Elections in any country cause turbulence and turmoil in the political domain, be it USA, India or even a ‘democracy’ like China. The schedule for the 2022 elections in China, of the new Central Committee of the 400-odd members, who in turn will appoint a new Politburo, has not yet been announced. The five-yearly process normally takes place in October or November.
The political landscape, which supposedly had been streamlined after Mao’s death, has changed considerably since Xi’s taking charge. Deng Xiaoping saw the need for political stability and reform for the country to progress economically. Since the 1980s, with the implementation of time-limits in the presidential tenure, it was assumed that the rise of another strong personality would be prevented. Deng’s successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, adhered to the succession model and retired at the end of their 10-year tenure.
Xi Jinping has rejected the retirement tradition; through a revision of the constitution in 2018, he has scrapped the term limit of 10 years on the presidency, thus granting himself an indefinite extension. As the party’s general secretary, a post that has no term limits, and who by convention is also the head of state and the army, Xi Jinping has secured for himself a lifetime leadership of China. While it is an ‘assured presumption’ that Xi would be in power next year and even beyond, changes in the rest of the hierarchy have already begun. Chinese politics is shrouded in obscurity.
The five-yearly turnover of officials and leaders, high and low, has been initiated. The process has also initiated evident tensions on the officialdom, for the selection/election is quite complex. A brief description is, hence, apt.
The Party’s 20th congress will assemble, as aforementioned, in October/November this year. Largely a ‘rubber-stamp’ affair, yet the members have an important role, for they elect a new Central Committee, which would then appoint a new Politburo (currently of 25 members) and military high command. The build-up to the 20th congress is not expected to be a smooth walk-over. Xi Jinping has to be alert to decide on the many appointments to be made before the congress convenes.
Some changes are enforced by the incumbent’s ages. Of the current 25 members, 11 members are 68 or above – Xi himself will be that age, but then the rule will not apply to him! This translates to the retirement of some notable politburo members; many ambitious eyes would be on these slots that are likely to fall vacant. The only uncertainty pertains to current Prime Minister Li Keqiang, who, as per norms, should be relinquishing office after his two-term tenure ends in 2023. When the 20th congress convenes, he will be 67 years, thus eligible to continue in the politburo, may be in a different appointment. These changes in the politburo – and, hence at every other lower level – may help Xi to grasp more power!
China has seen political uncertainty prior to a national congress convention. Ever since the demise of Deng Xiaoping, the transfer of power has entailed political turbulence. So will it be this year too, and not just because of Xi’s audacious bid for a third term. It is not just political rivalry that Xi is worried about. There is a demographic change underway that will influence Chinese politics now, and also in the years to come.
The cohort of the ‘oldies’ to which Xi and most of the other politburo members belong, are of a generation born in the 1950s, which grew up during Mao’s vicious and brutal Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976 when formal education was disrupted by the Party. The new congress turnover is likely to bring in about 85% of the members born in 1960 or later, as compared to the existing ratio of just over half. This younger group has come of age after Mao’s death in 1976, and has seen a rapid opening up of China to the Western world. This group, therefore, has comparatively more liberal political thoughts and is more pro-market than the ‘oldies’. The changeover of the lower strata officials commenced in 2021, with several provincial party chiefs being succeeded by those born in the 1960s, and some even in the 1970s. The presence and effects of this generation, and even younger officials, who may have been students during the 1989 pro-democracy uprising, can already be seen at the provincial levels and below!
Will these new-generation leaders upset Xi’s apple-cart? Not likely. With no visible relaxation of the vice-like grip that he has on the party, a return to the politically-liberal (in relative terms) era of the 1980s is hard to imagine. At every level, the moulding of the leadership is being intensively managed to ensure loyalty to the party and to Xi, right down to the rural townships, government departments, and local legislatures.
This five-year exercise is often portrayed as ‘democracy in action’ in China. Candidates to the Party congresses are theoretically chosen by the ordinary cadre. In reality, however, the democratic choice is minimal. It is ensured that the candidature of only those favoured by the higher-ups is approved, having been earlier carefully selected for their acquiescence. While officials give the appearance of sifting through a long list of candidates, seeking the opinion of people depending upon the quality of their work, and their sincerity to the party ideology, facts are different on the ground. Prior to filing the nominations, party committees propagate the deeds of the ‘chosen few’, sending out a message to the people to choose from those names only! The lists are trimmed down by passing them back and forth, down the ranks, until the provinces, the armed forces, and ‘electoral units’ produce a list to the satisfaction of the Organisation Department of the party. This exercise ensures that each candidate is vetted by the police, and the records department – to check details of tax payments and even compliance of family-planning rules!
To further ensure smooth sailing into his third term in November of this year, Xi has expressed his unhappiness and dissatisfaction at the methodology of ‘straw polls’. The officials, hence, are also interviewing senior people to assess their support for candidates aspiring for the powerful posts; this in their opinion is another safeguard for the selection of candidates with no “sickness”.
Even after having accumulated more power than any of his predecessors (except Mao), it appears that Xi is leaving no stone unturned to make certain that there is no opposition against him. Going step by step, he has purged senior, ambitious leaders through his now widespread and continuing, anti-corruption campaign; in 2017, he abolished the tenure and age limits, and followed it by inserting his ‘thoughts’ in the Constitution of the Party.
Nevertheless, all these actions have also caused frustration and unease amongst party members. The dissent may be silent, but its presence can be felt. A commentary, recently posted (Jan 08) on the web-page of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), the Party’s anti-corruption watchdog, indicated that some senior members were under suspicion for opposing Xi and were likely to be punished. Sun Lijun, a vice-minister of the public security bureau, was arrested in September 2021 for “forming factions, thus undermining the unity of the Party and causing political insecurity”. His actions translated into activities against Xi and his confession was put on the web-page on January 15. The CDIC itself has undergone a cleansing operation from 2020, with suspect members being weeded out, as a result of which, a January 04 CDIC memo mandates that “all personnel should ensure Xi’s undisputed central position”. No matter the seniority, if an official is suspected of dissent, or a misuse of his position to gain support of junior cadres, he would “be disciplined”.
Come November 2022, Xi Jinping would complete a decade as the general secretary and leader of the country. The state media, in the coming months, will be singing accolades of his actions taken in the last ten years to dispel any doubts in the minds of the people as to who is the “true leader”.
Therefore, will Xi, or will Xi not, seems to be an infructuous question!
–The writer is an IAF veteran. Views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
