Orchestrating the Theatre of War

The defence ministry needs to formulate the National Security Strategy (NSS) and conduct a Comprehensive Defence Review (CDR) before the integration of theatre commands. The intricate nature of regional dynamics, including China's strategic manoeuvres with Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, necessitates a holistic understanding of the evolving security landscape

According to a Press Information Bureau (PIB) release on June 18, a ‘Chintan Shivir,’ organised by the Ministry of Defence (ministry), deliberated upon various issues such as national security, cyber security, information security policy, defence acquisitions, production and exports, level playing field, human resources integration, training, operational matters, modernisation, and capability building. However, the outcome of the discussions was not made public, raising concerns about transparency, particularly when critical matters related to national security and military capability building are involved. Internal discussions and self-audits may not be sufficient.

Simultaneously, the MoD is finalising the establishment of theatre commands with four-star rank theatre commanders. It is expected that three new theatre commands will be created: two land theatres (one for China and one for Pakistan) and one maritime theatre covering the Indo-Pacific region. The proposal for establishing an Air Defence Command has been dropped. A group of 102 officers, including Major and Lieutenant Colonel ranks from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, have been cross-posted to other services.

As per a report, it is expected that the first Integrated Theatre Command (ITC) responsible for the entire Pakistan border will be based in Jaipur and is likely to be rolled out in August 2023. Similarly, the second ITC responsible for the entire China border will have its base in Lucknow. Additionally, the Maritime Theatre Command is planned to be established in Karwar naval base in Karnataka.

Addressing Transparency Concerns

According to reports, the government has decided to create other verticals such as cyber, space, intelligence, missiles, drones, National Defence University (NDU), and logistics command to ensure job retention for two-star and three-star officers after the establishment of theatre commands. Additionally, there are plans to introduce common Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) for two-star and three-star officers across the military to streamline the appraisal system for tri-Service appointments.

National Security Challenges

However, it is worth noting that the mention of creating the NDU in the media seems misleading, as a former police establishment in Gujarat has already been converted into the Rashtriya Raksha University. Furthermore, if there is a move to introduce a common ACR for all military officers, it raises the question of why the ‘points system’ in ACRs differs between the Army and sister services, where an “outstanding” rating is marked as 9 points in the Army and 7 points in the sister service.

Formation of Theatre Commands

An important question arises regarding how theatre commands are being created in the absence of a National Security Strategy (NSS), which the government assigned the National Security Advisor to define in 2019. Shouldn’t the NSS be formulated before further steps are taken towards theaterisation?

Considerations in Theatre Command Implementation

An important question arises regarding how theatre commands are being created in the absence of a National Security Strategy (NSS), which the government assigned the National Security Advisor to define in 2019. Shouldn’t the NSS be formulated before further steps are taken towards theaterisation?

The process of establishing theatre commands involves addressing various aspects, including the functioning of new theatre commands, their relationship with the Services HQ, the role of Service Chiefs, and their place in the reporting chain of ACRs. However, with only two land-theatre commands, certain considerations need attention: the central reserves of the Army for influencing outcomes in any theatre, central military reserves under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the CDS’s position as Chairman COSC rather than heading an integrated command with resources, and how the CDS would influence outcomes during critical situations if handling all theatre commands.

Resource Constraints and Flexibility

The shortage of resources and the activation of multiple fronts posed a dilemma for the Indian Air Force (IAF) regarding theaterisation. However, this challenge is equally applicable to the Army’s dual-tasked formations. While establishing new theatre commands, the Army’s limited flexibility needs to be examined carefully.

A theatre command each for China and Pakistan is obviously not merely geographically dividing areas east and west of Siachen where the Siachen Brigade faces both Pakistan and China. That is why the earlier idea of theaterisation talked of a Northern Land Theatre comprising J&K, Ladakh, and the Central Sector.

Addressing Future Threats Holistically

Above notwithstanding, the immediate need is to address future threats holistically, for which defining the NSS and undertaking comprehensive defence review (CDR) are essential. The Raksha Mantri’s Annual Directive is a generic document that hardly meets the requirement. The holistic threat assessment must also take into account threats across our borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh (not China-Pakistan only) considering the dynamics of the region and future portends.

Nepal’s Alignment with China

Nepal will continue to be drawn into China’s strategic sphere with a Communist or Communist-led government in Kathmandu. Nepal has stopped Nepalese youth from joining the Indian Army, and they have joined the French Foreign Legion and Russia’s Wagner Group. China’s recruitment of Nepalese youth has ramifications that need close examination.

China’s Occupations and Claims

Prudence lies in examining worst-case scenarios in the NSS and the CDR to avoid reacting to enemy actions piecemeal. The government should consider integrating the Army into the Border Infrastructure Management Authority, regardless of which force is manning which border

China has occupied most of the Doklam Plateau in Bhutan and established militarised villages with electronic warfare systems and air defence stations. Additionally, China claims Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary and possibly plans a road through Arunachal Pradesh. Bhutan’s boundary talks with China and their aim to outflank our defences in east Sikkim and lean on the Siliguri Corridor through the Jhampari Ridge require attention. Beijing’s new Foreign Relations Law (FRL) is focused more on national security than economics alone, which could be used to “manufacture” reasons for offensive actions.

China’s Influence in Myanmar and Manipur

With investments and defence exports, China is drawing Myanmar into its strategic sphere, facilitated by US-led Western sanctions. China is expanding military infrastructure in Myanmar’s Great Coco Islands and establishing credible proxies among armed groups and anti-India militant-terrorist organisations. The ongoing polarisation in Manipur has allowed Myanmar-based terrorist groups to operate.

Pressures on Bangladesh

The US-led West is pressuring Bangladesh on human rights, possibly to dethrone the Sheikh Hasina government. Opposition rule in Bangladesh aligns with China-Pakistan, with anti-terrorist camps operating in Bangladesh involving Al Qaeda and ISI instructors. The Bangladesh army has also practised for a cold start into the Siliguri Corridor. Opposition, if in power in Bangladesh, would encircle India in America’s calculus, potentially influencing New Delhi’s reliance on Washington.

Pakistan’s Proxy War

Pakistan’s proxy war on India supported by the US and UK is likely to continue, and it may even escalate with the Pakistan Taliban gaining more control or the use of IS/ISKP to destabilise South Asia.

Multiple Threats and Future Scenarios

Above are a few samples of multiple threats the theatre command responsible for China could face, which could be simultaneous at sub-conventional or conventional levels. These threats could arise when China seeks to establish depth in Ladakh for its G695 expressway slated to run close to Galwan and Hot Springs by 2035.

Strategic Considerations

Prudence lies in examining worst-case scenarios in the NSS and the CDR to avoid reacting to enemy actions piecemeal. The government should consider integrating the Army into the Border Infrastructure Management Authority, regardless of which force is manning which border. China’s Border Guard Divisions are directly under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Similarly, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) deployed on our borders should be placed under the command of the Army for operational efficiency. Additionally, our Vibrant Village Program (VVP) needs a review concerning the operational value of China’s border villages.

Examining China’s Strategic Support Force

The government’s announcement in May 2023 regarding the establishment of an Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) is a positive step. However, it is crucial to thoroughly evaluate the significant operational advantage of China’s Strategic Support Force. This force combines various functions such as intelligence, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and space warfare. Separating these verticals to preserve positions at the three-star, two-star, and one-star officer level is not desirable on India’s art. There is a possibility of adjusting these numbers within the overall reorganisation process.

References

-The author is an Indian Army veteran. Views expressed are personal.