The recent cross-border strikes by Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), backed by Afghan Taliban have led to tensions between the two neighbours. Traditionally, before the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan was a strategic ally of the Taliban. Pakistan offered sanctuary, training, and logistical resources throughout the Taliban’s power struggle, gaining a strategic foothold in the region. The post-2021 dynamics dramatically changed with escalating tensions and inimical relationships arising from political, territorial, and strategic security differences.
While Pakistan celebrated the Taliban’s resurgence as a potential strategic win, the fallouts have proven otherwise. The deep faultlines in their relationship, conflicts of interest and the Taliban’s assertion of independence and nationalism have transformed this relationship from an ally to an adversary, drawing the two nations into conflict.
Historical Context: Pakistan as an Ally of the Taliban
Pakistan played a key role in the Taliban’s rise in the 1990s and backed the Sunni Islamist group for years. During the tenure of Pakistan’s President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s, the ISI aided by the CIA trained about 90,000 Afghans, including Mullah Omar. Pakistan provided sanctuary, training, weapons, financial support and logistics to the Taliban’s consolidation of power during their first rule. It played a double game over two decades by remaining an American ally in its war on terror while backing the Taliban. The vision of strategic depth in Afghanistan, reducing India’s influence and using the Taliban as a strategic asset was a foreign policy imperative.
The collapse of the Afghan government in 2021 with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan marked the Taliban 2.0 return to power. Pakistan’s hope to deepen its strategic presence through a client regime in Kabul, however, backfired. Pakistan’s utility to the Taliban as a counterweight to the government in Kabul ended with the Taliban takeover of the government. Ironically, the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan strengthened the TTP, which was viewed as an ideological group that followed the strident Deobandi interpretation of Sunni Islam. This became an irritant for Pakistan and TTP intensified its terror activities within Pakistan unabated.
Prism of Fractured Relationship
The Durand Line Dispute
The Durand Line, a colonial-era legacy demarcating the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a bone of contention. The border, which divides Pashtun tribes between the two nations, has been disputed by Afghanistan, giving rise to cross-border hostilities.
For Pakistan, the Durand Line equates to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially in areas like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, in which Pashtun nationalism reigns high. Accordingly, Pakistan has fortified its Afghan border with a fence, to curb cross-border militancy, smuggling and infiltration. A lesson it learnt from Indian LC fencing.
The Taliban rejected the fencing as an act impinging upon Afghanistan’s sovereignty and the unity of Pashtun communities. Clashes among Afghan and Pakistani forces along the border have escalated and cross-border hostilities intensified.
The Resurgence of the TTP
The resurgence of the TTP and the rise of radical Islamist terror attacks have created turbulence in Pakistan. Since the Taliban took over Afghanistan, the TTP has exploited the situation to regroup and intensify attacks on Pakistani soil, targeting security forces and government assets, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. TTP aims to achieve in Pakistan what the Afghan Taliban have already achieved in Afghanistan and establish an Islamic emirate.
Pakistan’s hope to deepen its strategic presence through a client regime in Afghanistan during the Taliban 2.0 backfired, because, for the Taliban, Pakistan’s utility as a counterweight to the government in Kabul ended after capturing power in Afghanistan
The Taliban-led Afghanistan government’s inhibition to crack down on the TTP, which shares ideological and operational ties with them, has enraged Islamabad. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of providing sanctuary to TTP militants and perpetuating cross-border terrorism. From the Taliban’s angle, pressurising TTP risks alienating their militant base and undermining their credibility among Pashtun nationalists.
The Taliban’s Shift toward Independence
The Taliban’s transformation from an insurgent group to a governing entity has attendant sensitivity to Afghan nationalism and sovereignty. Pakistan’s strategic play to make it a proxy ally and have a predominant role is seen as an interference in their internal affairs.
This nationalist stance is the cornerstone of their foreign policy and survival. The Taliban have sought to diversify their global relationships, with China, Russia, and Track 2 overtures to even India. Pakistan besides shared borders and religious affinity, has little potential in its present state to contribute to the development of Afghanistan.
