s northern borders.
Operations in a Grey Zone war are conducted on the canvas between peace and wartime. With massive technological evolution, new concepts involving political interference, election meddling, economic coercion, use of proxies, cyber-attacks, and many such dubious tactics have evolved that give advantages to an aggressor, especially if it is technologically superior
The War
Every nation has certain pre-determined responses that get executed once a war is declared. Fighting a war doesn’t only require military but the response gets strengthened with all of national resources. Even within the military framework, certain action gets initiated only once it has to deal with a war scenario. Thus, the ‘declaration of war’ by a nation holds the key to several critical efforts at the national level being simultaneously executed by various stakeholders, which otherwise will not be there.
For instance, developments surrounding Doklam, Yangtse, or Galwan, have seen localised Chinese aggressions, limited in their geography and scope. But, all of them were designed by the Chinese to advance territorial claims. The intensity of these aggressions was reminiscent of larger pre-determined plans for sudden land-grabbing actions when everything appeared normal between both countries. The subsequent policy of China was to turn events into a new status quo without even having to bother about any serious consequences. But more importantly, in none of these cases, did national mobilisation occur or even ‘nation is at war’ declared!
Uncertainty Feeds Confusion
It may be right to believe that actions at LAC hardly merited such a strong response or was it? Ensuring the nation’s territorial integrity is a serious business for the Indian military. Thus, small-scale forced occupation, even on unresolved territorial claims, also warrants an equally firm response. The Indian Armed Forces amply demonstrated it during the Galwan incident. The issue of whether localised or not doesn’t vary much in the military calculus but surely it has a vast difference in response at a larger national level. This gap creates uncertainty as to how much to commit as forces need to maintain a composite posture across the borders.
The arming of Pakistan is China’s strategy to create a two-front criticality for India. It is believed that in case of a confrontation at LAC, China would be willing to keep it localised while enhancing the spectrum of hostilities in the Grey Zone. Pakistan would be willing to get involved with a nudge from China, considering it the best opportunity to get even with India
With a technologically advanced adversary across northern borders, willing to leverage high-end resources, including weapons, to the adversary on the western front, India has a serious challenge to its response mechanism. The recent announcement that the Pakistan Air Force is equipped with Chinese J-35 stealth fighters is part of several high-end weapons and technology transfers to Pakistan. The arming of Pakistan is China’s strategy to create a two-front criticality for India if a war breaks out. It is also believed that in case of a confrontation at LAC, China would be willing to keep it localised while enhancing the spectrum of hostilities in the Grey Zone. This strategy works best for them as they can exploit information warfare, and quick deployment capacities, disrupting critical supply chains and psychological operations. The advantage it would draw is the lack of attributability and accountability on international forums and obviate any clear military response.
How must it be Countered?
A clear understanding of the adversary is the first step to formulating effective countermeasures. Knowing China over the years makes it clear that India must not trust Beijing, or ‘Assume Nothing’ as the CIA’s famed ‘Moscow Rules’ suggest. When there is a conflict with China, it must be remembered that Pakistan will likely get involved with a nudge from China, considering it the best opportunity to get even.
Geopolitics changes faster than anticipated, endnote is always the self-capacity to counter envisaged threats. Internal resilience remains the key and planners would do best by factoring in the maximum possible threat. Prolonged and intense fighting in the Grey Zone could be a new reality that should be absorbed now
Today India can defend its territories and manage everything as per its national will. Whether the northern adversary wants to toy into the Grey Zone or not, it should not influence India’s preparedness and response mechanism, should it cross the laid down red lines? In this context, the Indian armed forces must critically monitor their thresholds across the northern borders at all times, and enhance capabilities to make those mechanisms much more reliable and robust.
Geopolitics changes faster than anticipated, endnote is always the self-capacity to counter envisaged threats. Internal resilience remains the key and planners would do best by factoring in the maximum possible threat. Prolonged and intense fighting in the Grey Zone could be a new reality that should be absorbed now.
-The writer has varied experience in the security paradigm and is a keen follower of global geopolitics. His work has been regularly featured in national publications. Visit newsanalytics.in to access more articles from the author. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
