The PLA Navy’s submarine presence in the Indian Ocean, ever since it deployed one of its submarines there ostensibly for anti-piracy patrols, has been a matter of concern for India. This concern has been frequently raised by successive Naval Chiefs and strategic analysts. The presence is poised to grow exponentially in the next decade as the PLA Navy’s rapid expansion continues unabated.
The PLA Navy’s expansion over the last decade has been spectacular, and its growth rate is unmatched in scale and scope by any other contemporary navy. Numerically, it is already the world’s largest navy with over 350 ships in commission, and it is expected to reach about 450 ships by the end of this decade. Approximately one-third of its force is anticipated to be blue water-capable. Presently, despite these impressive numbers, it lacks adequate blue water power projection presence both in terms of the capability of its platforms and the confidence to sustain its deployments in ‘far seas,’ including the Indian Ocean. Its two aircraft carriers, impressive as they are, have yet to venture beyond the Second Island Chain, and most of its maritime activities have been confined to the South China Sea and its adjacent waters.
Nevertheless, this has not deterred China from expanding its naval footprint in the Indian Ocean. At any given time, it is understood that there are approximately six PLA (N) ships deployed in the Indian Ocean. The Chinese naval base in Djibouti, its de facto control of Gwadar, and its maritime diplomacy through defence exports, naval base support, and economic largesse to regional countries, coupled with its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, are aimed at consolidating its presence in the Indian Ocean. This strategic positioning will facilitate the PLA Navy’s eventual breakout into the Indian Ocean with a formidable blue water presence, including an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group and nuclear attack submarines, supported by the necessary basing, logistic, and maintenance infrastructure for sustained deployment.
While the future presence of a large surface force in the Indian Ocean is indeed a cause for concern, the submarine presence poses a more potent threat. Unlike surface vessels that can be tracked and their intentions understood, submarines operating in the depths are challenging to monitor.
The Chinese naval base in Djibouti, its de facto control of Gwadar, and its maritime diplomacy through defence exports, naval base support, and economic largesse to regional countries, coupled with its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, are aimed at consolidating its presence in the Indian Ocean. This strategic positioning will facilitate the PLA Navy’s eventual breakout into the Indian Ocean with a formidable blue water presence
The PLA Navy boasts an impressive undersea warfare capability. Its submarine force includes four nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered conventionally armed attack submarines (SSN), and over fifty diesel-electric submarines (SSK). While the SSBNs of the Type 094 class focus on strengthening China’s nuclear deterrence, it is the SSNs and the SSKs that are of greater concern in conventional war-fighting.
China’s SSN Force
The PLA Navy currently operates six Type 093 SSNs, in three variants, with each version undergoing incremental improvements over its predecessor. These platforms are potent and at the forefront of China’s offensive naval power. A more advanced SSN, designated the Type 095, is under production and will serve as the nucleus of China’s undersea offensive capability in ‘far seas,’ either on independent deployments or integrated with surface force deployments, including Carrier Battle Groups.
It is understood that China intends to build 15 submarines of this class by the end of this decade, but a more conservative estimate suggests a more modest number of six to eight. By the end of this decade, China will have a minimum of 12-14 SSNs, enabling at least 7-9 submarines to be operational at any given time. Most of these will be deployed in the western Pacific and the South China Sea, furthering China’s aggressive intentions in the South and East China Seas and the Taiwan Straits. China is expected to deploy at least two SSNs in the Indian Ocean and its surrounding seas to counter India’s naval dominance.
There is a perception among Western analysts that Chinese SSNs are less silent than their contemporary Western counterparts. While this may be true for the present SSNs, which reportedly match the older Los Angeles class SSNs of the US Navy and the Akula-2 class of the Russian navy, the Type 095 SSNs may match the US Navy’s present Virginia class SSNs. However, one should never underestimate China’s capability. The Type 095 reportedly incorporates innovative stealth technologies in the design, including pump jet propulsions and raft-mounted machinery, which could match the stealth of comparable submarines.
China’s SSK Deployments
The PLA Navy, which once had 70-odd ancient Soviet-built Romeo-class and Ming-class boats, has rapidly modernized its conventional submarine force in the last decade. This modernization began with the import of Kilo-class (877 EKM) submarines from Russia, followed by the improved Kilo class (Type 636), also imported from Russia. Building on this experience, China started designing its own SSKs, including the Song Class and the Type 039 SSKs, progressively improved and now equipped with the Stirling engine Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) System. These are potent platforms armed with heavyweight torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, significantly enhancing the PLA Navy’s presence in the western Pacific and the South China Sea.
Despite these impressive numbers, the deployment of Chinese SSKs to the Indian Ocean is constrained by the distance of over 7000 miles they have to transit from their mainland. This limitation affects their available time on task in the operational area, considering the long return passage back to their home port.
China’s unfavourable maritime geography presents a second major limitation. Its SSKs are required to operate in restricted waters where depth is a constraint, as China has to defend its littoral waters within its First Island Chain and the South China Sea. Chinese submarines have to navigate through shallow and restricted littoral waters to exit into the open ocean and transit westwards towards the Indian Ocean.
The eastern Indian Ocean is bounded by three major straits connecting it to the Pacific Ocean. Of these, the Malacca Straits and the Sunda Straits are too narrow, shallow, and crowded for submarines to undertake a dived transit. This leaves only the Lombok Straits and the Ombai Wetar straits, located further south, with sufficient depth for dived transit of submarines. However, these increase the distance the submarine has to travel and are susceptible to detection en route by the ASW elements of the US Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, and other maritime forces in the region. Once they reach the approaches to these straits, they have to evade the substantial detection capabilities of the Southeast Asian navies. While exiting the straits, they must avoid encountering the ASW elements of the Indian Navy, which maintains constant vigilance in these waters.
China is working towards addressing these challenges. While it cannot alter its geography, it is leveraging its abundant capacities and economic clout to shape the environment and mitigate the risks to its maritime ambitions.
The Indian Ocean is critical to China’s great power ambitions, providing the sea space to exercise maritime power without the burden of unfavourable maritime geography. Additionally, it grants access to the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, crucial for an emerging maritime power. While Taiwan and the South China Sea will remain core interests for China, the future great power contestation for global supremacy is expected to take place in the Indian Ocean.
China established its first overseas naval base in Djibouti at the western extremity of the Indian Ocean in 2017, establishing a presence in the strategic waters of the Horn of Africa. Since then, this base has expanded, with reports suggesting that it will soon be capable of berthing an aircraft carrier. China has also made inroads into Iran to fill the power vacuum created by the US abrogation of JCPOA and the consequent sanctions imposed. Closer to India, the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Makran Coast in the North Arabian Sea, built with Chinese assistance as part of the major investment in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, is more or less controlled by China. While it may or may not become a Chinese naval base in the future, its availability to the PLA Navy is certain.
The likely submarine proliferation in India’s neighbourhood, with a large presence of Chinese-built submarines, provides China considerable leverage to its advantage and directly impacts India’s maritime security. India must, therefore, take measures to contain this through its maritime diplomacy, building a multinational strategic maritime network, developing a robust multi-dimensional undersea domain awareness architecture
For India, this presents a challenge as more than half of its trade transits through the western Indian Ocean. Additionally, a significant portion of India’s crude oil and gas transits through the Straits of Hormuz and the western Indian Ocean. Therefore, any challenge to India’s maritime pre-eminence in the west is a major vulnerability. In the Bay of Bengal, China has also made significant inroads. In 2017, it fulfilled Bangladesh’s maritime aspirations by providing two Ming-class submarines, leveraging this to construct a submarine base for the Bangladesh Navy. Commissioned earlier this year as BNS Sheikh Hasina, it has been operationalised and is capable of supporting six submarines. The operational capability of these 40-year-old Ming-class submarines is questionable, but for China, it provides strategic access to the Bay of Bengal.
In December 2021, China gave one Ming-class submarine to Myanmar in its effort to regain strategic space lost during Myanmar’s brief tryst with democracy. In 2020, India, in a bold show of defence diplomacy, gave one of its operational Kilo-class submarines to Myanmar. However, this gesture backfired as the military junta seized power a few months later, and China regained favour. China also intended to export three Type 039 submarines to Thailand, but the deal encountered difficulties, and it is expected that Thailand will receive a Chinese frigate instead. China’s submarine diplomacy in both Bangladesh and Myanmar ensures that its submarine maintenance specialists and equipment will be present in both countries. The availability of a submarine base in Bangladesh and submarine support in Myanmar addresses a major PLA (N) weakness regarding its submarine deployments.
In addition to these military facilities, China’s Belt and Road Initiative will provide it access and, in some cases, control of many ports in the Indo-Pacific littoral. While experts point out the considerable difference between a naval base and access to a port, they overlook the availability of submarine tenders and China’s dual-purpose merchant fleet. These can provide logistic and maintenance support in any of these ports, which already have a sizable presence of Chinese equipment and manpower. In the next few years, as China builds an adequate submarine force of SSNs and SSKs for prolonged deployments and a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, it is consolidating the infrastructure requirements to support them.
China’s defence diplomacy extends to shaping a favourable security environment around its perceived adversaries. In addition to providing military hardware to Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, etc., which does not pose a direct threat to India, China is arming Pakistan with four Type 052 frigates (designated as destroyers by the Pakistan Navy) equipped with anti-submarine weapons and sensors. More alarmingly, Pakistan is acquiring eight AIP-equipped Type 039 SSKs from China, with four being built in China and the remaining four in Pakistan. These are expected to enter service from 2025 onwards. Pakistan’s maritime strategy, centred on sea denial against India, is now reorienting towards a larger role in the Indian Ocean in its area of interest. This aligns with Chinese interests in developing Pakistan as a useful proxy to contain India in the Indian Ocean.
India, in response, is focusing on strengthening its multi-dimensional maritime domain awareness capability in recent years. The multi-mission deployment of Fleet ships across the Indian Ocean at any given time, institutional arrangements for information sharing with partner navies, numerous multilateral and bilateral exercises with other navies in the region, and its own surveillance efforts aim to anticipate developing situations that may threaten its interests. In the undersea dimension, the ability to operate the P8I Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) aircraft across wide swathes of the Indian Ocean, including deploying these from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, has significantly boosted efforts to detect and track the PLA Navy’s submarine movements, especially those intended for the Indian Ocean.
In 2022, the Indian Navy released an Unmanned Roadmap, which includes the requirements for unmanned underwater capability. An effective unmanned capability, comprising Extra Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (XLUUV), High Endurance Autonomous Underwater Vessels, and other kinetic and non-kinetic means of submarine detection, in line with global developments, across the approaches to the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, will be a force multiplier in the Indian Navy’s efforts to counter the Chinese submarine presence.
India should also leverage its strategic relationship with countries east of the Malacca Straits with robust anti-submarine capabilities to obtain information about Chinese submarine movements. Japan and the US have established a Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) network of seabed-based sensors called the ‘Fish Hook Undersea Defence Line’ since 2005. This network stretches from Japan to South East Asia, with key nodes at Okinawa, Guam, and Taiwan. There have been intermittent media reports since 2015 suggesting that India too is setting up a similar network stretching from Sumatra to Indira Point. An undersea cable has reportedly been laid connecting it to the existing Fish Hook system, forming an Indian Undersea wall against the penetration of Chinese submarines into the Indian Ocean. However, there is no official confirmation of this in the open domain.
Submarines form a key element in China’s future blue water aspirations. The development of its submarine force and the increase in its submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean merit concern. While China has every right to deploy its submarines in the high seas, it is crucial to monitor them and discern not only their presence but also their pattern of operations. The likely submarine proliferation in India’s neighbourhood, with a large presence of Chinese-built submarines, provides China considerable leverage to its advantage and directly impacts India’s maritime security. India must, therefore, take measures to contain this through its maritime diplomacy, building a multinational strategic maritime network, developing a robust multi-dimensional undersea domain awareness architecture, and strengthening the Indian Navy’s ability to deliver kinetic effect in the undersea domain to thwart any nefarious Chinese submarine intent in the Indian Ocean.
-The writer is the Vice President of the Indian Maritime Foundation, an Honorary Adjunct Fellow of the National Maritime Foundation, and on the Governing Body of the Society for Indian Ocean Studies. A submarine veteran and Anti-Submarine Warfare specialist, he commanded four submarines and a fleet ship. He was also the Indian Defence and Naval Adviser to the United Kingdom. He takes keen interest in matters maritime; writes and speaks extensively on the subject in India and abroad. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
