Every generation of warfare announces itself quietly before it explodes into history. The tank did not arrive suddenly in the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Air power was theorised long before it pulverised cities. Nuclear weapons were debated in journals before they were used on Hiroshima. Today, a similar warning is visible if one chooses to look past the noise.
The chatter around “sonic weapons” and mysterious directed energy systems, sparked most recently by claims surrounding operations in Venezuela, should not be read literally. Sensational labels are distractions. States do not reveal their real capabilities in press quotes. But strategic shifts often surface first through exaggeration and rumour. They signal direction, not detail.
The direction is unmistakable. War is moving away from destruction and towards disabling. Towards blinding rather than bombing. Towards confusion rather than conquest; towards cognition rather than physical. Towards creating physical and psychological paralysis without ever crossing the traditional redlines that trigger full retaliation.
This new tool of warfighting has a message for India. The capabilities for these tools are important because those inimical to India’s security sit on our disputed borders and prepare for new tools and new ways to subdue India.
China does not view conflict as a contest of platforms. It views it as a contest of systems. Its doctrine is explicit. Victory lies in paralysing the enemy’s ability to sense, decide and coordinate. The battlefield is not platform-centric but netcentric with informalisation as its tool. Directed energy, electronic warfare, cyber operations and space denial are not separate verticals in Chinese thinking. They are layers of the same strike.
Pakistan, by contrast, does not seek systemic dominance. It seeks disruption and escalation control. Its objective is to generate uncertainty, buy time and manipulate thresholds under the nuclear overhang. In such a framework, tools that can disorient, disable communications, or degrade sensors without leaving craters are not exotic. They are ideal.
India sits between these two approaches, facing one adversary that aims to overwhelm systems and the other that aims to destabilise decision-making. Directed energy weapons and related non-kinetic capabilities fit neatly into both playbooks.
China’s focus on electronic warfare brigades, directed energy weapons, sonic bombs, space-based C5ISR, counter-space weapons and electromagnetic spectrum dominance is not accidental. A battlefield where Indian forces cannot see clearly, communicate reliably, or trust their sensors is a battlefield already tilted in favour of the adversary, even before the first kinetic exchange
This is where acoustic systems, high-power microwaves, lasers and electromagnetic attacks enter the picture. Not as miracle weapons, and certainly not as cinematic devices that liquefy brains, but as precision instruments of paralysis.
High-powered energy lasers are already being deployed globally for air defence and counter-drone roles. Microwave systems are designed to fry electronics rather than armour. Electronic warfare can disrupt or blackout a radar, jam communication networks and corrupt data flow. Acoustic systems or sonic weapons can cause extreme disorientation, panic and total paralysis to respond at a critical time. The common thread is not lethality. It is control.
China has invested heavily in this domain. Its focus on electronic warfare brigades, directed energy weapons, sonic bombs, space-based C5ISR, counter-space weapons and electromagnetic spectrum dominance is not accidental. A battlefield where Indian forces cannot see clearly, communicate reliably, or trust their sensors is a battlefield already tilted in favour of the adversary, even before the first kinetic exchange.
The course taken by Pakistan is unique but no less concerning. It does not require a complex, large system. It needs selective disruption, temporary blindness at a critical moment, confusion during mobilisation and degradation of air defence or command links during a crisis. Non-kinetic tools offer plausible deniability while exploiting India’s traditionally restrained escalation ladder.
The uncomfortable truth is that unless this area gains focus, India remains more visible than resilient.
India’s deterrence posture is often shaped by what can be counted and displayed. Missiles tested, platforms inducted and numbers announced. Focus is less on the way these systems perform during network degradation, network jamming, GPS denial or hostile electromagnetic environment.
The course adopted by Pakistan is unique but no less concerning. It does not require a complex, large system. It needs selective disruption, temporary blindness at a critical moment, confusion during mobilisation and degradation of air defence or command links during a crisis. Non-kinetic tools offer plausible deniability while exploiting India’s traditionally restrained escalation ladder
Scant attention is drawn to the vulnerability of civilians as well. The future potential pressure points may be airports, ports, power grids, telecom networks and data centres. The destruction of civilian infrastructure can be an early warning or even a substitute for the actual military intervention in a future crisis. The objective would not be destruction, but political pressure through systemic stress. India cannot afford to discover these vulnerabilities during a crisis.
What is required now is introspection and capability-building for offensive and defensive applications of these tools. The Indian Army has already announced 2026 as the ‘Year of Networking and Data Centricity’; these tools must be a part of this effort.
First, India must acknowledge that directed energy and non-kinetic warfare are not supporting actors. They are central to future conflict. This requires leadership at the highest level, not just within laboratories or niche directorates. A national roadmap for directed energy, electromagnetic and spectrum warfare should be articulated clearly, funded realistically and driven institutionally in a time-critical manner.
Second, integration must replace fragmentation. Research on lasers, microwaves, electronic warfare, cyber operations, acoustic weapons and space security cannot remain siloed. China’s advantage lies not just in technology, but in coherence. India must move towards a unified understanding of how these domains interact in real conflict.
India must acknowledge that directed energy and non-kinetic warfare are central to future conflict. This requires leadership at the highest level, not just within labs or niche directorates. A national roadmap for directed energy, electromagnetic and spectrum warfare should be articulated clearly, funded realistically, and driven institutionally in a time-critical manner
Third, defence must be given equal weight as offence. Hardening of military systems against electromagnetic warfare, ensuring redundancy, protecting data integrity and planning for degraded operations should become a part of resilience and fighting under disruptions. The assumption of uninterrupted connectivity is a dangerous illusion.
Fourth, training must reflect reality. Soldiers and commanders must be prepared to fight when screens go blank, signals fail, and information is incomplete. Future wars will reward adaptability and judgement over technological dependence. The Professional Military Education needs to adapt to future warfare and human resource outlook, oriented accordingly.
Fifth, India must approach global discussions on regulating new weapons with clear eyes. Norms matter, but they do not constrain great powers in moments of perceived necessity. India should engage to shape rules, not to rely on them.
The real lesson from the current discourse on sonic weapons and directed energy is not that secret devices are reshaping the world overnight. It is that the character of coercion is changing. Power is increasingly exercised by denying functionality rather than inflicting damage
Above all, India must resist two temptations. The first is dismissiveness, the belief that anything not yet fully proven can be ignored. The second is sensationalism, the urge to see every rumour as a revolution. Strategic maturity lies between these extremes.
The real lesson from the current discourse on sonic weapons and directed energy is not that secret devices are reshaping the world overnight. It is that the character of coercion is changing. Power is increasingly exercised by denying functionality rather than inflicting damage.
For India, bordered by a system-destroying peer and a risk-manipulating rival, this shift is not academic. It is existential.
The next conflict may not begin with explosions. It may begin with silence, confusion and systems that simply refuse to work. The question is not whether such tools exist. The question is whether India is preparing for the day they are used against India.
The author, a PVSM, AVSM, VSM has had an illustrious career spanning nearly four decades. A distinguished Armoured Corps officer, he has served in various prestigious staff and command appointments including Commander Independent Armoured Brigade, ADG PP, GOC Armoured Division and GOC Strike 1. The officer retired as DG Mechanised Forces in December 2017 during which he was the architect to initiate process for reintroduction of Light Tank and Chairman on the study on C5ISR for Indian Army. Subsequently he was Consultant MoD/OFB from 2018 to 2020. He is also a reputed defence analyst, a motivational speaker and prolific writer on matters of military, defence technology and national security. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda
