The relationship between India and China is one of the most complex equations. Both countries are bound together by a common civilisational, economic dependency, and geographic destiny, but also exhibit cyclic patterns of confrontation and distrust. The lack of trust can make even the most pragmatic arrangements fragile. Timid attempts were made in recent decades to collaborate, but backstabbing led to the Doklam and Galwan incidents. The tragedy lies not only in the clashes but in the fact that there is no serious future-oriented framework in place to eliminate mistrust at its roots.
There is also the American game plan that fuels the breakdown of trust. Washington has indeed cultivated both rivalry and suspicion in Asia as part of its balancing act, eager to pitch India as a counterweight to China while reinforcing Beijing’s paranoia about encirclement. Still, India and China are civilisational states that have the acumen to rise above external manipulations. They must ask themselves whether to let their future be scripted in someone else’s capital or whether they have the strategic maturity to chart their path.
The truth is that neither side gains from a continued hostility. China faces slowing growth, a shrinking labour force and rising scepticism from the West, and India has to maintain the momentum for high growth if it wants to meet the aspirations of its young population and achieve Viksit Bharat goals. Locking resources into a military standoff along a 3,488-kilometre border is a no-win game for both. The resumption of fertiliser and rare earth exports should be seen in this context. It is not goodwill alone but recognition that sustained hostility carries economic costs that neither side can afford.
Neither side gains from a continued hostility. China faces slowing growth, a shrinking labour force and rising scepticism from the West, and India must maintain the momentum for high growth to achieve Viksit Bharat goals. Locking resources into a military standoff along a 3,488-km border is a no-win situation for both
Mutual trust cannot be created in one summit, but it may be a good beginning to break the ice. It must be constructed brick by brick. This implies strict adherence to current commitments, transparency in the deployment of military, and the end of coercion and salami slicing as bargaining chips. The resumption of direct flights, exchange of students, and cross-cultural activities, such as the Kailash Manasarovar pilgrimage from 2026, are such small indicators. Societal contact makes conflict harder to sustain. When ordinary citizens, students and businesses have a stake in peace, leaders feel pressure to deliver it.
Triangle of relationships
The India–China equation cannot be separated from the presence of the United States. This triangle of relationships fractures much of Asia’s strategic landscape. For Washington, India is the democratic partner of choice to balance China. For Beijing, India’s tilt towards Washington is both an irritant and a potential threat to its vision of dominance in Asia. For New Delhi, both countries matter, but in very different ways.
India benefits from American technology, capital and defence cooperation. At the same time, it knows from history that US foreign policy is transactional. Washington’s embrace can be warm, but it can also turn cold when priorities change. Yet this must be the foundation of Asian strategy and relationship with China.
India benefits from US technology, capital and defence cooperation. At the same time, history shows that US foreign policy is transactional. Washington’s embrace can be warm, but it can also turn cold when priorities change. Yet this must be the foundation of Asian strategy and relationship with China
India must learn to deal with China directly, based on its national interests, rather than through the filter of Washington’s concerns. That is how India will preserve its strategic space while maintaining its faith in its democratic partners elsewhere. For New Delhi, this is also a test of strategic clarity. India cannot afford to drift into becoming a mere appendage of America’s grand strategy. The future of Asia will not be decided in Brussels or Washington but in how India and China learn to manage their contradictions. The West thrives on a divided Asia; its strategic community has made no secret of this.
Collaboration is not weakness
In the future, the challenge remains to find new spheres of shared interest. Opportunities exist in digital infrastructure, green technology, disaster management and resilient supply chains. Joint ventures have the capability of watering down mistrust and building strategies that incline towards cooperation. Historical traumas cannot be eliminated by trade, but it can offer an incentive that is sufficient to discourage escalation.
There are several challenges in the way ahead. The resolution of border issues, even if inching towards it with caution, will be positive. Communication mechanisms and hotlines should be employed. Political tussles should not be applied to economic relations. Most importantly, leaders should convey the message to the domestic audience that collaboration with each other is not a sign of weakness but rather a display of convergence with caution for a better tomorrow.
The promise of an Asian century will remain hollow unless India and China find a way to coexist with dignity and cooperation. Eternal rivalry may serve nationalist rhetoric, but it weakens both countries. Constructive coexistence, however difficult, opens the possibility of shared leadership in a multipolar order
By confirming participation in the Tianjin summit, India has shown that it is willing to engage at the highest level. By continuing its defence modernisation and external partnerships, it has shown that it will not engage from a position of weakness. Both tracks are essential.
Asian Century Promise
Much has been written about the promise of an Asian century, driven by the rise of India and China. That promise will remain hollow unless the two find a way to coexist with dignity and cooperation. Eternal rivalry may serve nationalist rhetoric, but it weakens both countries. Constructive coexistence, however difficult, opens the possibility of shared leadership in a multipolar order.
The future of Asia will not be decided in Moscow or Washington but in how India and China learn to manage their contradictions. The West thrives on a divided Asia; its strategic community has made no secret of this intent.
Trust is not a soft word in geopolitics; it is the foundation on which nations either rise together or bleed separately. For two civilisational giants standing on the cusp of global influence, the cost of refusing trust may well be the loss of the Asian century itself. Yet, as handshakes and talks brighten the gloom, complacency must never find space for the dragon to disrupt status quo again. Strength is respected.
The author, a PVSM, AVSM, VSM has had an illustrious career spanning nearly four decades. A distinguished Armoured Corps officer, he has served in various prestigious staff and command appointments including Commander Independent Armoured Brigade, ADG PP, GOC Armoured Division and GOC Strike 1. The officer retired as DG Mechanised Forces in December 2017 during which he was the architect to initiate process for reintroduction of Light Tank and Chairman on the study on C5ISR for Indian Army. Subsequently he was Consultant MoD/OFB from 2018 to 2020. He is also a reputed defence analyst, a motivational speaker and prolific writer on matters of military, defence technology and national security. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily carry the views of Raksha Anirveda