The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries (Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China, with the USA joining in later), was signed in July 2015 after long, bitter and acrimonious negotiations. Its sole purpose was to limit Iran’s nuclear programme to prevent it from making a nuclear weapon, under strict monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN-sponsored inspection agency. The inspections, apart from being periodic and announced in advance, also included surprise, unannounced visits; Iran was to open any and every nuclear facility that the inspectors wanted to visit, and should they be barred, the issue was to be referred to an arbitration panel, from within the signatories.

The negotiations, although appeared one-sided against Iran, had provisions for the lifting of the stringent sanctions imposed by the EU and USA, as reciprocation. If at any time, it was believed that Iran was not fulfilling its obligations and surreptitiously moving ahead to either increase its stockpile beyond the permissible of 300 kg, or produce weapon-grade material, the sanctions that had been removed could instantly be re-introduced, without a warning period! Notwithstanding the restrictions imposed on Iran, there was a silver lining for it too; Iran would get access to some modern, sensitive technologies, but with an arms embargo for five years, and limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme for another eight years.

The JCPOA, although heavily loaded against Iran, was accepted by it. After a wait of some months, the annulment of sanctions took effect, providing the much-sought relief. Iran accrued two major benefits: One, as the trade and financial sanctions were revoked, the economy began to see an uplift; crippled by years of a limited ability to export oil and gas, Iran re-entered the world market. Two, even as Iran shut down some centrifuges and downgraded its reactors, it continued to retain its nuclear expertise with a scaled-down model of its nuclear infrastructure, thus enabling the making of a bomb, in another 15-20 years.

The agreement was signed, as aforementioned, in July 2015, during the presidency of Barack Obama, who had offered the hand of friendship to Iran with his now-famous quote: “We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” The US president was required to certify to the US Congress, every 90 days, that continued revoking of sanctions was in accordance with the terms of the JCPOA, and also in the national security interests of the USA, and that there were no violations by Iran, of the terms stipulated in the JCPOA.

Exit Obama, enter Trump

Barack Obama, in the limited time of his tenure, till January 2017, fulfilled the obligations of the JCPOA. It, however, was not the case with his successor Donald Trump who, even during his election campaign, had repeatedly said that the JCPOA was a sell-out to Iran and that he would walk out of the agreement at the first available opportunity. After taking over as president of the USA in January 2017, Donald Trump, nevertheless, twice certified Iran’s behaviour as per the agreement. This was done with reluctance and with complaints against Iran that it was hiding its nuclear capabilities from the IAEA inspectors, despite those very inspectors giving a clean chit to Iran. Finally, on a ‘triumphant’ note, on May 8 in 2018, Donald Trump finally announced the US withdrawal from the deal and re-imposition of sanctions on Iran and anyone dealing with it.

Trump charged Iran with not complying with the terms of the JCPOA, highlighting two instances when Iran’s production of heavy water was in excess of the laid-down limits. Iran did briefly exceed the production limits on heavy water production, twice in 2016 (February and November) and on both occasions, the issue was quickly and amicably resolved to the satisfaction of all parties involved. These two violations, which happened in 2016, did not, however, prevent Trump from certifying Iran’s compliance, twice in 2017!

Inspection of sites by the IAEA was conducted as per a planned schedule; apart from more than 400 inspections, Iran also allowed more than 80 short-notice inspections. The IAEA, moreover, also had daily access to Natanz, the only location where Iran was permitted to enrich uranium, apart from many other significant transparency measures. Nevertheless, Trump insisted that Iran had not granted access to military installations that were supposedly a part of its ‘clandestine’ nuclear programme; there were no such complaints from the IAEA! Iran was also charged with ‘multiple violations of the agreement’ by Donald Trump, the most significant of which being Iran ‘not living up to the spirit of the deal’! Iran’s activities from Syria to Yemen were viewed as disrupting factors in the region and directly opposing the ‘spirit’ of the JCPOA, which, in his view, was supposed to contribute to ‘regional and international peace and security’.

For all Iran’s partiality for troublemaking, its regional influence is often overstated. The region’s instability is not solely due to Iran’s activities. Other Arab powers of West Asia, most of them American allies, bear significant responsibility too, for fuelling the extremism, sectarianism, and lack of accountability that feed the region’s conflicts.

Repercussions

On the day of signing the deal, July 14 in 2015, even before the ink had dried on the papers, celebrations broke out on the streets of Iran where people hoped that the JCPOA would now end their hardships endured through the many long years of sanctions. Even the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, gave his stamp of approval to the deal and congratulated the negotiators.

The reactions of Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from an international treaty, against the advice of others, on flimsy grounds, were on the expected lines. The other members announced their continued support for the continuance of the JCPOA. This was expected since a range of UN and other independent observers, including Tamir Pardo, former intelligence chief of Israel, had confirmed that Iran’s nuclear ambitions had been severely curbed and that Iran had, by and large, kept its part of the accord. As was expected, Israel, which had opposed the nuclear deal right from its conceptualisation, continued its opposition. However, there were a few objections by Israel’s defence and intelligence establishments, who favoured the deal, feeling that Iran’s ambitions had been curbed to quite an extent.

In Iran, the signatory Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, although subdued in his reaction and wanting to recommence talks to save the JCPOA, instructed the country’s atomic agency to enhance the enrichment programme. In the year following the US withdrawal from the agreement, Iran continued to escalate its nuclear development in phases, starting from May 2019. In the first phase, Iran began to increase its stockpile of low-enriched uranium; in the second phase, which was announced in July 2019, the increase of uranium enrichment beyond JCPOA limits was commenced; starting September 2019, Iran moved ahead with its third phase with its Atomic Energy Organisation suspending all the JCPOA limits related to research and development and the testing of centrifuges.

Over the years, Iran has progressively accelerated the uranium enrichment, the fissile material essential for both reactors and bombs; part of the enrichment has reached 60 per cent levels, just a hair-breadth away from weapons grade. It has also completed the conversion of uranium hexafluoride gas into uranium metal, the most likely use of which is in nuclear bombs, all the while hampering inspection by the IAEA. Rafael Grossi, the IAEA director-general, has commented, “What you have here is an Iran that has grown in width, depth and height, in all dimensions in its nuclear programme.” (The Economist: February 12, 2022).

What is disconcerting to the Western world and its allies in West Asia is the shrinking of the ‘break-out-time’ – the time it would need to make a bomb’s worth of fissile material – from about a year when the JCPOA was in force, to less than a month. The USA, obviously, feels that the ongoing talks between Iran and the P5 – Iran refuses to talk to the USA directly – are reaching the make-or-break point!

What Next?

Iran and the five remaining parties to the 2015 nuclear deal are in the eighth round of negotiations in Vienna to bring the US back into the deal, persuading it to revoke sanctions, which are in grave violation of the agreement. What Donald Trump had wanted, back in 2018, was to exert ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran to sign a ‘better deal’. The tactical mistake has turned out to be a strategic blunder, as Iran instead of reducing its uranium stockpile, has far advanced its nuclear programme beyond the pre-JCPOA years.

Iran has often said it has totally lost trust in the USA and Europe, since the former unilaterally left the nuclear deal, to pursue a confrontational policy against it, and the latter, without a choice, went along with the USA. Now with a hardliner president at the helm, Iran is adamant that for the talks in Vienna to succeed, all sanctions need to be removed, and its frozen assets in banks to be restored.

President Biden, as a goodwill gesture, announced on February 4 sanction waivers for civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran. This would enable Russian, Chinese and European companies to work with Iran on some of its civil nuclear projects. This waiver was announced to demonstrate the Biden administration’s sincerity in wanting to further suspend US sanctions. Israel too appears to have changed its stand on the JCPOA, showing more pragmatism; in a security meeting, the chief of Israeli Intelligence reportedly said that Israeli would be ‘better off’ if a deal is arrived at, without altering Israel’s threat perception of Iran.

The US withdrawal and the fresh imposition of sanctions had infuriated Iran. It then began enriching and stockpiling uranium, without any consideration of the limits specified in the JCPOA. It also debarred the IAEA inspectors from visiting sites that had been mentioned in the deal. So much was the ire and mistrust of the USA that today, Iran totally refused to talk to US representatives when the current round of talks began some months ago. The lifting of some sanctions by the USA as a display of its ‘good intent’ has been rebuffed by Iran. Will such assurances by the USA be enough to see a successful culmination of the talks?

Closing thoughts

While optimists feel that a beginning has been made, Iran, however, does not feel so. US negotiators opine that the longer the talks continue, the sooner will the restrictions imposed on Iran by the terms of the JCPOA, expire under the ‘sunset clauses’. Given that the JCPOA did permit Iran to maintain a limited nuclear programme for peaceful purposes, albeit under IAEA supervision, it has, thanks to Trump’s stubbornness, today much more than what is specified as per the terms.

But what are the ‘sunset clauses’? As with most arms control agreements, the JCPOA too contains measures that will expire over a period of time; however, there are some aspects that create some permanent barriers to bar Iran from building a nuclear weapon. Several key limitations on uranium enrichment will phase out between January 2026 and 2031; Iran would be at liberty after that to commence enrichment using its first-generation centrifuges, and develop advanced centrifuges; the limit of 300 kg of 3.67 per cent uranium would expire in 2031, giving it the freedom to enrich uranium in quantity and quality. However, an inspection of sites and mines would continue for another 5-10 years. An important clause is a specific prohibition on ‘activities that may contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device’, which would remain in permanence.

Iran is not satisfied with the ‘chicken-feed’ repealing of sanctions. The Iranian government seems to be quite assured in its assessment that the USA will not go to war. Nevertheless, the risk of a misunderstanding remains high. Iran wants more now, rather than later, since it feels that Biden would not continue in office beyond 2025, and any Republican president, would definitely, once again revoke the JCPOA. The USA as well is unwilling to give any such assurance!

Russia and China, the two non-Western signatories to the JCPOA, have thus far been able to coax Iran to proceed with the negotiations. How far will such nudging continue is difficult to predict, as both these countries have their own issues with the other signatories, especially the USA. Their relations with Iran too are somewhat complex: Russia supplies Iran with weapons and civil nuclear technology, while China is the biggest buyer of Iranian oil. Neither of them, however, wants to see a nuclear-armed Iran that could upset the delicate geopolitical equation of West Asia.

To compound matters further are the war-clouds hovering over Ukraine that could upset the continuing talks with Iran. Some diplomats and strategists are hopeful that the crisis in Ukraine, would accelerate the talks towards a final conclusion, while some feel that Russia and China are already hardening their stance. At a meeting during the opening of the Winter Olympics, Russia and China, in a joint statement denounced the USA and its allies, for spreading “antagonism and confrontation” around the world.

The success to recommence the JCPOA is essential, or else, the world would see another crisis erupting in West Asia. Will the USA, in all humility, accept its mistake and lift all sanctions, past and present? Will Iran shed its defiance and accept the reductions of its stockpile and enrichment? The burden of success of the talks lies with both the countries!

End Note

Even as this piece was being written, the author has come across some unconfirmed reports that the Russian representative at the ongoing Vienna talks has said that the talks have reached the final stages; as Iran is willing to release all Western prisoners in Iran, should the sanctions be revoked.

–The writer is an IAF veteran. Views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda