Expanding Frontiers of War

Hybrid warfare challenges traditional notions of warfare, blurring the lines between state and non-state actors, and ushering in a new era of strategic complexity. In the Red Sea region, tensions between state and non-state actors have escalated, highlighting the intricate interplay of geopolitical interests and regional dynamics

By Niranjan Marjani

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The concept of warfare is continuously evolving and becoming broader and more complex, encompassing various elements beyond the traditional state-versus-state conflicts. War is no longer solely defined as conventional warfare between states; it now also includes conflicts between state actors, non-state actors, and criminal or proxy groups, termed as unconventional warfare.

Hybrid warfare is a military concept that has gained traction since the end of the Cold War among strategists, policymakers, and observers in the defence and security domain worldwide. Hybrid warfare could be defined as a combination of conventional and non-conventional warfare, where the involved entities employ cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and economic pressures in addition to military operations.

The Israel-Hamas war that began on October 7, 2023, is increasingly spilling over into a wider geographic expanse. This conflict has spread to the Indian Ocean Region and has taken on the form of a global conflict as several regional and extra-regional powers are now involved.

In addition to the conventional military conflict, elements of hybrid warfare are also becoming a part of this conflict.

The hybrid nature of the conflict in the Red Sea

The conflict in the Middle East, of which the conflict in the Red Sea is a subset, has several elements of hybrid warfare. Firstly, the war between Israel and Hamas is a war between a state and a non-state actor. Hamas governs Gaza, which is not a recognised state. Additionally, Hamas is designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States and the European Union.

Secondly, alongside the involvement of Hamas, Lebanon-based Hezbollah is also engaged in conflict with Israel. The Yemen-based Houthis, in a show of support for Hamas, have targeted commercial ships passing through the Red Sea, particularly those transiting to or from Israel. All three of these organisations are supported by Iran. Through these organisations, Iran is engaged in a proxy war with its adversaries like Israel and the Gulf States in different parts of the Middle East, including Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.

India is also involved in the development of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) along with Gulf States like the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, the Israel-Hamas war has delayed the development of this route

Third, at the operational level, the tactics employed by the Houthis are also part of hybrid warfare. Attacks on merchant ships through drones have been a prominent feature of the Houthis’ military strategy. Further, in the first week of March, several subsea internet cables were found damaged in the Red Sea. These attacks have only added to the complexities of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war.

Fourth, in addition to the attacks, the disinformation component of the hybrid war has gained prominence due to the attacks on the subsea internet cables. It was not immediately clear who had caused damage to these cables. Conflicting reports about this incident also obscure obtaining exact information about who could have caused this damage.

The Yemeni government indicated that the Houthis may have attacked these internet cables. Israel has also concurred with the Yemeni government and has blamed the Houthis. For their part, the Houthis have denied any responsibility in this incident. Meanwhile, a German internet firm, DE-CIX, has hinted that the damage to the cables was caused by an anchor from a ship that was attacked by the Houthis.

As mentioned previously, the theatre of this war is constantly expanding and has implications for India as well.

Implications for India

Before discussing the implications of the conflict in the Red Sea for India, it is pertinent to establish how India fits into the matrix of this conflict. While India is not a direct party involved in either the Israel-Hamas war or the conflict in the Red Sea, the spillover effects of this conflict stand to affect India. The absence of direct involvement implies that the conflicts in the Middle East are not directed against India, nor is India targeting any country or group as a part of this conflict. However, since hybrid warfare blurs the boundaries of conventional war, India, as a stakeholder in the Middle East, is vulnerable to these conflicts.

For its part, India has taken a multi-pronged approach since the start of this conflict to address the challenges arising from it. At the diplomatic level, while condemning the terror attack by Hamas and supporting Israel, India has also sent humanitarian aid to Gaza.

At the strategic level, the Indian Navy has been involved in protecting commercial vessels passing through the Red Sea. Since November 2023, several commercial ships have been subjected to attacks by the Houthis. The attacks have included direct confrontations, hijackings of ships, and attacks through drones. By engaging with the attackers and thwarting the attacks, India has positioned itself as a net security provider in the Western Indian Ocean.

Regarding the implications, India faces two principal perspectives:

First, this conflict has compelled India to reroute its trade with Europe. The Suez Canal route serves as the primary transit route for India’s trade with Europe. With the conflict in the Red Sea, India, along with several other countries, is forced to take a longer route through the Cape of Good Hope. This not only extends the delivery time by 15-20 days but also increases transit costs due to increased freight rates and insurance premiums. India is also involved in the development of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) along with Gulf States like the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, the Israel-Hamas war has delayed the development of this route. For India, which concluded a free trade agreement with the UAE in 2022 and is in talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Union for similar agreements, the current conflict in the Red Sea could further delay the materialisation of these economic engagements.

Second, the damage to the subsea internet cables, part of the cyber warfare, could have multi-dimensional impacts on India. These cables are conduits for data transmission and global communication, including internet traffic, telephone calls, and data exchanges. India is among the major hubs for subsea cables worldwide, with Mumbai having about 20 cables and Chennai having nine. As a hub, India connects various regions like the Middle East, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Europe through these subsea cables. As one of the largest and fastest-growing economies in the world, India depends on high-speed connectivity for its economic activity and digital services. With digital public infrastructure becoming a backbone of the Indian economy, it is imperative for India to be nimble-footed to counter these threats.

The Israel-Hamas war has destabilised the Middle East, thereby putting temporary brakes on, if not totally derailing, the peace efforts between the Arab States and Israel for the past few years. However, hybrid warfare, which also includes grey zone warfare carried out during the ambiguous time period between war and peace, is likely to continue

This war has destabilised the Middle East, thereby putting temporary brakes on, if not totally derailing, the peace efforts between the Arab States and Israel for the past few years. The immediate trigger may be the Israel-Hamas war. However, hybrid warfare, which also includes grey zone warfare carried out during the ambiguous time period between war and peace, is likely to continue. Overall, global wars are increasingly becoming complicated, making it difficult to distinguish them as conventional or unconventional. The geopolitics of the Middle East is also defined by states involved in unconventional conflicts with their adversaries through employing proxy groups or non-state actors.

For India, which is not directly pitched against any of the conflicting sides in the Middle East, diplomacy remains a primary mechanism to secure its interests. Simultaneously, India also needs to strengthen its own capabilities to counter the direct or indirect impact of hybrid warfare, particularly in the cyber domain, as it remains a crucial component across economic and strategic domains. Only through continuous upgrades in its hybrid warfare capabilities can India meet the challenges posed by the emerging complex theatres of war.

–The writer is an Independent Political Analyst and Researcher based in Vadodara. Follow him on Twitter: @NiranjanMarjani. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda