The 26th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 31 and September 1, 2026, unfolded against a backdrop of profound geopolitical transformation. The summit, which coincided with the organisation’s 25th anniversary, offered an opportunity to reflect not only on the SCO’s evolution but also on Eurasia’s changing strategic landscape. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s call for a roadmap for the organisation’s next 25 years, centred around the themes of Security, Connectivity and Opportunity, captured the larger imperatives confronting an organisation whose geographical reach and political significance have expanded considerably since its establishment.
Yet, beneath the formal declarations and diplomatic choreography of the summit lies a more consequential story. It is the story of Central Asia itself. For centuries, Central Asia has occupied a paradoxical position in international affairs. Geographically, it has stood at the heart of the Eurasian landmass, connecting empires, civilisations, markets and military frontiers. Politically, however, it has frequently been treated as a peripheral space, viewed through the ambitions of larger powers rather than through the agency of the states that inhabit it. That perception is steadily changing.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are increasingly emerging not simply as pieces on the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard, but as important actors shaping the contours of the region around them. Their strategic significance derives from an extraordinary convergence of geography, energy resources, critical minerals, emerging markets, transport corridors and political agency. Situated between Russia and China, adjacent to Afghanistan and connected through historical and contemporary networks to South Asia, the Middle East and Europe, Central Asia is rapidly becoming one of the most consequential regions in the emerging Eurasian order. For India, this transformation presents an opportunity of considerable strategic importance.
The SCO in a Changing Eurasian Order
The SCO has travelled a considerable distance since its inception. Established in 2001, the organisation initially emerged as a mechanism focused mainly on regional security, confidence-building and the management of shared concerns among China, Russia and the Central Asian republics. Over time, however, its canvas has expanded.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are emerging as important actors shaping the contours of the region. Their strategic significance derives from an extraordinary convergence of geography, energy resources, critical minerals, emerging markets, transport corridors and political agency
Security remains at its core, particularly in relation to terrorism, extremism, organised crime, narcotics trafficking and instability emanating from Afghanistan. Yet the SCO has ventured into trade, energy, investment, digital technologies, transportation, sustainable development and people-to-people exchanges.
This expansion reflects a wider transformation in the meaning of security itself. In the 21st century, strategic vulnerability is no longer determined solely by military strength. The security of states is also shaped by the resilience of their supply chains, access to energy, control over technological infrastructure, availability of critical minerals and ability to remain connected to global markets.
The SCO consequently finds itself at an interesting juncture. It encompasses some of the world’s most consequential powers and spans an immense portion of Eurasia. At the same time, it contains considerable political, economic and strategic diversity. China and Russia do not always view Eurasia’s future through the same lens. India and China continue to navigate big strategic differences, while India and Pakistan remain divided by longstanding security concerns. The Central Asian republics have sought to preserve room to manoeuvre rather than becoming dependent on any one external power. The organisation’s future relevance will therefore depend on its ability to transform its extraordinary geographical reach into meaningful and practical cooperation.
The Bishkek Summit must be understood within this larger context. It was not merely another gathering of Eurasian leaders. It was an organisation trying to define its relevance in a world where power distribution is becoming increasingly dispersed and where Eurasia is emerging as one of the main theatres of geopolitical competition and cooperation.
The Central Asian Renaissance
The most significant development within this changing landscape is probably the growing importance of Central Asia. For much of the post-Cold War period, discussions surrounding the region were dominated by the language of the ‘New Great Game’. Central Asia was portrayed primarily as an arena in which Russia, China and the United States competed for influence, particularly because of the region’s oil and gas reserves and its strategic location. That description, while once useful, is increasingly inadequate.
India’s relationship with Central Asia predates contemporary geopolitics. The region has historically served as a conduit for merchants, ideas, languages, religions and cultural traditions. Modern India, however, must translate this civilisational inheritance into tangible strategic engagement
Central Asian states are demonstrating a growing capacity to pursue what might be described as strategic pluralism. They are cultivating relationships with Russia and China while simultaneously deepening engagement with India, Türkiye, the European Union, Japan and the Gulf states. Their objective is not necessarily to replace one great power with another. Rather, it is to ensure that their foreign policies remain sufficiently diversified to preserve sovereignty, economic flexibility and strategic autonomy. This is perhaps one of the most important developments in contemporary Eurasian politics.
Kazakhstan occupies a pivotal position in the region’s energy and transportation architecture. Uzbekistan, with its substantial population and expanding economic base, is emerging as an increasingly important regional market and political centre. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess significant hydropower potential and occupy strategically important mountainous terrain. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, possesses some of the world’s most significant natural gas reserves. Beyond hydrocarbons, however, the region’s importance is increasingly connected to critical minerals and new technologies. As the global economy transitions towards renewable energy, electric mobility and advanced manufacturing, access to lithium, uranium, rare earth elements and other strategic resources is becoming a matter of national security. The geography of Central Asia is therefore acquiring a new meaning.
It is no longer simply the space between Russia, China, Afghanistan and the Caspian Sea. It is becoming a bridge between continents, a reservoir of strategic resources and a potential fulcrum of Eurasian connectivity.
The New Geography of Connectivity
Perhaps nowhere is this transformation more visible than in the emergence of new transport and economic corridors. The geopolitics of the 21st century is being written not only in military bases and diplomatic agreements but also along railway lines, highways, ports, pipelines, fibre-optic cables and digital payment networks. Infrastructure has become an instrument of strategic influence.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed Central Asia’s physical and economic landscape, bringing substantial Chinese investment into infrastructure and connectivity. Russia retains extensive historical, economic and security relationships across the region. Türkiye has sought to strengthen its connections with the Turkic states, while the Gulf countries and European powers have also begun to recognise the region’s expanding strategic value. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has added another layer to this transformation. Traditional trade routes have come under greater scrutiny, encouraging governments and businesses to explore alternative pathways across the Eurasian landmass. The emergence of the Trans-Caspian and Middle Corridor routes, the expansion of the International North-South Transport Corridor and renewed attention towards connections through Iran have consequently assumed greater significance.
For India, connectivity is perhaps the most important piece of this strategic puzzle. India’s geographical access to Central Asia is complicated due to the absence of a direct land route. Pakistan’s geographic position separates India from the region, while the continuing instability in Afghanistan further complicates the possibility of conventional overland connectivity. India has consequently sought to overcome geography through infrastructure and partnerships.
For India, the SCO provides a rare institutional setting in which it can simultaneously engage Russia, China, Iran and the Central Asian republics on questions of terrorism and regional security. This makes the organisation valuable even when political differences among its members remain substantial
The development of Chabahar Port in Iran and India’s participation in the International North-South Transport Corridor represent attempts to create an alternative geographical imagination in which India can reach Central Asia without depending on routes passing through Pakistan. This is much more than a question of trade. Connectivity, in the contemporary geopolitical environment, is an instrument of strategic autonomy.
India’s Central Asian Opportunity
India’s relationship with Central Asia predates contemporary geopolitics. The region has historically served as a conduit for the movement of merchants, ideas, languages, religions and cultural traditions. The intellectual and cultural exchanges travelled along the ancient Silk Roads and created connections between the Indian subcontinent and Central Asian societies that continue to resonate in contemporary diplomacy. Modern India, however, must translate this civilisational inheritance into tangible strategic engagement.
The India-Central Asia Dialogue provides an important institutional platform for doing so. Economic cooperation, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, information technology, education, agriculture, energy and digital connectivity are areas in which India possesses considerable potential. India’s comparative advantage does not lie in matching China’s enormous financial resources or Russia’s entrenched security architecture. Instead, India can build influence through a different set of instruments. Technology, education, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, digital public infrastructure, entrepreneurship and human capital can form the foundations of a distinctive Indian presence in Central Asia.
India’s experience in developing digital payment systems and digital public infrastructure is particularly relevant for Central Asian states seeking to modernise their economies. Similarly, Indian pharmaceutical companies can contribute to healthcare access, while educational institutions can provide avenues for academic and professional exchange. This approach allows India to build influence without necessarily entering into a direct contest for dominance. The objective should be to become one of the region’s reliable and consequential partners.
Security and the Afghan Question
Security remains another indispensable pillar of India’s engagement in Central Asia. The geographical proximity of Central Asia to Afghanistan makes developments within Afghanistan a concern for every state in the region. Terrorism, radicalisation, narcotics trafficking, organised crime and the movement of extremist networks have implications that transcend national borders.
For India, these concerns are particularly acute. The SCO provides a rare institutional setting in which India can simultaneously engage Russia, China, Iran and the Central Asian republics on questions of terrorism and regional security. This makes the organisation valuable even when political differences among its members remain substantial.
India has consistently argued that terrorism cannot be compartmentalised according to political convenience. For New Delhi, the credibility of regional security institutions depends on their willingness to address terrorism, terror financing, radicalisation and organised crime uncompromisingly. Central Asia, meanwhile, has a direct interest in ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a source of persistent regional instability. This creates a convergence of interests between India and the Central Asian republics, and allows India to deepen security cooperation without transforming its regional policy into an overt contest for geopolitical influence.
The Strategic Significance of the SCO for India
India’s membership of the SCO has occasionally appeared complicated because of its difficult relationships with China and Pakistan. Yet this complexity is precisely what gives the organisation strategic value. The SCO provides India with a platform from which it can engage the Eurasian heartland while maintaining strategic autonomy. It brings India into regular interaction with Russia, China, Iran and the Central Asian republics, all of which possess important stakes in the future of Eurasia.
Central Asia’s deeper significance lies in its position at the intersection of several worlds. It is connected to Russia in the north, China in the east, Iran and Middle Eastern countries in the south-west, South Asia in the south and Europe in the west. Few regions possess such geographical centrality
For India, the organisation should therefore not be viewed merely as a diplomatic forum. It can serve as a bridge between India’s interests in South Asia and the increasingly interconnected Eurasian continental system. This is particularly important at a time when the international system is moving away from the relatively clear hierarchy of the post-Cold War era. Power is becoming more distributed. Regional organisations are acquiring greater significance. Middle powers are exercising greater strategic agency. Economic corridors are reshaping traditional geographical assumptions.
The SCO sits at the intersection of all these developments. India’s challenge will be to ensure that its participation remains purposeful. The organisation’s declarations must translate into tangible cooperation in counterterrorism, transportation, energy, technology, trade, education and cultural exchange. India’s engagement with Central Asia must also move beyond summit diplomacy to sustained institutional and economic presence.
From the Eurasian Heartland to the Indian Ocean
Central Asia’s deeper significance lies in its position at the intersection of several worlds. It is connected to Russia in the north, China in the east, Iran and Middle Eastern countries in the south-west, South Asia in the south and Europe in the west. Few regions possess such geographical centrality.
This makes Central Asia one of the places where Eurasia’s future architecture will be negotiated. For India, the challenge is therefore not simply to increase bilateral trade with Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, nor merely to participate in another regional organisation. The larger objective must be to establish a durable Indian presence within the evolving Eurasian system. Chabahar can provide a maritime gateway. The INSTC can provide a transportation artery. The SCO can provide a political and security platform. The India-Central Asia Dialogue can provide a mechanism for bilateral and regional engagement. Education, healthcare, technology and cultural diplomacy can provide the human foundations upon which this relationship can be built.
Together, these elements can constitute a coherent strategy. India’s Central Asian policy should consequently be understood not as an isolated regional initiative, but as part of a larger attempt to connect the Indian Ocean with the Eurasian heartland.
Conclusion
The Bishkek Summit comes at a moment when the centre of gravity of global geopolitics is shifting. The old map of international relations divided the world into familiar spheres of influence. The emerging map is more fluid. Power travels along corridors of resources, technologies and networks. States seek strategic autonomy through diversification rather than alignment. Regions once considered peripheral are acquiring new importance because of their geography, resources and capacity to connect competing centres of power.
This time carries promise and urgency for India. It cannot alter the geography that separates it from Central Asia, but it can alter the strategic consequences of that geography. Through Chabahar, the INSTC, the India-Central Asia Dialogue and the SCO, New Delhi possesses the foundations of a broader Eurasian strategy
Central Asia stands at the very heart of this transformation. Its significance is no longer reducible to the energy politics of the Caspian basin or the rivalry of Russia, China and the United States. The region is becoming an increasingly autonomous geopolitical space; one whose states possess both the strategic location and the political will to shape their own futures. The SCO reflects this transformation. Its future will depend upon whether it can convert its extraordinary geographical breadth into meaningful cooperation and whether its members can find common ground despite their considerable political differences.
For India, the moment carries both promise and urgency. India cannot alter the geography that separates it from Central Asia, but it can alter the strategic consequences of that geography. Through Chabahar, the INSTC, the India-Central Asia Dialogue and the SCO, New Delhi possesses the foundations of a broader Eurasian strategy.
The task now is to give that strategy depth, continuity and access. India need not seek dominance in Central Asia. Nor should it attempt to replicate the strategies of China, Russia or other powers. Its strength may instead lie in offering the region another avenue of partnership, one built on connectivity, technology, education, healthcare, commerce and strategic autonomy.
The Central Asian republics are increasingly refusing to be merely the objects of great-power competition. They are becoming architects of their own geopolitical futures. India’s opportunity lies in recognising this transformation early and engaging with it not as a distant observer, but as a consequential partner. The question before New Delhi is therefore no longer whether Central Asia matters. The question is whether India is prepared to make Central Asia an integral part of its own Eurasian imagination.
Lt Gen S K Gadeock is a distinguished military leader, global strategist, and scholar who served as the Commandant of the Defence Services Staff College. A decorated veteran and former Logistics Advisor to the Botswana Defence Force, he has held numerous high-ranking appointments including Director General of the Amity Institute of Defence & Strategic Studies. Serving on the Advisory Board of Raksha Anirveda, he is a prolific writer and motivational speaker.
