Not just India, Bhutan or Nepal, and Southeast Asian nations like Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei have to fend off their territories from China’s salami-slice strategy. Even Russia that claims to be enjoying limitless partnership with Beijing is facing a situation when it has to be on its toes to protect its land from China’s hostile grab.
Chinese land grabbing along Indian border
Since the 2020 Galwan Valley clash between Indian and Chinese troops, which left around 20 Indian soldiers dead, India and China continue to have their armies placed in an eyeball-to-eyeball position, especially in areas such as Depsang Plains and Demchok of eastern Ladakh.
India’s construction of a new road to its high-altitude forward airbase at Daulat Beg Oldie, considered to be the world’s highest landing ground, is seen as the major reason, which triggered the deadly clash between Indian and Chinese troops at the Galwan Valley.
Although the two countries have withdrawn their armies from Galwan, Pangong Tso and Patrolling Point-15, Patrolling Point-17 in the Gogra Hotsprings, China has refused to de-escalate and disengage its troops from Depsang Plains and Demchok, stating that they are legacy issues predating the 2020 standoff between the two countries.
China frequently uses the word ‘legacy’ to trash the border demarcated between Tibet and India during the British colonial rule. However, India says there cannot be normalcy in relations with Beijing unless China disengages from Depsang Plains and Demchok.
India’s construction of a new road to its high-altitude forward airbase at Daulat Beg Oldie, triggered the deadly clash between Indian and Chinese troops at the Galwan Valley
To resolve the standoff between the two countries, both sides have so far held 21 rounds of corps commander level talks but without any breakthrough. However, after every commander level meeting, one sentiment finds a permanent echo and that is: India and China agreed to maintain peace and tranquillity on the ground in border areas along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh.
China’s strategy
Despite this solemn commitment, China continues to settle people along the India-China and the China-Bhutan border. Along the 3,488 kms long Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries, China has set up villages on the banks of River Tsari Chu in Upper Subansiri district and near the River Kameng in Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh.
Reports have surfaced that China has constructed villages in Barahoti in Uttarakhand too, besides Ladakh and Sikkim. It is said that China is developing these villages, building mostly multi-storey, large, and spacious buildings at a rapid pace, sometimes as many as 300-400 houses in multi-story blocks within 90-100 days. According to China’s state-backed People’s Daily, more than 620 villages were set up in areas bordering the Tibetan Administrative Region by end-2021 alone.
China has also started settling people in these villages. It has recently settled 147 families in one of three villages that have been built along the disputed Bhutan-China border. Of this total, 38 families from the Tibetan city of Shigatse, were settled last year on 28 December in the newly expanded Tamalung village built along the Bhutan-China border.
Built at the end of 2022, Tamalung village had initially 70 homes accommodating 200 people, but now it has been expanded to accommodate as many as 235 families, the Hong Kong-based English daily said citing reports from local media. Another border village, Gyalaphug has also seen expansion, with it currently having more than 150 houses, South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong-based daily said.
As reported by China’s state-backed People’s Daily, more than 620 villages were set up in areas bordering the Tibetan Administrative Region by end-2021 alone
As per Foreign Policy, a US-based magazine, Gyalaphug village, which lies in the Beyul Khenpajong region, some 12,000 feet high in the Himalayan mountains the neighbouring Menchuma Valley too, has witnessed development of tens of miles of road and several key military buildings by 2021.
Interestingly, to camouflage its motive behind the strategy to settle Chinese nationals in areas bordering Bhutan, China has named these settlements as “moderate prosperity villages”.
Land Grabbing along Bhutan border
However, what is worrisome is that China is actively engaged in settling its people in areas, which are claimed by Bhutan. Both Beyul Khenpajong and Menchuma Valley fall within Bhutanese territory of “hidden valley” which is considered as sacred by the people of the Himalayan nation, with King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk’s family “tracing its ancestral heritage” to the area, Foreign Policy quoted Robert Barnett, an expert on Tibet and the China-Bhutan border as saying.
It is all happening even though Bhutan and China are holding talks to settle their lingering border dispute. In October 2021, the two countries signed an MoU for a three-stage process to resolve festering border disputes. It was never made public officially, but various media reports, including South China Morning Post suggested that it involved, delimitation of the border on paper, through visiting the demarcated area and then formally declaring the agreed boundary between the two countries.
In October 2023, the then Bhutanese Foreign Affairs and External Trade Minister Tandi Dorji went to Beijing to hold 25th round of boundary talks with Chinese officials. Later he told the media that the two countries are nearing the completion of the three-step roadmap. Early in 2023, then Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering in an interview with a Belgian newspaper said that demarcation of the Bhutan-China boundary would be settled at an early date.
The key areas of dispute between Bhutan and China are on the western border along the Chumbi Valley and two northern areas of Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys. Since 2020, China has also raised an additional claim over Doklam, which was the site of standoff between India and China in 2017.
China is also actively engaged in settling its people in areas, which are claimed by Bhutan, even including land, which is considered as sacred by the people of the Himalayan nation
Beijing claims that as many as 764 sq. km. territory of Bhutan, including areas of Jakarlung, Pasamlung valleys and Doklam are part of the Tibet Autonomous Region. But analysts term China’s claim as ‘blatant’. They say China is pushing forward its expansionist design in the name of Tibet. As per Foreign Policy, China is adopting all tricks up its sleeve to force Bhutan to cede areas of Jakarlung, Pasamlung valleys and Doklam to Beijing.
Chinese activities along Nepal border
China, though, is not settling villages in areas bordering Nepal, it is engaged in land grabbing activities in the Himalayan country. In 2022, Nepal’s Ministry of Agriculture reported land grabbing by China in at least 10 places falling in Humla, Rasuwa, Sindhupalchowk and Sankhuasabha districts.
As per a survey conducted by Nepal’s Ministry of Agriculture, China encroached on 36 hectares of land at 10 places on the Himalayan nation’s northern border. Nepali dailies had earlier reported incidents of China pushing the international boundary 1,500 metres inside Nepal near its Dolakha and Solukhumbu districts.
Analysts say China’s move to build roads, settle villages and develop other infrastructure in disputed areas closer to India, Bhutan or grabbing hectares of land in Nepal is part of the same design that it has adopted through an imaginary nine-dash line to claim as much as 90% of the South China Sea. Beijing has a regular fight with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei over the South China Sea.
China is not allowing the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei to engage in fishing or other activities like exploring for gas or oil in areas of the South China Sea
Chinese claims in South China Sea
In 2016, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, handling a dispute between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea, ruled in favour of Manila by stating that Beijing had no legal basis for maritime claims over the South China Sea, Beijing reacted with outrage to the judgement. Chinese President Xi Jinping said, “China opposes and will never accept any claim or action based on these rulings.”
The Foreign Ministry of China also said: “China solemnly declares that the award (of international tribunal) is null and void and has no binding force.” Since then, Beijing has heavily militarised the South China Sea by building military infrastructure, placing missiles and other weapons on islands spread across this water body of the Pacific Ocean.
Meanwhile, China is not allowing the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei to engage in fishing or other activities like exploring for gas or oil in areas of the South China Sea, claiming that they belong to China. Besides Southeast Asian nations, it has a regular fight with Japan in the East China Sea over the Senkaku Islands.
Both China and Russia declared limitless partnership agreement in 2022, yet Moscow has to be always on its toes as Beijing in its revised map released in August 2023 shows Russia’s Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island as part of China. The Island, called as Heixiazi by China, sits at the confluence of two border rivers, the Ussuri and Amur.
Moscow too, has to be always on its toes as Beijing in its revised map released in August 2023 shows Russia’s Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island as part of China
After more than a century of territorial dispute, Russia ceded roughly half of the island to China in 2008. Russia also abandoned its army base there. In return, Beijing agreed that it would not lay claim over the territory, but suddenly in its revised map released last year, China has shown the entire Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island as its part, giving Russians sleepless nights.
These developments indicate in clear terms about China’s expansionist designs. It shows that to cater to its territorial ambition, it can tear asunder any agreement or trust that comes in the way of it pursuing land-grabbing tactics in its neighbourhood areas.
–The writer is a senior journalist with wide experience in covering international affairs. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
