As of 2025, just about 14 countries including USA, UK, China, India, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Turkey, Thailand, Egypt, Australia, South Korea, Brazil have about 51 active aircraft/helicopter carriers in the world. The United States has the largest fleet – 11 big nuclear powered aircraft carriers (10 Nimitz-class and one Gerald R. Ford-class supercarriers), followed by China two in service and a third- Fujian in advanced trials, India currently has INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant – while a third, INS Vishal is in the pipeline. United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, and Egypt have two each. South Korea has two large helicopter carriers; Australia has two aviation ships. Brazil, France, Turkey, Spain, and Thailand have one aircraft carrier each. Russia has no operational carrier (in 2025); Admiral Kuznetsov has been out of service since 2017 and may soon be scrapped.
What this means is that more than 200 countries in the world – including Pakistan don’t have and are happy without even one aircraft carrier. This brings us to the question – why do so few countries feel the need to invest in an aircraft carrier? Are aircraft carriers worth their price or far too expensive to buy, operate and maintain?
Are aircraft carriers worth the price tag
Aircraft carriers are the single most expensive asset in any Navy’s arsenal. The total cost (including upgrades) to own a single carrier over the 50 years lifespan can exceed US $20 billion—far more than other ships and aircraft. Even routine repairs and upgrades require extensive dock infrastructure and specialised personnel. The cost to build, operate and maintain them is quite high. The per hour cost to keep them at sea is more than the naval budget of most countries.
The Gerald R. Ford nuclear-powered aircraft carrier currently being constructed for the United States Navy, is the most expensive naval project in history. Each carrier costs approximately US $13 billion to construct, excluding the US $4.7 billion invested in research and development. The total expenditure including design, construction, logistics, and testing reached about US $120 billion. What more, the operating costs over a 50-year life cycle, excluding crew salaries and aircraft maintenance – can exceed US $100–120 million annually.
This means that a single Ford-class carrier group gobbles up nearly 5–6 percent of Pentagon’s annual budget, and the funds earmarked for other new submarines, destroyers, and unmanned vessels.
India too faces a similar dilemma due to cost overruns. The final price of INS Vikramaditya including aircrafts and modifications was US $6–7 billion. INS Vikrant cost roughly US $2.6 billion for the hull alone, and its full operational cost with 36 aircraft is estimated between US $10–11 billion. Even INS Vishal – in the pipeline –is estimated to cost around US $16–17 billion.
Aircraft carriers are the single most expensive asset in any Navy’s arsenal. The total cost (including upgrades) of a single carrier to an owner – over the 50 years lifespan can exceed US $20 billion—far more than other ships and aircraft. The per hour cost to keep them at sea is more than the naval budget of most countries
Disadvantages of aircraft carriers
The basic drawback is that aircraft carriers are noisy, slow, and difficult to conceal. Due to their enormous size and propulsion systems, they can be easily detected by enemy surveillance systems – satellites, sensors and radars. This makes them lucrative targets for adversaries, in the era of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), hypersonic weapons, stealth submarines, and swarming drones.
The United States lost several carriers including USS Lexington (Battle of Coral Sea, May 1942), USS Yorktown (Battle of Midway, June 1942), and USS Hornet (Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, October 1942), during World War II, due to kamikaze attacks, torpedo strikes, and bombings.
USS Liscome Bay was sunk by a Japanese submarine in 1943, illustrating how a well-placed single torpedo can destroy a whole ship. Likewise, British carriers – HMS Ark Royal, HMS Courageous, and HMS Hermes were sunk by German and Japanese aircrafts and submarines in World War II.
Critics say that drones, missiles, and smaller ships can do many things a carrier does for less money. Another reason behind this is that carriers by themselves do not possess strong anti-ship or anti-submarine fighting capabilities and cannot operate independently in contested environments. Even a small amount of damage can render the flight deck unusable. The loss of even a single carrier can significantly degrade a nation’s morale. Hence aircraft carriers always need a multi-layered defence system called Carrier Strike Group (CSG) consisting of destroyers, cruisers, and submarines—to defend them 24×7 from missiles, submarines, and hostile aircrafts. These escort ships enhance the carrier’s survival but add to the complexity and cost of operations.
Hence even nations which have aircraft carriers in their fleet – think twice before fielding them in a hostile environment. This was the reason why INS Vikrant was ‘safely hidden’ in the Bombay Harbour and not allowed to go out to sea during the 1965 war, because of intelligence reports that Pakistan had deployed Daphne‑class submarines capable of striking high‑value naval targets.
Some of the other disadvantages of the aircraft carriers include:
Operational Limitations: Many carriers, especially smaller and conventional types, have limitations in power, manoeuvrability, and endurance compared to nuclear-powered supercarriers. Conventional carriers such as those operated by India lack the operational range and sustained power projection of their nuclear counterparts, restricting their blue-water capabilities. Moreover, smaller carriers have inferior defensive systems and are more exposed to saturation attacks by drones or missiles.
Aircraft and Launch System Constraints: Non-CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off Barrier Arrested Recovery) carriers—like those using STOBAR (Short Take-Off Barrier Arrested Recovery) systems—cannot launch heavier fixed-wing Airborne Early Warning aircraft, reducing the fleet’s situational awareness and detection range. Aircraft operating from such carriers cannot take off with full fuel or weapons loads, limiting sortie effectiveness and combat radius.
Personnel Training and Safety Risks: Operating and landing aircraft on carriers is inherently risky and demands specialised training, which poses challenges for both pilot recruitment and safety. Flight deck operations are perilous due to the high-speed, high-stress environment and risk of catastrophic accidents.
The Gerald R. Ford nuclear-powered aircraft carrier currently being constructed for the United States Navy, is the most expensive naval project in history. A single Ford-class carrier group gobbles up nearly 5–6 percent of Pentagon’s annual budget – funds earmarked for other submarines, destroyers, and unmanned vessels
Advantages of aircraft carriers
Despite all the risks and drawbacks, an aircraft carrier is like a floating air base with its own runway, storage facility (for food, fuel, weapons to last for months), workshops, hospital, as well as the carrier strike group (CSG) for protection. Together they can sail hundreds of miles per day – for weeks together and launch combat aircraft, and helicopters without waiting for permission to use a foreign airfield. This mix of mobility, independence and endurance is what makes aircraft carriers worth their cost for countries, which need to project sustained airpower at sea far from home.
Aircraft carriers significantly influence regional diplomacy and deterrence by serving as potent symbols of national power and military capability. Their deployment asserts a country’s presence and interests in contested or strategic waters, sending strong diplomatic signals without direct conflict. This “carrier diplomacy” reassures allies, deters potential adversaries by raising the stakes of aggression, and shapes adversaries’ risk calculations. Carriers offer a visible, flexible platform for rapid escalation or de-escalation, reinforcing commitments to regional security while providing options short of war. However, their deterrence effect depends on context, regional military balances, and political will to use them effectively.
In the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant played a crucial role by providing a floating airbase that enforced a naval blockade over East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Vikrant’s Sea Hawk aircraft conducted over 300 strike sorties, targeting Pakistani ground forces and crucial coastal logistics points, which crippled Pakistani supply lines and air capabilities. The presence of INS Vikrant assured Indian control over the Bay of Bengal, achieving air superiority and supporting the swift surrender of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Additionally, the Indian Navy, including Vikrant, succeeded in sinking Pakistan’s submarine PNS Ghazi, which aimed to target the carrier, marking a significant naval victory and solidifying Indian dominance at sea.
That is precisely the reason why India talks about a three-carrier fleet while more than two hundred other countries—including Pakistan—have none.
Why India needs three carriers
India has a 7,516.6 km coastline — 6,100 km along the mainland and 1,416.6 km along the Andaman-Nicobar and Lakshadweep islands – touching 13 states and union territories. India is surrounded by water on three sides — Arabian Sea to the west, Bay of Bengal to the east, and Indian Ocean to the south. India’s coastline hosts 13 major and over 200 minor ports, serving as the backbone of its maritime trade network. Together, these ports handle over 90% of India’s trade by volume, making them critical to economic growth and energy security.
Most of India’s international trade—over 90% by volume and roughly 70% by value—moves by sea through the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. India’s energy lifelines that powers most of Asia and Europe passes through two narrow maritime chokepoints — Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca — both of which are crucial for global oil and gas trade.
The Strait of Hormuz located between Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south, connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea. Around 20 to 21 million barrels of oil flow through it each day, accounting for roughly one-fifth of all global petroleum trade and nearly one-fifth of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG). This strait is a lifeline for India, because nearly 63% of its crude oil imports originate in the Gulf region and must transit through Hormuz. A closure of this route, even temporarily, could severely disrupt India’s oil supply and global energy prices.
Similarly the Strait of Malacca, links the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean. It carries about 23 to 24 million barrels of oil and gas daily, making it the world’s largest energy choke point by traffic volume. It serves as the main route for nearly 25% of all seaborne oil trade. Because of its narrow width at certain points — just 1.5 miles wide at the Phillips Channel — regional piracy and maritime congestion have been persistent security concerns.
India is also a “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean, ensuring the safety of sea lanes, escorting shipping, and responding to regional crises. This role involves maintaining naval patrols across key choke points from the Gulf to East Africa and the Andaman–Nicobar Islands, delivering humanitarian assistance, combating piracy, and partnering with regional countries for maritime security.
The logic behind Indian Navy demand for three aircraft carriers
The rationale for Indian Navy’s demand for three aircraft carriers is grounded in the sustained naval presence and power projection across India’s vast maritime zones, especially the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Having three carriers allows two to be operational simultaneously—one on the eastern and another on the western seaboard—while the third undergoes maintenance or refit. This arrangement guarantees uninterrupted carrier-based air support and maritime dominance.
At least four former Chiefs of Naval Staff have supported this operational need. “Considering the vast area of operations and growing threat in the Indian Ocean Region, the Indian Navy has a requirement of three operational aircraft carriers to sustain our maritime dominance,” Admiral R. Hari Kumar stated.
Admiral Karambir Singh noted that a third carrier would bolster India’s deterrence, enhance rapid response to regional crises, and sustain a credible power projection capability against emerging threats from rivals such as China.
“We are fully convinced about the power of three indigenous aircraft carriers. It is central to our concept of operations,” Admiral Dinesh K. Tripathi was quoted as saying.
According to Admiral Sunil Lamba, “For India to maintain maritime security and constant surveillance over multiple theatres, the capacity to operate more than one carrier fleet simultaneously is essential.”
Strategically, three carriers help safeguard crucial sea lines of communication, secure maritime trade routes, and assert India’s status as a regional blue-water naval power. The planned INS Vishal (IAC-3), an advanced CATOBAR carrier with electromagnetic launch systems, aims to complement existing carriers INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant, addressing limitations and increasing force projection capabilities.
Aircraft carriers are huge, noisy, slow, and difficult to conceal. They can be easily detected by enemy– satellites, sensors and radars. Hence even nations which have aircraft carriers in their fleet – think twice before fielding them. This was the reason why INS Vikrant was ‘safely hidden’ in the Bombay Harbour and not allowed to go out to sea during the 1965 war
Why Pakistan has none and isn’t trying to get one
Pakistan is avoiding acquiring an aircraft carrier primarily due to the high financial and technological costs involved, which strain its limited defence budget and industrial capacity. Unlike India, Pakistan focuses on maintaining a cost-effective navy with submarines, frigates, and smaller surface vessels that are more suitable for its regional naval strategy and resource constraints. Additionally, Pakistan relies on asymmetric and missile-based maritime defence rather than large-scale power projection typical of carriers. Political and strategic priorities, along with dependence on foreign technology and procurement challenges, also contribute to Pakistan’s avoidance of aircraft carriers despite their strategic significance.
Pakistan’s maritime problem is mostly local: defend a short coastline, protect nearby sea lanes, and deter a stronger neighbour. It can cover most of its near-sea air needs from land bases around Karachi. In that setting, a full carrier strike group would be an expensive way to buy a capability it rarely needs and could struggle to protect. Instead, Pakistan has invested in sea-denial tools: submarines, coastal and ship-launched anti-ship missiles, and maritime patrol aircraft. The heart of this approach is the eight-boat Hangor-class submarine program with China, built in China and at Karachi Shipyard under a transfer-of-technology deal. Submarines are far cheaper to operate than a carrier with escorts and an air wing, they suit Pakistan’s close-to-home missions, and they complicate any opponent’s plans without trying to control distant seas. In short: sea denial fits Pakistan’s geography, budget and strategy; sea control with carriers does not.
Are carriers “indispensable tools” or “outdated, vulnerable luxuries”?
The honest answer is that they are indispensable for a few countries and poor value for most others. Aircraft carriers are indispensable tools for countries with global or regional interests far from home shores, such as the United States, India, UK, France, Japan, and China.
However, for countries with limited budgets—like Pakistan—they become costly, vulnerable luxuries. The full value of carriers demands an entire support ecosystem (air wings, escorts, submarines, supply chains), which many nations cannot sustain. Thus, they are pivotal for some but poor investments for others.
One last thing to keep in mind is operational availability of an aircraft carrier, meaning the percentage of time it is ready to sail and launch aircraft. Extended maintenance or repair periods directly impact mission readiness and strategic influence. Maintenance includes planned overhauls and unplanned repairs, both of which must be carefully managed to minimise downtime. Thus, investing in a robust industrial base, reliable maintenance plans, and continuous crew training is essential to keep carriers operational and cost-effective over their long service lives.
The bottom line
The cost-effectiveness of aircraft carriers is evaluated by analysing their total life-cycle costs against the strategic value and operational capabilities they provide. This includes acquisition costs, operating and maintenance expenses, personnel, fuel, and overhaul cycles over the carrier’s decades-long service life. Measures of effectiveness used include overseas presence, crisis response ability, and war-fighting capacity. Nuclear-powered carriers, while more expensive, offer advantages such as greater aviation fuel capacity and less frequent need for refuelling. The evaluation also considers the entire carrier strike group ecosystem required to keep the carrier operational. Ultimately, cost-effectiveness balances the high investment against sustained, sovereign airpower projection and rapid crisis response that few other assets can match.
–The writer is a seasoned media professional with over three decades of experience in print, electronic, and web media. He is presently Editor of Taazakhabar News. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
