Raising the Cost of the Game: How Iran is Trying to Wear Down the US and Israel

Iran is also trying to hit the ‘eyes’ of the defence network, not just the bases. Reports citing imagery and briefings say a high-value US missile-defence tracking radar in Jordan was struck and destroyed, and other imagery-based reporting has indicated damage to a major early-warning radar facility in Qatar, reinforcing the same logic: degrade detection and tracking, and every subsequent defence becomes harder, costlier, and more uncertain.

Iran uses relatively cheap drones and missiles in waves, forcing the United States and Israel to fire costly air-defence interceptors and keep fighter patrols and surveillance running just to protect bases and allies. The daily bill rises with every incoming, not only in money but also in stockpile stress and operational fatigue

The second lever is audience cost, the domestic political penalty leaders pay when a conflict becomes prolonged, unclear, or visibly costly. In Washington, the administration has publicly insisted the mission is ‘laser-focused’ and ‘not endless’, while also acknowledging more casualties are likely. Those two messages collide if the war drifts into a long grind: the more open-ended it looks, the higher the political price at home. In Israel, official messaging has increasingly signalled preparation for a prolonged operation, which may be militarily prudent but politically costly if daily disruption and casualties persist.

Audience costs are magnified by one factor that no strategy document can fully control: images of death and suffering. Incidents like the strike on a girls’ school in Minab have become powerful accelerants of political pressure because they shift the war into moral and emotional terrain. Even when responsibility is contested or under investigation, the narrative effect is immediate: domestic support becomes brittle, international sympathy shifts, and leaders expend political capital defending the operation rather than shaping the endgame.

The third lever is political and legitimacy cost, achieved through information warfare and legal framing. Iran’s objective here is straightforward: portray the US and Israel as reckless, destabilising, or disproportionate, and make continued operations harder to justify to domestic voters and international partners. This is where global institutions matter. The UN Secretary-General warned that the bombing and retaliatory strikes represent a ‘grave threat’ to international peace and security and pressed for preventing wider escalation across the Middle East. Such statements do not stop missiles, but they shape coalition politics and raise reputational costs over time.

Qatar Energy declared force majeure on LNG shipments, halting production and signalling how quickly the crisis can become a global gas shock. Qatar says the attacks ‘cannot go unanswered’. This is the kind of widening pressure Iran benefits from. The more regional states feel exposed, the more they demand stability, increasing the diplomatic cost for the principal belligerents

The fourth and most decisive lever in this theatre is economic cost, especially through energy and shipping. This war sits on top of global choke points. When the Strait of Hormuz becomes unsafe or effectively blocked, markets respond instantly. In the last few days, crude prices surged towards the $120 range before swinging sharply on political messaging and expectations of emergency releases or de-escalation signals. The key point is not the exact price on any given day. The key point is that the war has opened an ‘energy timer’: every extra day of disruption raises inflation risk, freight costs, and domestic political stress far beyond the battlefield.

This economic lever has moved from theory to reality. Qatar Energy declared force majeure on LNG shipments after attacks on facilities at Ras Laffan and Mesaieed, halting production and signalling how quickly the crisis can become a global gas shock. Qatar’s foreign ministry spokesperson Majed Al-Ansari publicly stated that the attacks “cannot go unanswered” and described repeated missile and drone threats to civilian and commercial infrastructure, illustrating how quickly even careful Gulf balancing can be pulled into the conflict’s logic. This is exactly the kind of widening pressure Iran benefits from: the more regional states feel exposed, the more they demand stability, and the higher the diplomatic cost for the principal belligerents.

The United States and Israel will try to impose counter-costs. Israel has been launching extensive strike waves across Iran. The US aims to destroy missile capabilities, missile production, and naval assets of Iran. Yet none of this automatically produces a clean exit. In wars of endurance, the hardest part is about building a credible off-ramp that does not appear to be a surrender

The fifth lever is diplomatic cost through widening involvement. Iran’s retaliation and threat posture have already extended beyond a narrow US–Iran dyad to include a broader set of regional actors who now face direct or indirect risk. International reporting notes missile and drone strikes being reported across a wide arc of states in the region, and Gulf states condemning attacks on their sovereignty while calling for an end to ‘hostile escalation’. The wider the blast radius, the harder it becomes for Washington and Tel Aviv to keep the coalition aligned and the narrative controlled. A war that begins as capability denial can mutate into a crisis of regional governance, market stability, and alliance management.

Iran’s strategy also tries to engineer an escalation trap. The US and Israel must choose between costly restraint and costly escalation. If they escalate sharply, they risk a larger regional war and a deeper energy shock. If it restrains itself, Iran can claim resilience and continue to impose costs. This is the logic of a collision game: neither side wants to be seen as backing down first, and that makes miscalculation more likely. It is also why the language of nuclear risk has entered the discourse. The IAEA’s Director General, Rafael Grossi, stated there was ‘no indication’ that Iranian nuclear installations had been hit at that stage, while also warning of nuclear safety risks and urging maximum restraint. Even when nuclear facilities are not struck, nuclear framing compresses bargaining space and raises the perceived stakes, making off-ramps harder.

So, what are Iran’s practical options as it tries to keep raising costs?

One option is sustained, calibrated salvos that exploit the cost-exchange ratio: keep sending drones and missiles in waves so the US and Israel must keep spending expensive interceptors, flying constant patrols, and living on high alert, while Tehran stays below the threshold that would trigger an all-out response. A second is maritime risk signalling: Iran does not need a total shutdown to gain leverage; even limited disruption and uncertainty can raise insurance premiums, reroute shipping, and turn energy anxiety into global pressure for de-escalation. A third is narrative escalation: highlight civilian harm, humanitarian suffering, and legal arguments to raise audience costs and weaken coalition patience. A fourth is diplomatic internationalisation: broaden the scope of exposure across capitals so that more governments pressure Washington and Tel Aviv to contain the war and accept a workable off-ramp.

For India, diaspora safety becomes an operational concern, not a diplomatic footnote. Maritime stability in the Arabian Sea matters directly for trade. India’s best posture is calm preparedness: protect citizens, hedge against energy exposure, maintain maritime awareness, and keep diplomatic channels open with all key partners to encourage de-escalation and restore stability

The US and Israel, meanwhile, will try to impose counter-costs by degrading launch sites, production nodes, and command infrastructure. Israel’s military has publicly described extensive strike waves in Tehran and across Iran, including attacks on missile launchers, air defence systems, and internal security and intelligence headquarters, while also signalling readiness for a prolonged operation. The US side has articulated aims to destroy missile capabilities, missile production, and naval assets, while arguing it is not expanding its objectives. Yet none of this automatically produces a clean exit. In wars of endurance, the hardest part is not escalation. It is about building a credible off-ramp that does not appear to be a surrender.

For India, the implications are immediate and practical. Energy volatility, freight and insurance shocks, and supply-chain uncertainty feed inflation and strain budgets. Diaspora safety in the Gulf becomes an operational concern, not a diplomatic footnote. Maritime stability in the Arabian Sea matters directly for trade. India’s best posture is calm preparedness: protect citizens, hedge against energy exposure, maintain maritime awareness, and keep diplomatic channels open with all key partners to encourage de-escalation and restore stability.

If Iran is playing a cost-raising game, the central question becomes whether Washington and Tel Aviv can keep the value of continuing higher than the cost of continuing for longer than Tehran can. The longer energy and shipping disruptions persist, the more global pressure builds for a workable pause. And in the end, wars like this usually bend not because someone suddenly becomes generous, but because the cost curve becomes unbearable and a face-saving exit finally becomes possible.