It is more than 100 days into the special operations launched by Russia and the narrative changes as per the narrator! And, it is more than 50 days since the Russian forces withdrew from the suburbs of Kyiv and the territory surrounding Kharkiv, yet today, the Russian forces have occupied more territory in Ukraine with a consolidated hold of roughly 20 percent of all Ukrainian territory; this includes much of Severodonetsk, a strategic town in Luhansk, where some of the heaviest fightings is now occurring. The Ukrainian forces have had sporadic success in some areas, but have generally been retreating, after taking heavy losses over the past weeks (Ukraine estimates its casualties to be about 100-200 deaths and 500 injured every day). In areas outside the Donbas, the Ukrainian forces, in turn, are engaged in counterattacks to get Russia to pull away some of its forces.

In the near future, President Putin may announce a win, if he is so inclined towards announcing a success, and in stopping the genocide against Russians that he purportedly claims was occurring. Russia’s aim is to capture most of the Donbas, thus creating a land-bridge with an uninterrupted Russia-controlled logistics-route to the earlier-annexed Crimea and the additional territory in the Ukrainian south.

Ukraine has not been able to join NATO, a core Ukrainian aspiration, with the denial being a pre-invasion Russian demand. NATO’s expansion faced more hurdles when Turkiye (as Turkey is now known) was instrumental in preventing Sweden and Finland from being inducted as NATO members. President Putin can at least claim to block Ukraine’s membership despite the repeated and, at times, desperate pleas of the Ukrainian government for its induction into the EU and NATO.

The main problem

The Western nations’ intention is to help improve Ukraine’s position before President Putin announces any victory and attempts to freeze the conflict. While continuing to assist Ukraine, these nations also do not wish to significantly increase the risks of expanded direct conflict between the USA/NATO and Russia. This is the main problem. Announcements to the effect are incompatible with sustainable peace for Ukraine and, also the Western nations. This could be the explanation as to why President Biden felt compelled to publicly lay out his latest policy parameters, in his op-ed in the New York Times last week.

President Biden announced on May 31 that a compromise position for his administration is to provide Ukraine with ‘more advanced rocket systems and munitions that will enable them to more precisely strike key targets on the battlefield’. The first consignment is to be of four HIMARS, (High Mobility Advanced Rocket System) missile launchers (whether as a part or not of the 40 million USD package, has not been confirmed). The system carries six missiles with a GPS-guided range of 70-84 km; the long-range rockets, ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) with a range of 300 km are not being provided, because the US does not want responsibility for escalating war with Russia itself and, hence, risking a retaliation.

The USA has been at the forefront among the major powers in providing support to the Ukrainian war effort in material, intelligence-sharing, and the imposition of tough sanctions; President Biden wants to show consistency in American leadership by continuing support, but without crossing the red line, so as to not draw Russia into a direct conflict. This approach also seems to be the logic behind proactively ruling out support for regime change in Russia (as Secretary of State Tony Blinken similarly did with regard to Xi Jinping in his recent China speech), as well as President Biden’s extant policies of opposing US troops on the ground and refusing a no-fly zone.

The risk of escalation

All of this, however, is more art than science – as one commentator puts it! American rockets with a 70-km range can still be fired into Russia. The heavy Grey-Eagle drones in the pipeline to be sold to Ukraine, have the potential to disrupt supply chains well inside Russia, putting at risk both the Russian military and civilians. The Ukrainian government has reportedly given an assurance to the USA, against the use of these and other such weapons systems against targets well inside Russian territory. A question then arises: can the Ukrainian government exercise such strict control over a decentralised and stretched military fighting for its survival? And even if Ukraine does restrict the use, how likely are the instructions to remain in place as the course of the war changes? Who can predict!

Meanwhile, imaginable expansions of US engagement, which are presently off the table, continue to remain as options as answers to “What if…?” questions: what if Russia takes the first step to escalate directly against the West; what if President Putin himself, unacceptably, escalates against Ukraine; most specifically, what if he decides to use weapons of mass destruction? The US administration seems to hold out hope that some deterrence against Russia remains by limiting the fighting to Ukraine. For now, however, neither President Putin, nor President Zelensky of Ukraine, nor the USA has shown any genuine interest in a negotiated settlement, unless they think they’re winning! This translates into increased operations across the Southeast of the country for the coming weeks/months.