The Taliban in 2024 organised a Regional Cooperation Initiative meeting which included representatives and envoys of 12 leading stakeholder countries including India and Pakistan. The region-centric narrative aimed at developing regional legitimacy and constructive engagement between Afghanistan and regional countries. Ironically it also spelled the larger interest of Afghanistan which sidelines the strategic importance of Pakistan in the canvas.
Emerging Threats: ISKP and Baloch Separatists
The role of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and hostilities from Baloch separatists complicate Pakistan’s security paradigm. The Afghan-based terror group opposes both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Pakistani government, which it aims to overthrow to create a transnational caliphate. ISKP continues to pose a substantial and ongoing threat to Pakistan.
In Baluchistan, separatist groups have aligned with the TTP, targeting Chinese investment infrastructure and Pakistani security forces. The failure to cope with these threats exacerbates Pakistan’s insecurity, specifically in a vicinity essential to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This has added vulnerabilities, creating complexities in the Pakistan-China relationship.
The Taliban-led Afghanistan government’s inhibition to crack down on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which shares ideological and operational ties with them, has enraged Islamabad. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of providing sanctuary to TTP militants and perpetuating cross-border terrorism
Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma
Pakistan faces a major challenge and threat in handling the Taliban, compounded by the fragility of its worsening economic and political survival. This limits Islamabad’s levers to act against Kabul and the possibility of opening another front. Furthermore, the history of even major powers like Russia and the US failing to rein in the Taliban underscores the challenge of Pakistan’s strategic depth ambition.
While Pakistan retains leverage through religious affinity and common borders, the Taliban’s nationalist orientation and pursuit of international legitimacy have constrained Islamabad’s influence. China has deepened ties with the Taliban-led government, maintaining its embassy in Kabul, exploring economic opportunities, and proposing to extend the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. This has introduced a new layer of competition, diluting Pakistan’s leverage.
Implications for India
The strained Pakistan-Taliban relations present strategic possibilities for India to engage diplomatically and economically with Afghanistan and gain leverage. The challenge remains its policy of non-appeasement with militant organisations. A fine balance and discreet diplomatic presence must be ensured for India’s regional strategic interest.
India has already invested in Afghan infrastructure and development projects, positioning itself as a dependable partner. A weakened Pakistan-Taliban alliance ought to reduce Islamabad’s leverage to use Afghanistan as a base for anti-India activities.
However, the instability in the Afghan-Pak region could have a spill over effect in India giving vent to Islamist forces and radical groups. Moreover, China’s expanding influence in Afghanistan, through resources and infrastructure projects, complicates India’s strategic calculus in the region.
The strained Pakistan-Taliban ties present strategic possibilities for India to engage diplomatically and economically with Afghanistan and gain leverage. Given its policy of non-appeasement with militant organisations, a fine balance must be ensured for India’s regional strategic interest
The Road Ahead
The intensification of hostilities between Pakistan and the Taliban has created instability in the region. The disputed Durand Line, cross-border terrorism, and Afghan nationalism are complex challenges. For Pakistan, this strained relationship threatens its internal security calculus and strategic aspirations.
For the Taliban, asserting their sovereignty stays a top priority, even at the cost of turning a blind eye to TTP and alienating its former ally Pakistan. Its focus remains to garner international legitimacy and monetary aid for its development. Its desire for strategic autonomy further complicates its relationship with Pakistan.
Without a concerted attempt to deal with these demanding situations, the Pakistan-Taliban relationship is likely to remain fractious creating regional instability. Pakistan on the verge of a survival crisis can ill afford another front nor can it be a spectator to TTP’s enlarged footprints and intensified attacks. Finally, destiny has boomeranged on Pakistan with a clear message- ‘As you sow so shall you reap’.
The author, a PVSM, AVSM, VSM has had an illustrious career spanning nearly four decades. A distinguished Armoured Corps officer, he has served in various prestigious staff and command appointments including Commander Independent Armoured Brigade, ADG PP, GOC Armoured Division and GOC Strike 1. The officer retired as DG Mechanised Forces in December 2017 during which he was the architect to initiate process for reintroduction of Light Tank and Chairman on the study on C5ISR for Indian Army. Subsequently he was Consultant MoD/OFB from 2018 to 2020. He is also a reputed defence analyst, a motivational speaker and prolific writer on matters of military, defence technology and national security. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda
