Amphibious Operations: War history is filled with several amphibious operations carried out in the most audacious manner. These operations turned into folklore and changed the course of times ahead. Take the case of the D-Day landing in Normandy in June 1944, the British-led landings at Gallipoli in 1915, the landing of US forces at Inchon in 1950, Operation Sledge Hammer in 2012, and the UAE’s takeover of Socotra in 2018. However, the one operation that stands out was the June 6 landing of the Allied forces on the French coast of Normandy. Allied Commander General Dwight D Eisenhower led the operations onto the supposedly heavily fortified Normandy coast. The fate of the Second World War was arguably hanging on this operation. The successes achieved with this greatest amphibious operation later led to the war’s culmination. The outstanding coordination between Allied Naval and land forces during this operation was miraculous.
Approximately 1,60,000 Allied troops passed through the English Channel in 7,000 ships and landing crafts. It is believed that the Allied casualties at the beachhead itself were over 10,000. Similarly, the amphibious operations at Gallipoli had an amalgamation of over 16,000 troops.
Amphibious warfare involves launching attacks from the sea onto hostile shores, requiring the coordination of land, sea and even air operations. These operations entail a very high degree of synchronisation, specialised training, special equipment, and knowledge of hydrography, besides tremendous sea-based firepower. Still, success depends on nature’s fury and a determined enemy. Thus, capability augmentation requires sustained effort and long-term planning.
Amphibious warfare involves launching attacks from the sea onto hostile shores, requiring the coordination of land, sea and even air operations. These operations entail a high degree of synchronisation, specialised training, special equipment, and the knowledge of hydrography, besides sea-based firepower
Newer Threats
The expeditionary forces in the imperial era extensively used amphibious warfare but with changing times, modern warfare has become more of a high-intensity short-duration air intensive campaign. The Naval power was exploited more for blocking and choking the enemy preventing any external material support during the conflict. After the blockade of Leningrad by Nazi Germany (1941–1945), and the blockade of Japan by the United States and British Empire (1944–1945), the US set up a naval blockade of Iraq in 1990, in one of the largest operations post-World War II. Not far back in history, Western powers attempted to establish a blockade of India during the 1971 liberation war of Bangladesh. However, the plan was abandoned at the last moment because of the timely action of the Soviet Navy, which trailed the US 7th Fleet by 19 days.
India as an independent republic prioritised the defences of its land boundaries and securing the vast sea coast. It neither had the intent nor felt the requirement to maintain any expeditionary forces travelling miles in the sea to grab the land of others. Consequently, the Navy’s concept of defence remained the protection of national maritime boundaries, securing India’s island territories, commercial sea lanes and national Exclusive Economic Zone. Protecting the 7,500 km coastline and more than 872 island territories is a humongous challenge. Therefore, the national focus remained restricted to building a conventional force structure and service-specific growth of the armed forces.
Boundary Disputes
While India continues to carry the vision of self-defence and non-aggression as a cornerstone of its national approach, new challenges have erupted. India’s growing economy and its commercial umbilicals must be secured and strengthened as newer threats to India’s maritime security have the potential to manifest into complicated security challenges. The security dynamics, from East to West, has changed in the last two decades. The South China Sea has become a conflict zone for the hegemonical PLA Navy and smaller ASEAN nations. The grouping established a strong economic connection with China not long ago but now, suffers from the aggression of its bigger neighbour.
The Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei are well-sucked in maritime boundary disputes with China. China’s aggressive BRI push has lured some smaller nations in the Indian Ocean towards itself. China’s easy access to these regions in India’s neighbourhood has created new security challenges for India
The Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei are well-sucked in maritime boundary disputes with China. The imagined vulnerability of China on the Malacca Strait has led to over-patrolling and docking of PLA Navy ships in India’s immediate neighbourhood. China’s aggressive BRI push has lured some smaller nations in the Indian Ocean close to Indian territory. China’s easy access to these regions creates new security challenges for India. Military intervention sometimes becomes more logical than subtle diplomacy and India must be prepared for that. It must continue to explore likely future challenges and analyse its capacity and growth matrix to match up to expected turmoil successfully.
The Indian Navy’s focus probably remains on the security of India’s maritime boundary and territories through sea and aerial patrolling, integrating the assets of the Indian Coast Guard and securing the sea lanes through coordinated surveillance and monitoring. The relative attention on the amphibious capacity remains low. Consequently, the resource allocation to meet such a contingency is also likely to be moderate at best. Contrast this with the existing capacities in the region. The two main players China and the US have been dominating the waters. The US has its 5th and 7th Fleet stationed in the region with massive amphibian capabilities, and China continuously upgraded its naval capacity to enlarge an ambitious landing in Taiwan if the need arises.
The Indian Navy’s next key target should be augmenting the amphibious capability. Apart from protecting Indian territories, it should also be able to respond to friendly distress calls, if the need arises. India has many littoral neighbours who look up to its presence to ensure peace and stability
Capability Augmentation
It will be detrimental to India’s security if the discussion is restricted to direct territorial threats. India needs a capacity build-up by several notches in a reasonable period as far as its amphibious warfare capability is concerned. It may be earlier than anticipated when the threats come banging on the door. Airlifting troops is the fastest option now but every means acts as a force multiplier in a conflict. The strong amphibious capability is irreplaceable for the quantum of troops they can carry along with the firepower while ensuring a much better survivability ratio.
As the regional complexities grow further, the Indian Navy will feel the need to expand in the vertical and horizontal capacity build-up. Integration and jointmanship are the buzzwords in the armed forces today. The next key thing to be formulated will be large amphibious capability augmentation. In addition to protecting the Indian territories, the Navy must be able to respond to friendly distress calls if the need arises. India has many littoral neighbours who look up to its presence to ensure peace and stability. The Navy’s strong amphibious capability would give out the right geopolitical signals to adversaries and help instil adequate caution, ultimately preventing untoward events.
-The writer has varied experience in the security paradigm and is a keen follower of global geopolitics. His work has been regularly featured in national publications. Visit newsanalytics.in to access more articles from the author. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
