Following the Pahalgam attack (April 22, 2025), New Delhi launched punitive strikes targeting jihadist group infrastructure and, as the escalation grew, critical Pakistani military sites (radars, C2, air bases). On May 10, Islamabad announced a calibrated retaliatory operation: striking military targets in India (air bases, depots, radars, C2), particularly in Kashmir, with the explicit aim of restoring deterrence and imposing symmetrical costs without crossing the nuclear threshold.
Beyond the fog of war and the disinformation all belligerents employ to amplify their successes and downplay their failures, some think tanks and commentators have sketched out a ‘Western perception’ of the deep strike dimension. What follows is an overview.
On the Indian Side: ‘Operation Sindoor’
New Delhi sought to strike fast, hard and deep in order to punish Islamabad and its jihadist proxies, demonstrate that it could impose a significant military cost, and bring to maturity a strategic approach initiated in 2019 at Balakot through a controlled escalation, with no intent to seize territory, but on a scale unprecedented since 1971.
The Indian strikes relied on a wide range of effectors in a multi-vector and multi-profile approach. They combined Western, Israeli and Russo-Indian systems, including cruise missiles of various ranges, loitering munitions and drones such as the Israeli Harop and even the old British Banshee. The aim was to create a dilemma for Pakistani air defence, forcing it to cope with dissimilar vectors spread across time and space while still protecting its most critical sites.
Open sources do not allow a firm match between the systems used and the targets hit without falling into uncertain speculation. Observed damage includes air bases such as Nur Khan, Sargodha, Skardu and Malir near Karachi, as well as logistics depots and command centres. These strikes extended deep into Pakistani territory, from the border to the maximum range of the munitions employed.
Cruise missiles appear to have been used in ways that exploited their respective characteristics. SCALP-EG missiles, air-launched from Rafale aircraft, were reportedly fired from 250 to 300 kilometres away, with a low-altitude flight profile designed to evade Pakistani radars and optimise terminal penetration. BrahMos supersonic missiles relied on very high speed combined with manoeuvrability to penetrate Pakistani defences.
Guided HAMMER bombs and loitering munitions may have been employed against forward radar sites such as Pasrur, Chunian and Arifwala. Drones reportedly saturated the airspace near the border and helped divert defensive systems.
The Pakistan Air Force reportedly created a temporary bubble of air superiority, deploying J-10C and JF-17 Block III fighters armed with PL-15 missiles and supported by electronic-warfare platforms, in order to limit the freedom of action of Indian fighters
The strikes are said to have disabled several radars and temporarily disrupted Pakistani C2, particularly around Lahore. However, India is believed to have lost at least two aircraft, a Rafale and a Mirage 2000, according to OSINT indicators. These losses underline the difficulty of protecting launch platforms in a contested environment with long-range beyond-visual-range missiles and electronic warfare.
The Pakistani Side: ‘Operation Bunyan Marsoos’
On May 10, Islamabad announced Operation Bunyan Marsoos, aiming to demonstrate its ability to conduct symmetrical deep strikes, to restore the credibility of Pakistani conventional deterrence, and to avoid nuclear escalation by selecting limited objectives.
On this side of the border, in a form of symmetry between near-peer competitors, the approach was also multi-effector, theoretically combining Pakistani with Chinese-origin systems across a spectrum that included missiles, rockets, loitering munitions and drones, notably of Turkish manufacture. Available sources do not allow a high level of certainty about the actual use of these systems. The Pakistani government mainly referred to the long-range guided rockets Fatah-1 and Fatah-2, with ranges of 150 to 250 kilometres and relatively low sophistication, while refraining from giving details on the use of its broader cruise-missile inventory.
During Operation Sindoor, India demonstrated that it can reach Pakistani infrastructure in depth with sophisticated stand-off weapons. However, India also faces some limits, particularly in terms of quantity. Its current number of Rafale aircraft restricts the launch of SCALP missiles, and its stockpiles of munitions remain limited
The use of drones for saturation missions is, however, well documented. Some Indian sources report hundreds of UAVs launched simultaneously against several dozen targets.
Little is known about any use of Babur ground-launched subsonic cruise missiles, which fly at low altitude and have a maximum range of 700 kilometres, or of air-launched RA’AD-II missiles carried by Mirage III and JF-17 aircraft. Their extended range would allow stand-off strikes to hit targets precisely and effectively while bypassing Indian radars.
The Pakistan Air Force reportedly sought to protect these strike assets by creating a temporary bubble of air superiority, deploying J-10C and JF-17 Block III fighters armed with PL-15 missiles and supported by electronic-warfare platforms, in order to limit the freedom of action of Indian fighters.
Pakistan ultimately claimed to have struck several dozen military targets, including Adampur, Udhampur, or Halwara. It even claimed a SEAD success by destroying an S-400 battery at Udhampur, a statement that has been entirely disputed by India and remains poorly, if at all, documented.
For India and Pakistan: Progress?
At the doctrinal level, India has moved from symbolic strikes such as Balakot to integrated campaigns combining cruise missiles, guided rockets and drones. It could now consider modular deep-strike sequences that can be scaled up or down depending on the military and, above all, political effects achieved. From a strategic perspective, New Delhi has demonstrated that it can reach Pakistani infrastructure in depth with sophisticated stand-off weapons. However, India also faces some limits, particularly in terms of quantity. Its current number of Rafale aircraft restricts the launch of SCALP missiles, and its stockpiles of munitions remain limited. It must therefore expand its range of cruise-missile carriers, which explains the renewed interest in an additional 114 Rafale aircraft, and increase stockpiles across each category of munitions.
Strategically, Islamabad, without officially presenting a full review of its arsenal, has shown that it possesses a deep-strike capability whose performance still needs to be optimised. The terminal effectiveness of several munitions used remains unproven, as the battle damage assessment failed to convince observers. In any case, the Pakistani army has created an Army Rocket Force Command responsible for conventional deep strikes, a new tool serving its ‘quid pro quo plus’ strategic approach. The crisis also revealed a heavy dependence on Chinese support for missiles, beyond-visual-range air-to-air weapons and electronic warfare.
Faced with the length of operations and the multiplicity of targets, it is essential to increase stockpiles of the solutions that have proven their worth in recent engagements. The United Kingdom and France are therefore ramping up production of SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles, a significant share of which has been delivered to Ukraine
For European Forces: Confirmed Directions
Overall, the lessons drawn from this episode reinforce the trends already identified in Western (and especially European) deep-strike arsenals, within the rearmament dynamic triggered by the war in Ukraine, from which both armed forces and industry are drawing their main insights.
Combine mass and quality. Faced with the length of operations and the multiplicity of targets, it is essential to increase stockpiles of the solutions that have proven their worth in recent engagements. The United Kingdom and France are therefore ramping up production of SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles, a significant share of which has been delivered to Ukraine. This industrial effort should also satisfy India, apparently very pleased with this acquisition. Multiple projects are also under study through the multilateral European Long Strike Approach initiative.
Put drones in their proper place. Operational feedback shows their growing vulnerability to the most effective air-defence systems. And counter-drone warfare is only just beginning. Emerging solutions combine electronic warfare, lasers and microwaves, which should in future cause carnage among UAV swarms. Drones can still be effective against lightly protected secondary targets or for saturation effects. But overcoming the new defences will require such sophistication and cost that drones will become almost cruise-missile-like, although less capable.
Combine solutions. In this context, the superiority strike, meaning delivering decisive, destructive or even deterrent effect against hardened high-value targets, will be optimised by ‘intelligent coordinated attacks’, combining stealth (with airframe designs similar to stealth aircraft), speed and manoeuvrability to break through multilayered IAMD bubbles. Following this logic, the European missile manufacturer MBDA is developing STRATUS, a system designed as a pair of complementary munitions: a low-observable (LO), long-range subsonic missile, and a supersonic, manoeuvring rapid-strike (RS) missile. This natively combined solution aims to carry out strikes on hardened land, naval and even airborne targets, as well as SEAD/DEAD missions, against the A2/AD and IAMD capabilities expected by 2035.
European forces will benefit from multiplying launch platforms across all domains, ideally able to carry the same missile. At present, they show a land-to-land gap, which they are striving to fill by buying American systems, such as Germany’s Typhon launchers capable of firing Tomahawk missiles, or by developing sovereign solutions
Develop multi-domain complementarity. European forces will benefit from multiplying launch platforms across all domains, ideally able to carry the same missile. At present, they show a land-to-land gap, which they are striving to fill by buying American systems, such as Germany’s Typhon launchers capable of firing Tomahawk missiles, or by developing sovereign solutions. Among these is the Land-Cruise Missile, with a range of over 1,000 km, the land evolution of the Naval Cruise Missile, itself derived from the air-launched SCALP. Offered by France for export along with its FDI frigates and submarines, it supports the multi-domain complementarity concept, validated in 2024 by a simultaneous exercise strike from a submarine and a frigate. Its use as a land-to-land effector would significantly broaden the range of combinations, providing a more modern alternative to the Tomahawk.
On both the Indian and Pakistani sides, the 2025 precedent outlined a continuum of strikes that each protagonist sought to coordinate in complementary salvos. The shared lesson for European armies is clear: the success of tomorrow’s campaigns will depend on orchestrating strikes according to the importance, hardness, protection and depth of the intended targets, with an arsenal up to the challenge, combining both quality and quantity.
–The writer is a defence and security industry consultant with varied experience of working with medium and large companies majorly in European market. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
