Did the HB Report on the 1962 war suggest the war might have been triggered by India provoking China through its ‘Forward Policy’ launched in 1954? Under this policy, Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru ordered the establishment of forward posts as per the Indian claim line (maps showing the boundary according to the Johnson-Ardagh Line of 1865), particularly in the places that might be disputed. There is a possibility that this forward policy might have been manipulated to disrupt Nehru’s dream of India-China friendship.
One must note that Nehru had initially favoured China over the Western/USA block:
- Besides accepting Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, Nehru supplied nearly 10,000 mounds of rice to Chinese troops in Tibet through the Chumbi valley. It is pertinent to note that Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel had advised Nehru to accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Even the military had objected to it. The Lt Gen Kulwant Singh Committee, set up by the government in 1952, had predicted in a report that India and China would go to war in 5-7 years.
- When the USA offered India a UNSC berth, Nehru refused. Instead, he proposed that China deserved it more.
- One must not forget Prime Minister Nehru’s rebuke of Gen Roy Bucher when he had recommended more funds for the Army. Nehru thundered, “What funds? We have no enemies. We don’t need Army. We can do with police,” or words to that effect.
Army HQ discounted Chinese violent and aggressive reactions at the behest of IB assessment. The HB report quotes IB chief BN Mullick as saying, “The Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so.” This assessment contradicted the Army intelligence opinion a year ago.
So, what led to his volte-face and anti-China ‘forward policy’? It was probably after 1954, when intelligence reports came through the IB chief (famous BN Mullick, on whom Nehru had blind faith), that China was constructing a Tibet Highway (G219) through Aksai Chin. This information had trickled to IB probably through CIA channels. Nehru took the briefing from IB & Army on the border with Tibet. He realised that Britain had left an undefined border with Tibet at the time of partition. There were various lines drawn from time to time by Britain. It was suggested that the Johnson-Ardagh line of 1865 was the most favourable one. Nehru immediately ordered:
- Publication of Indian maps showing this as the border
- Occupation of forward posts according to Indian claim line. Thus, the stage was set for a break in Nehru’s China infatuation.
IB insisted China won’t react
By August 1962, India had established nearly 60 such posts under Army and armed police. Even in the western sector, Army HQ was insisting upon forward posts but western Army Cdr asked for more reinforcements to do so. Western Command was apprehensive of Chinese reaction, which was turned down on IB’s assertion of Chinese reluctance to react.
Forward patrolling was started in 1954 by the armed police wing of IB, under BN Mullick. This led to the Kangka Clash of 1959. After that, forward patrolling was stopped and the Army took over the command. However, by 1961, Lt Gen BM Kaul, a Nehru favourite, was appointed the CGS (Chief of General Staff). Brig DK Palit, Kaul’s favourite, was appointed Director of Military Operations (DMO). The restriction on forward patrolling was lifted on November 2, 1961.
India had set up a post at Dhola in the east ahead of the McMahon Line. On September 8, 1962, Chinese troops besieged the Dhola post. It might be noted that in July 1962, China had cut off an Indian post of a Gorkha Regiment Company in Galwan Valley in the western sector of Ladakh. When a reinforcement of 5 JAT battalion was sent on October 6, 1962, to provide relief, it was massacred.
India set up a post at Dhola ahead of the McMahon Line. On September 8, 1962, Chinese troops besieged the Dhola post. In July 1962, China cut off an Indian post of a Gorkha Regiment Company in the Galwan Valley in the western sector of Ladakh. When a reinforcement of 5 JAT battalion was sent on October 6, 1962, to provide relief, it was massacred.
Therefore, there were indications of the ‘forward policy’ and unwanted aggression by India, provoking Chinese leader Mao Zedong to ‘teach India a lesson’. Henry Kissinger, US foreign minister with President Richard Nixon in 1972, claimed in his autobiography that Mao had told him that he wanted to teach a ‘lesson to Nehru’. Was it for Nehru’s volte-face on China?
Army HQ’s incredible order
In mid-September 1962, Indian troops deployed below Thagla Ridge were ordered by Army HQ (a) to capture a Chinese post, about 1000 yards northeast of Dhola post, (b) contain the concentration of China south of Thagla Ridge.
The HB report on this order says that the General Staff, sitting in Delhi, ordering an action against a position, 1000 yards northeast of Dhola post, was astounding. The terrain was unknown, the enemy situation vague and for all that, there may have been a ravine in between (the troops and their objective), but yet the order was issued. This order could go down in the annals of history as being an incredible order for the ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’.
Worst was that Army HQ at the behest of IB assessment, discounted Chinese violent and aggressive reaction. Of course, BN Mullick was at the helm of affairs of IB. The HB report quotes Mullick as saying, “The Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so.” This assessment contradicted the Army intelligence opinion 12 months ago.
Allegedly, as is now known Brig DK Palit (appointed by BM Kaul), in consultation with BN Mullick, decided to deny documentary access to the HB committee on matters concerning any document emanating civil side. In other words, he tried to scuttle the inquiry from finding out the truth, as far as he could, exposing the nexus between civil and military authorities.
Rumours of US manipulations
Herein lies the catch. It is rumoured that it had something to do with the USA through IB. A TRUTH COMMISSION is a must to unearth the root cause, not only to know the conduct of principal characters in the government and military but also to ascertain if it was not thrust upon India by some international manipulations. Today, at a time when India does not have good relations with China, global players are trying to pitch India against China to serve their interests.
Maybe HB had commented on this. Brig DK Palit, who had survived the humiliation of the 1962 war and continued to be DMO, asserted in his autobiography published in 1991 that the HB committee had no business to pry into “the high-level policies and decisions”. The question arises what was he protecting? A further query springs up: what was preventing the GOI from publishing it? Devil lay in Part-4 (Conclusions) of the HB report, which remains unpublished or was never leaked. It could be as well a comment on IB’s deliberate attempt to provoke a Sino-Indian war by manipulating deliberate acts of provocations. But at whose behest?
Limited scope of review panel
A brief look at the HB report is necessary here. This committee was instituted by the Army (acting Army Chief Lt Gen JN Chaudhuri) to review the operations. Its authors were Lieutenant-General TB Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat, a Victoria Cross winner in World War 2. It is said of PS Bhagat that he was a no-nonsense soldier. The report was written by him and surely, he went much beyond his terms of reference. He might have made unpalatable comments in the unpublished and not yet leaked Chapter 4 of Part 1 on civil-military relations and unwanted interference in military operations by intelligence agencies, read IB.
It did not have a governmental mandate to go into political decision-making issues. It had a limited scope. Also, the functioning of the Army Headquarters was outside the purview of this commission. Thus, all the main characters of the war were kept out of its scanner. Some scholars state that General Chaudhuri did not want to ‘dig too deeply’ into the conduct of the top military echelons. The terms of reference were restricted to:
- Training
- Equipment
- System of command
- Physical fitness of troops
- Capacity of Commanders at all levels to influence the men under their command.
The terms of reference suggest that the committee was designed to cover up the fiasco and mask the facts — as to why certain decisions were taken when the odds were against India. Knowledgeable sources inform that the report was in seven bound volumes, along with appendices.
There were two copies of the report, one was with Army Chief General Chaudhuri and the other with Defence Minister YB Chavan under his private secretary RD Pradhan’s own care. But it is doubtful, if they are in their original shape and size today, after 61 years. Indian public needs to know not only about the real contents of the HB report but also the whole chronology of the 1962 conflict. This certainly seeks a TRUTH COMMISSION.
The leaked version of the report reveals that the report was divided into two parts. Part 1 contained four chapters:
- Chapter I – Western Command
- Chapter II – Eastern Command
- Chapter III – IV Corps
- Chapter IV – Conclusions
Part 2, it seems contained details on tactics and operational procedures. They were probably meant for a more general distribution.
Game of Foxes sparked the war
Chapter IV appears to have certain unpalatable facts, certainly not about the Army and Generals and not even about the political establishment. I presume, as it will come out, that the ‘game of the foxes’ sparked the war.
The report was critical of the Indian Army’s high command of the time, as well as of the execution of tactical operations. It states that the Indian government, which would have been keen to recover territory, advocated a cautious policy, but that the Army Headquarters dictated a militarily unsound policy.
While soldiers were being battered in the Himalayas, the government and IB authorities were more worried about the urban venues of Kolkata (Calcutta), New Delhi and Mumbai. Once again, IB recommended the non-use of the offensive power of the Air Force and the IAF chief readily accepted. IB’s point was that PLAAF was far superior. Also, that mountainous terrain won’t allow manoeuvrability to Indian fighter aircraft. How strange was this logic? While China had no airfields in Tibet, and it had to operate from the mainland, IAF had to operate from plains with more load. If the terrain was tough, it was for PLAAF. However, the government and IAF accepted this IB logic. Strangely, no one has discussed IB’s role in the war.
IB chief had close links with CIA
Claude Arpi in his blog on the HB report by Neville Maxwell writes on IB chief BN Mullick: Since the Prime Minister placed such faith in BN Mullick, it would be at the least the lese-majesty and even heresy, to deny him a kind of a papal infallibility. Suppose it is taken that Mullick was just not deluded. What other explanation could there be for the unwavering consistency with which he urged his country forward on a course, which in general perception, could only lead to war with a superior military power and defeat?
Chapter IV appears to have certain unpalatable facts, certainly not about the Army and Generals and not even about the political establishment. Probably, the ‘game of the foxes’ sparked the war. IB chief BN Mullick maintained close links with the CIA station head in New Delhi. Was someone trying to teach a lesson to India and Nehru for defying the West?
Claude Arpi carries on: Another question arises: who in those years, would most have welcomed the great falling out which saw India shift in a few years from a strong international support for the People’s Republic of China to enmity and armed conflict with it? From founding and leading the Non-Alignment Movement to the tacit enlistment in the hostile encirclement of China, which was Washington’s aim. Mullick maintained close links with the CIA station head in New Delhi, Harry Rossitsky. The answer may lie in the agency’s archives!
Was someone trying to teach a lesson to India and Nehru for defying the West? Was the war orchestrated by some intelligence agencies to break Nehru’s flourishing love affair with China? Is there such a connection in the HB report? If so, only a fool in the Indian government would think of declassifying it.
-An ex-NDA and Wellington Staff College graduate, Col Rajinder Singh is a renowned author and security analyst. He has authored four books, two individually and two in collaboration. His best-selling books are Kashmir – A Different Perspective and The ULFA Insurgency. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