It is quite possible that Russia will be in a far worse position in a few months’ time. Ukraine’s urgency in requesting new missile systems is perhaps due to its perception of the Russian position; Ukraine feels that they’re nearing a point when it could cause crippling damage to Russian tanks, armoured vehicles, helicopters, artillery, and command staff; calculated estimates from the Pentagon are that Russia has already lost a majority of its tanks and armoured vehicles during these last 100 days, and Russia’s precision missiles stockpiles now stand depleted by 30-50 percent. Depleted stocks can be replaced over years, but it cannot be done in the coming months! The Ukrainian strategy in the Donbas appears similar to the one it followed in Kharkiv—retreat and come back in force against the Russians, who do not yet have fortified positions. The Ukrainians, with fewer soldiers, but more accurate artillery, and better intelligence, are fighting against the Russians who, with their extended logistics lines, are running into supply problems. Such a situation, if it continues, could tip the balance in favour of Ukraine – especially in the South, around Kherson, where Russian supply lines are harder to maintain – which is probably why the Ukrainians decided to counterattack there first.

Is there any possibility of negotiating for peace? In principle, any ceding of territory by Russia in the Eastern/SE regions would reflect a dramatically improved negotiating position for Ukraine, but the prolonged fighting has changed the Ukrainian perspective. There are stumbling blocks, even before negotiations have begun; Russia is holding hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians as prisoners (including at least 50,000 children (200,000 according to President Zelensky) in camps in Ukraine; there are tens of thousands of unresolved war crimes against the Russians that have been allegedly committed; President Zelensky while asking for more arms assistance, and getting it too, is now asking for direct talks only with President Putin. These issues, and others from either side, mean that even if the territory gets ceded back, it is impossible to imagine a near-term freeze in the conflict leading to successful negotiations.

Challenges for Putin

So much for Ukraine. The Russian president is facing and will continue to face unacceptable international challenges. As the days have turned into weeks and months, Ukraine has become more closely aligned with NATO than ever before. If that was a core Russian security concern on February 24, it is only getting worse with each passing day, with increased NATO defence spending, forward deployments, and territorial expansion. Russia’s economy, under severe sanctions – past and present – has contracted 10 per cent in a year and will face much greater pressure (the sanctions are even tougher than those against Iran, which over a decade have led to a greater than 60 per cent reduction in Iranian GDP). French President Emmanuel Macron continues to urge other nations not to humiliate President Putin, as a precursor to France’s desire to facilitate an eventual negotiated settlement. There is, however, no entry into a negotiated settlement, unless the Russian president is prepared to accept a radically diminished position for himself and his country, something that is unimaginable under the present circumstances. This, then, implies more fighting and a much more hostile posture towards the West. If President Putin sees an opportunity, it is not from the West trying to provide him with a stable exit from the conflict, but rather from the hope that NATO and the EU will tire of the war and, accordingly, international support will diminish for Ukraine.

The conflict seems to be heading into a long, grinding battle between Russia and Ukraine, against a backdrop of diplomatic confrontation between Russia and NATO/USA. President Putin has described the war in the Donbas as “Russians fighting for their own land”, making clear the goal of the ‘second phase’ of military operations’ – capturing all of the Donbas – as a national security necessity.

Long-term goals

There also seem to be some longer-term goals beyond the Donbas, which is why Russia is continuing to hit targets all over the country – both in terms of degrading military capabilities, crushing the Ukrainian economy, and thwarting the effort to rebuild, and more generally punishing the Ukrainian population. If the ultimate goal is to restore ‘historical Russia’, then, President Putin will eventually want to take the port city of Odessa, without much destruction; the recent increase of Russian bombing there and more explosions in neighbouring Transnistria, are an indicator in that direction. Lastly, allowing President Zelensky to continue in power as an international hero, with closer ties to NATO and the EU, is just not acceptable to President Putin, and this means that even a near-term frozen conflict will be a deeply unstable equilibrium.

There is much more political pain forecast, for at least one of the nations involved, before a more constructive path towards peace is plausible!

–The writer is an IAF veteran. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda