On May 22, a MiG-21 Bison jet flown by Squadron Leader Abhinav Choudhary was on a routine training sortie and was returning to Suratgarh when it crashed in a field near Moga, Punjab. In Meerut, the pilot’s father cried as he clutched his son’s t-shirt bearing an Indian Military College insignia. “This piece of clothing belongs to my son. I will wear this because this is all that remains. I lost my lion son. Everything is over, destroyed,” said Satyendra Chaudhary.
Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman’s heroic dogfight in February 2019 during which he downed a Pakistan Air Force F-16 (before getting shot down) should not detract from the fact that MiG-21 is the oldest fighter in the IAF. All aircraft have a finite lifespan and the MiG-21 – which first flew in 1956 – is flying well past its use by date. The 112 Bison variants in the IAF have been upgraded with new radars, avionics and Russian Vympel R-73 air to air missiles so they can theoretically win a dogfight against modern jets, but even after receiving extensive life extensions their airframes are in a precarious condition.
As well as being notorious for engine trouble, the MiG-21’s mechanicals, structures and wings all need frequent repairs. In Russia the aircraft can only be found in aviation museums or boneyards, and that’s where India’s variants belong. Instead, the second generation fighter has been tasked with intercepting fourth generation attack jets such as the F-16. This is like taking a knife to a gunfight.
Built Cheap
When the USSR first developed the MiG-21, the idea was to have large numbers of high-speed (Mach 2) interceptors that could shoot down enemy bombers. The Fishbed wasn’t designed to be a multirole aircraft with fancy weaponry, avionics or even a radar – it was meant to be vectored towards enemy aircraft by ground control, shoot down its target, return to base and reload.
Besides, back in the 1950s and 1960s, the Russians were low on technology, funds and resources. Therefore, their design philosophy was to get things done at the lowest possible cost. No doubt the MiG-21 had advanced design concepts – in which the USSR excelled – but at the end of the day it was a riveted aircraft while its chief American rival, the F-104, was CNC milled.
The bargain basement design philosophy means the MiG-21 has short legs, cannot carry a great deal of ordnance and lacks the space for sophisticated electronic equipment. It was said about the MiG-21 that it was an in a fuel crisis even as it took off. A Romanian Air Force pilot told Aviation Week: “We don’t have the endurance of the western fighters…. Our missions are 30-45 minutes, so we need to fly twice to achieve the same number of hours.” This means more wear and tear in an aircraft that wasn’t meant to fly a lot of sorties.
Obsolescence cannot be reversed. Unlike bomber aircraft such as the US Air Force B-52 or the Russian T-95M – both built in the 1950s – and now being used to launch long-range cruise missiles from safe standoff distances, the MiG-21 does not have the luxury of time or distance. It has to plunge into dogfights from the get go against superior aircraft such as the F-16 which is armed with powerful AMRAAM radar guided missiles and advanced radars.
In theory the MiG-21 will operate under the protective umbrella (known as Combat Air Patrol) provided by big brothers Rafale, Sukhoi Su-30 Flanker and MiG-29 Fulcrum. But the reality is that when F-16s are detected across the LoC by Indian radars, it is the MiG-21s from Srinagar Air Force Base that are scrambled first to tackle the threat. For a few critical seconds before the Sukhois and Fulcrums arrive from bases further east such as Halwara and Ambala and gather in the combat zone over Jammu & Kashmir, the MiG-21 is highly vulnerable against the F-16’s AMRAAM. This small window of vulnerability can be exploited by the enemy.
During the Kargil War in 1999, MiG-21s and MiG-27s experienced engine flameouts while they were performing evasive manoeuvres over the warzone. In that war too an IAF pilot, K. Nachiketa, was captured and almost lynched by the Pakistan Army soldiers after his engine flamed out over Kargil.
The MiG-21, which was designed to operate in the cold European environment, operates at a lower efficiency in India’s hot climate. Plus, in the rarefied (lighter) air in India’s mountains, aircraft cannot generate sufficient lift. In such an environment, the single engine MiG-21 is in trouble the moment it develops engine trouble. In comparison, a twin engine aircraft – or a modern fighter such as the F-16 – won’t be impacted to the same extent.
Defence conglomerate Northrop Grumman once published a study where it was claimed that the peacetime loss rate of a twin engine fighter was one fifth of a single engine fighter. According to Bharat Rakshak, “In the case of the (over 350) MIG 21 crashes, some 40-50 losses would have been avoided had the aircraft been twin engine.” Also, the aircraft’s small engine bay doesn’t have the space for modern power plants that are much larger.
Pilot Drawdown
The MiG-21s formed the backbone of the IAF in the 1960s and ’70s. But the situation changed with the arrival of newer aircraft, which drew the most experienced pilots from the MiG-21 squadrons. The MiG-21 now became the jet that rookie pilots graduated to. This proved disastrous.
In an article in Indian Aviation magazine, IAF Wing Commander K.S. Suresh says in air combat manoeuvres, inexperienced pilots flying the MiG-21 have got into trouble without realising it. When the aircraft develops a high rate of descent, it cannot be arrested with the power available. Worse, “there is no protest from the aircraft like severe shudder, wing rocking etc prevalent in other types of aircraft. This gives a feeling of well-being and a number of pilots did not recognise the danger in time to take recovery action or eject”.
Essentially, young pilots were pitchforked into an aerial meat grinder, resulting in a high loss rate from peacetime accidents. This won’t change and will continue to put IAF pilots’ lives at risk.
Training and Support
Success in air combat depends on a number of factors such as pilot skills, support from other forces and ground-based radars, and that’s precisely why Abhinandan’s MiG-21 was able to chase the F-16 into Pakistan-held territory and shoot it down. But after downing the enemy jet, he reportedly performed a highly dangerous manoeuvre called “high-g barrel roll”. This involved vertically climbing at high speed and reversing the jet’s direction towards India. While doing so the MiG’s old engines suffered a thrust problem and the aircraft became almost non-manoeuverable for a few seconds. That’s probably when a surface to air missile or anti-aircraft artillery hit his plane.
Since the MiG-21 is an interceptor, Wing Commander Abhinandan’s aircraft was carrying only air-to-air weaponry. This meant he couldn’t attack the Pakistani air defence unit which was engaging his jet, allowing the enemy to fire at him with impunity. Had he been able to fire some rockets or drop some bombs on the artillery units firing at him, the ground-based threat would have been less effective or neutralised.
To hold up against today’s fighter jets, an aircraft needs the latest technology such as advanced avionics and radar, greater weapon-load capacity, some stealth features, electronic warfare capability and precision weaponry, which the MiG-21 does not have, Padamjit Singh Ahluwalia, former chief of Western Air Command, told the media. “As a fighter jet, the MiG-21 is a basic plane with regular avionics, it doesn’t have precision-strike weapons or a reliable engine.”
Fleet Size Problems
The IAF has sought at least 45 fighter squadrons to counter a two front collusive threat. But India’s notorious defence procurement policies have landed the IAF in a crisis with only 31 fighter jet squadrons currently, against an authorised strength of 42. According to a Standing Committee on Defence report tabled in the Lok Sabha in December 2017, “This gap in the force level is due to the rate at which fighter aircraft are retiring after completion of their total technical life which exceeds the rate at which their replacements are being inducted into the IAF.”
Since there is a certain size of a force needed to deal with threats and challenges, and the IAF is currently facing severe depletion, the IAF is forced to fly these ancient MiGs.
Kill Record in India’s Wars
Though trouble prone and handicapped by its short legs, the MiG-21 was a feared fighter in its days. During the 1971 War the MiG-21s were pivotal in giving the IAF air superiority, which played a huge part in India’s victory. Military analyst Edward Coggins writes in Wings That Stay On: The Role of Fighter Aircraft in War that by the time the hostilities came to an end, the IAF MiG-21s had claimed four Pakistani F-104s, two F6, one F-86 Sabre and one Lockheed C-130 Hercules. The Russian fighter had clearly won the much anticipated air combat between the MiG-21 and the F-104, he writes.
With top cover provided by the MiGs, the IAF’s Sukhoi-7s and Hunters launched relentless attacks on Pakistan’s forward airbases, forcing the PAF to operate from bases further inland. This curtailed their range and the PAF aircraft were no longer able to attack freely.
According to the IAF’s official history of the 1971 War, from December 8 Western Air Command changed its tactics for counter air and close air support operations. “Deliberate attempts were made to attract the PAF’s attention and invite aerial engagement. Strike missions were led by fighters which flew high enough to be seen on Pak radar screens. But the PAF refused to cooperate. Instead there was a marked decline on attacks on Indian troops.”
The main reason why the PAF refused to engage in dogfights was the fear of encountering the MiG-21. The Pakistanis were now psyched by the multiplier effect of the MiG-21. The aircraft was punching huge holes in the Pakistani air space, and the PAF could do nothing about it.
“The MiG-21 proved to be a highly effective air defence weapons system,” says the IAF. Grouping the high flying MiGs with low flying Hunters and Sukhois was a brilliant tactic. The air superiority umbrella created by the MiG allowed other IAF aircraft to mount their attacks in an environment that favoured them.
Post MiG-21 Fleet
On July 16, 2016, a day after a MiG-21 crashed while landing at Uttarlai in Rajasthan, serving Wing Commander Sanjeet Singh Kaila petitioned the courts for the scrapping of the entire fleet. Kaila contended that flying the aircraft violated his right to work in a safe environment. The wing commander was involved in a crash during a flight exercise in 2005 after his aircraft caught fire. The fact that a serving officer took a career risk to approach the courts makes it clear that the IAF has a major crisis on its hands with its MiG-21 fleet.
The IAF must not surrender its pole position in the region. During the Cold War decades, as reward for being America’s loyal sidekick, Pakistan received the latest US jet fighters such as the F-85 Sabre, F-104 Starfighter and the F-16 Falcon. But the pendulum of air superiority swung towards the IAF with the arrival of the Russian MiG-29 multirole fighter in 1985 and more decisively after the Sukhoi Su-30MKI was inducted in 1997. The latest French Rafales have given the fleet a much-needed boost.
Under no circumstances should the IAF lag in the area of air combat. India must fast track fighter acquisitions to get those numbers up. The positive news is that the Narendra Modi has finally stepped up acquisition of modern jets. As well as brand new Rafales, the IAF is adding additional squadrons of the Su-30MKIs (over the 272 originally contracted). Plus, mothballed MiG-29s from Russia are being inducted as an emergency measure. Small numbers of the indigenous Tejas fighter will also be inducted although unlike the MiG-21, these battle untested jets won’t be located at frontline air bases.
Going by past experience India’s political leadership is known to sit on procurement files on the flimsiest of excuses. If that happens yet again, some of the remaining 111 MiG-21s may still be flying when the aircraft’s 70th anniversary comes around.
–The writer is a globally cited defence analyst. His work has been published by leading think tanks, and quoted extensively in books on diplomacy, counter terrorism, warfare and economic development. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
