Armenia, located at the crossroads of West Asia and Eurasia, is one of the strategically most important countries in the Eurasian region. The geopolitics of Eurasia, still shaped to a certain extent by the Cold War rivalry between Russia and the West, could be heading towards a recalibration. Armenia, once a part of the Soviet Union and a close ally of Russia is playing a part in the changing contours of the geopolitics of Eurasia.
Towards the end of 2024, Russian border guards left the border checkpoint on the Armenia-Iran border. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on December 30 that Armenian troops are patrolling the border with Iran without Russian troops.
Russia had maintained its border patrol troops in Armenia since 1991, even after Armenia became independent from the Soviet Union. This arrangement of more than 30 years ended after an agreement between Armenia and Russia in October 2024. As per this agreement, Russian border troops would leave by December 31, 2024, and Armenian troops would take control of the border patrol from January 1, 2025. This development comes five months after Russian troops withdrew from Zvartnots International Airport and other border locations in Armenia.
This apparent recalibration of ties between Armenia and Russia would have implications for Eurasia as the region is a competing ground for various regional and extra-regional powers.
Armenia’s Apparent Tilt Towards the West
Armenia’s tilt towards the West is not recent and sudden. Armenia has been one of Russia’s closest allies. Even after gaining independence in 1991, Armenia’s foreign and security policies were aligned with Russia.
Russia maintained its border patrol troops in Armenia since 1991. Towards the end of 2024, Russian border guards left the border checkpoint on the Armenia-Iran border. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on December 30 that Armenian troops are patrolling the border with Iran without Russian troops
However, in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, friction started surfacing between Armenia and Russia. Nagorno-Karabakh, officially recognised as a part of Azerbaijan, has been a region with an Armenian majority. This region has been the cause of contestation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and has witnessed two major wars between the South Caucasus neighbours in the past almost four decades. Following the ceasefire agreement at the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994, Armenian forces controlled Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven adjacent districts. However, following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War from September to November 2020 and occasional incursions by Azerbaijan into the Armenia-controlled territory, Azerbaijan wrested control of the seven districts and also the major portion of Nagorno-Karabakh’s territory. Although Russia brokered a ceasefire between the two warring neighbours, Armenia resented receiving little assistance from Russia during the war. This has caused Armenia to look for partners other than Russia.
In June 2024, Yerevan announced that it would formally withdraw from the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). In a statement in the Armenian parliament, Prime Minister Nikol Pashniyan said that Armenia will decide the timing of its exit from the CSTO. Pashniyan also accused the members of this grouping of not fulfilling their obligations and of siding with Azerbaijan against Armenia.
As a result of friction with Russia and its security architecture CSTO, Armenia is seeking to strengthen its ties with the West. This month, January 2025, Armenia and the United States signed a strategic partnership agreement during Armenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan’s visit to Washington DC. This agreement would facilitate stronger trade and strategic-political ties between Armenia and the United States.
Just a few days earlier, the Armenian government approved a bill that calls for launching a bid for Armenia to join the European Union (EU). The accession would be a lengthy process and could only be finalised after a referendum. However, Armenia is eager to increase its proximity to the EU as Pashinyan had stated in 2023 during his address to the European Parliament.
Friction between Armenia and Russia surfaced in the aftermath of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Nagorno-Karabakh region has been the cause of two major wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia brokered a ceasefire, but Armenia resented receiving little assistance from Russia during the war
Recently, the EU extended its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civil monitoring mission on Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan. The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) started patrolling in February 2023 and its current mandate covers the entire length of the border with Azerbaijan on Armenia’s side.
Implications for Eurasia
As Armenia and the West, in particular the EU, take steps to increase their engagements, these developments could contribute to the geopolitical dynamics of Eurasia from three perspectives.
First, by strengthening its ties with Armenia, the EU would increase its footprint in the region. But while doing so, it may have to practice diplomatic balancing. Already the EU has significant economic stakes in Eurasia outside of Armenia. Armenia’s adversary Azerbaijan has been one of the major suppliers of gas to the EU since the past about four decades. Azerbaijan is one of the countries that EU works closely with under the latter’s Global Gateway strategy. Azerbaijan is also a part of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Corridor, also known as the Middle Corridor. This corridor connects China and East Asia to Europe through Central Asia, Eurasia and West Asia. It is an important economic corridor for Azerbaijan as well as for the European countries. As the Armenia-Azerbaijan relations continue to remain volatile, it would not be easy for the EU to navigate amid the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia.
Armenia’s tilt towards the West may change the geopolitical dynamics in Eurasia. The European Union would increase its footprint in the region. But while doing so, it may have to practice diplomatic balancing. Already the EU has significant economic stakes in Eurasia outside of Armenia
Second, for its part, although Armenia is seeking to diversify its external relations by accelerating its outreach to the West, it would not be easy to decouple from Russia at least in the near future. While Moscow is no longer the principal arms supplier to Yerevan, in the economic sphere the latter is still heavily dependent on the former. Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Armenia joined the EAEU in 2014 after halting the process of signing an Association Agreement with the EU. At a bilateral level, Armenia’s trade with Russia has only increased in the past few years. The Armenia-Russia bilateral trade, which was approximately $2.5 billion in 2021, reached $5.3 billion in 2022, $7.3 billion in 2023 and about $12 billion in 2024. Also, Armenia’s accession to the EAEU was conditional upon it not joining the EU. Now that Armenia has initiated the bid to join the EU. It could mean that Armenia would have to leave the EAEU. This would not be an easy choice for Yerevan as its economy is heavily dependent on EAEU as well as Russia. This could mean greater friction in Eurasia between Russia and the EU to exert their individual influence.
Third, Eurasia has long been a region under Russia’s influence. The Russia-Ukraine war may have conditioned Moscow to reset its priorities. The recent development indicates that Eurasia is undergoing recalibration on strategic and economic fronts. While Russia is trying to build cordial ties with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the EU is taking steps to get closer to Armenia. However, as the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues the EU and Russia would continue to be on the opposing ends of the spectrum. It implies that any recalibration in Eurasia still does not have the capability to reduce the conflict in the region.
The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is a long-drawn one and continues without a lasting resolution which continues to cast a shadow over the geopolitics of Eurasia.
–The writer is an Independent Political Analyst and Researcher based in Vadodara. Follow him on Twitter: @NiranjanMarjani. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
