The cycle of violence in the Middle East has reignited since the October 7, 2023 attack in Israel by Hamas and other militant organisations based in Gaza. The unpredictability, swiftness and scale of the attack took the Israeli government, security and intelligence establishment and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) by surprise. The initial shock and chaos underlined that the Israeli security forces and political establishment were caught off guard; hence, it took several hours for the Israeli military to respond. The massacre of civilians and the battle between IDF soldiers and Gaza militants continued for nearly 48 hours, leading to the initial estimate of nearly 1,400 casualties and 3,500 injured. However, Israeli authorities later revised the number of casualties to 1,139, including 766 Israeli civilians (36 children) and 373 soldiers, while nearly 250 Israelis including women, children and elderly were taken hostage as a bargain to moderate Israeli military response and to be exchanged during future negotiations. In terms of casualties, the attack turned out to be one of the worst in Israeli history. It was also the worst military attack on Israel since the 1973 Egypt-Syria surprise attack that led to the October or Yom Kippur War.
Hamas and other Gaza militants called the attack Toofan Al-Aqsa or Operation Al-Aqsa Flood with the stated objective of responding to the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, the blockade and siege of the Gaza Strip, the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements and settler violence in the West Bank. Preceding the 7 October attack, 2023 had witnessed an escalation in violent confrontation between Palestinians and Israeli settlers and IDF in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and had led to nearly 247 Palestinian and 39 Israeli deaths. Some of the violence revolved around heightened tensions due to visits by right-wing Israeli ministers and leaders to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area in the Old City.
In response to the 7 October attack, Israel declared a state of war and began a military operation termed Swords of Iron that started instantly after the government and IDF recovered from the initial shock. The IDF mobilised its army, navy and air force and also called the reservists. After the initial bombings, a ground incursion started with simultaneous bombings and air, land and sea blockades. The stated objective of the Israeli response is to destroy Hamas, freeing all Israeli hostages and taking control of the Gaza Strip. So far, over 24,000 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza including over 10,000 children and 7,000 women and nearly 60,000 wounded. Due to the indiscriminate bombing and blockade, the majority of over 2 million Gaza residents are now internally displaced and completely dependent on external aid for their survival. As of January 2024, the Israel-Gaza War continues with the air attacks giving way to urban warfare in select areas where suspected militants are hiding or where the Israeli hostages are suspected to be kept.
Though the Arab Gulf countries support the Palestinian right to a state, they prefer a peaceful process without the involvement of armed Islamist groups such as Hamas, which not only boosts the morale of other such groups in the region but also gives Iran an upper hand in the regional geopolitics. So, it is likely that once the dust settles in Gaza, the economic, political and strategic cooperation between Israel and Arab Gulf countries will increase
The Israel-Gaza War adds another layer to the cycle of violence associated with the Israeli-Arab, Israeli-Palestinian and Israel-Iran conflict that has continued for over a hundred years, especially since the 1948 Arab-Israel War. The situation highlights the continuity of the Palestinian issue as a serious regional and international problem that many had assumed over the past decade to have become dormant. It underlines the futility of ignoring the Palestinian aspiration of self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The conflict also highlights the inability of the faction-ridden Palestinian politics to take control of the situation and act responsibly and that behoves a civil resistance. But besides the Palestinian and Israeli dimensions that will continue to unfold over the years and decades to come, it is the regional and international dimension of this conflict that needs discussion.
Possibility of escalation
First and foremost, many have underlined the possibility of the war escalating into a wider military conflict between Israel and the regional proxies of Iran such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and the Shiite Militias in Syria. The fronts with Hezbollah (south Lebanon) and Houthis (Red Sea) are already active at a low scale. Meanwhile, IDF has targeted several locations in Syria to disrupt Hezbollah and Iranian supply chains and logistical support while the US and the UK have targeted Houthi bases in Yemen. Iran too has targeted northern Iraq in response to the attack by ISIS in Kerman in early January. If the trend continues this can eventually lead to a wider conflict but the chances of this happening are limited at this point. The reason is that except Iran no other regional country has the means or the desire to enter into any military confrontation with Israel. Iran too has, thus far, preferred to activate its proxies in a limited fashion to avoid any confrontation. Nonetheless, one should not forget that historically wars erupt not with careful planning but through reckless actions of a few with one incident leading to another and turning into a wider conflict.
Secondly, if one assumes that there would not be a direct regional conflict between Israel and its international partners, on the one hand, and Iran and its regional proxies, on the other, then in what direction the ongoing conflict between Israel and Gaza would head? In most likelihood, after the dust settles in Gaza, and Israel achieves its objective of expelling Hamas and neutralising any imminent security threats from Gaza, the proxy war between Israel and Iran will continue. Notably, a low-scale proxy war between the two has been going on for years, especially in Iraq and Syria, and this may be widened to include Yemen and Lebanon. The US and Israel may also plan targeted strikes inside Iran while Israel is likely to intensify the targeted killing of high-value Iranian individuals and scientists to delay and derail its nuclear programme. In such a scenario, the role of other regional and international actors active in the Middle East will become all the more important, especially if an all-out war has to be prevented and overall regional security and stability has to be maintained.
Regional response and impact
The regional response to the conflict has been on the expected lines. Most Arab countries have been critical of the disproportionate Israeli response but many have condemned the Hamas attack, especially on civilians. However, almost all Arab countries have underlined the continued Israeli illegal occupation of Palestinian territories and the Palestinian statelessness as a cause of the current escalation. They have also underlined the problem of the continued blockade of the Gaza Strip and the increasing settlements and settler violence in the West Bank as the reason for increased anger among the Palestinians giving Hamas the boost to undertake violent actions. Türkiye too has been critical of the Israeli actions but has avoided any direct involvement. Iran while being critical of Israeli actions continues to call for the destruction of the Jewish state and has extended support, training and weaponisation of non-state actors based in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen that increasingly act as its proxies.
The international response falls within the broader geopolitical divide wherein the US-led international order views Israel as an important cog in its global and Middle Eastern scheme of things and remains committed to the security and survival of the Jewish state. On the other hand, the China-led challenge to the US-led order has been unable to posit a coherent response with individual countries taking a stand based on their interest and historical views
In terms of the regional impact, the ongoing rapprochement between Israel and Arab Gulf countries that led to the signing of the Abraham Accords in September 2020 and talks of an imminent Israel-Saudi Arabia normalisation might be delayed. However, the chances of this being completely derailed are very limited, not because the Arab Gulf countries do not support the Palestinian right to a state but because they prefer a peaceful process without the involvement of armed Islamist groups such as Hamas, which not only boost the morale of other such groups in the region but also give Islamic Republic of Iran an upper hand in the regional geopolitics. In that respect, it is likely that once the dust settles in Gaza, the economic, political and strategic cooperation between Israel and Arab Gulf countries will increase especially as Israel would need the support of friendly Arab powers, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, to control and govern Gaza.
Thirdly, the obvious question that emerges is what will be the impact of the Israel-Gaza war on the regional rapprochement that had ensued among regional rivals, especially Iran, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, the UAE, Egypt and Qatar. The divergences among these countries and their geopolitical interests remain, but what led them to seek diplomacy over confrontation was geoeconomic compulsions. The decade-long devastation caused by Arab Spring uprisings in many regional countries, and the economic fallout of COVID-19, adding to the urgency of preparing for a post-oil economy have forced the regional countries to seek cooperation. The trend coincided with the election of Joe Biden with the hope that this could be leveraged in Washington under a Democratic administration. The launch of I2U2 and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) underlined the progress in this direction as well as the growing involvement of India in the new geoeconomic configuration in the Middle East. Although many have raised doubts about the chances for IMEC’s survival given the ongoing war, in all likelihood, the regional countries with their external partners will renew efforts towards greater geo-economic cooperation after the end of the War in Gaza.
International response and impact
The international response to the Israel-Gaza War has also been on expected lines with the United States and its European and Western allies coming out in support of Israel and its right to defence while the majority of the Asian, African and Latin American countries have either taken a neutral stand or have expressed their support for the Palestinian right to self-determination and condemned continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Some have also criticised Hamas’s action as a terrorist act while also underlining the continued Israeli settlements and settler violence. Many have also called for a ceasefire while some have condemned the disproportionate Israeli military response and indiscriminate killing of civilians, women and children.
India faces serious challenges due to the emergent situation. Despite the limited possibility of the war widening into a regional conflict, the disruptions in the Middle East will adversely impact India’s growing engagements in the region. India has over the past decade, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, carefully calibrated its Middle East policy to move away from bilateralism to regionalism thereby trying to integrate itself into the ongoing geoeconomic rapprochement
The international response falls within the broader geopolitical divide wherein the US-led international order views Israel as an important cog in its global and Middle Eastern scheme of things and remains committed to the security and survival of the Jewish state. On the other hand, the China-led challenge to the US-led order has been unable to posit a coherent response with individual countries taking a stand based on their interest and historical views. Russia, for example, has not shown much interest in trying to mediate the conflict and has focused on balancing its response to bilateral relations with Israel and support for Palestinian statehood. South Africa, on the other hand, has taken a proactive stand in challenging Israeli action by dragging it to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) calling for an immediate ceasefire. China has been more forthcoming in its support for Palestinian rights without necessarily being overtly critical of Israel but has supported the international call for a ceasefire.
Internationally, the war in Gaza is unlikely to have a significant impact beyond what happens in the Middle East and how it might impact the global community. Thus, the danger and threats to the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab are the most critical issues in everyone’s mind. If the security of this critical maritime passage cannot be ensured, it is likely to have a significant impact on the cost of goods passing between Asia and Europe and will have a serious impact on the maritime trade between these two continents. Countries such as Egypt and Israel are also likely to be seriously affected if the situation in the Red Sea is not brought under control. Although compared to the Ukraine crisis, the international impact of the crisis in Gaza has thus far remained limited but any further escalation and widening of the conflict can have a devastating impact.
Indian response, challenges and options
India has taken a principled stand on the conflict. It condemned the Hamas attack on Israel as an act of terror underlining its longstanding commitment to condemn all acts of terror regardless of its perpetrators’ reasoning, objectives or ideology. Given its strong bilateral ties and strategic relations with Israel, India has also extended support to the Israeli right to defend itself and take any military action to ensure its security. It has, therefore, avoided condemning the Israeli action and abstained from the UNGA resolution calling for an immediate humanitarian halt to the fighting in October. But later in November, India voted in favour of a UNGA resolution calling for an end to Israeli occupation and building of settlements in the Occupied Territories. While supporting the Israeli right of defence and condemning Hamas terrorist attack, India has been mindful of its traditional support for the Palestinian cause and hence has extended humanitarian aid to Gaza underlining its commitment to the developmental support for the people of Palestine.
Besides, India faces serious challenges due to the emergent situation. Despite the limited possibility of the war widening into a regional conflict, the disruptions in the Middle East will adversely impact India’s growing engagements in the region. India has over the past decade, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, carefully calibrated its Middle East policy to move away from bilateralism to regionalism thereby trying to integrate itself into the ongoing geoeconomic rapprochement. With stronger partnerships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, India has begun to transform its relations in the Middle East to a more meaningful regional engagement by joining the Bahrain-based and US-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and by joining the I2U2 and IMEC with a long-term geoeconomic objective. The question remains if this will be affected by the ongoing conflict, and how should India respond in case it does.
With stronger partnerships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, India has begun to transform its relations in the Middle East to a more meaningful regional engagement by joining the Bahrain-based and US-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and by joining the I2U2 and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) with a long-term geoeconomic objective. The question remains if this will be affected by the ongoing conflict, and how should India respond in case it does
For India, the options remain clear to an extent in the sense that strengthening individual partnerships with regional countries, especially Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, will have to continue. At the same time, India has been careful not to alienate Iran because of the importance of Tehran in New Delhi’s interests in and connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Besides, Iran is also a factor in the Gulf and Middle East and this is likely to keep the two countries engaged. The China factor too has emerged as a major challenge for India in the Middle East and the way Beijing has been developing relations with individual states while enhancing its strategic investments through connectivity projects and mega-business deals is notable. This posits the question as to how India can project itself as an attractive partner to rival China. India’s traditionally strong relations and fast-growing economy is an advantage, and improvement in business environment and willingness to join regional and international forces towards an economic transformation in the Middle East put it in a much advantageous position. In that sense, one should expect continuity in the Indian position in the direction in which the Modi government has taken with a careful de-hyphenation between Israel and Palestine.
Conclusion
The ongoing crisis in Gaza has raised serious questions about the future of security, stability and peace in the Middle East. The crisis is yet another reminder of how the Palestinian issue remains potentially explosive despite becoming a lesser priority for the regional and international actors over the past two decades. It also posits the question of whether the antipathy to the Middle East Peace Process was sensible and how viable is it to prioritise regional political and economic integration over finding a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are no immediate answers to these questions. The failure of the Middle East Peace Process in the past and the inability of the political and economic integration of Israel in the region are among the lacunas that have brought the situation to its current state. But these are only symptoms of the larger problem, the inability of the regional people and the state to find a way to live in peace and accept each other without any prejudice to their faith, ethnicity and political and cultural orientation. Without addressing this core problem, the cycle of violence and instability in the region is unlikely to end and the regional and international powers will have to find a way to live with it rather than wishing it away.
-The author is an Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
