Submarines are critical for sea-control as they deny the enemy space to navigate and dominate the deep blue. They are the killer wolves of the ocean that can decimate enemy fleets without warning and disappear as stealthily as they surface. The Indian Navy is fast-tracking its submarine programme in the following context:
- India’s great power ambitions.
- Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s assertion that the Indian Navy is the net security provider in the IOR; the responsibility of maintaining security and stability in the region is India’s responsibility.
- The increasing size of the Chinese submarine fleet – both conventional and nuclear armed.
- China’s development of modern and increasingly stealthy submarines.
- Pakistan’s plan to more than double its submarine fleet with Chinese technology stolen from Russia’s super silent submarines.
In this backdrop, India faces significant budgetary constraints in its efforts to modernise and expand its fleet. The Indian Navy will need to innovate beyond traditional methods to navigate budget limitations. Effective fund management and astute planning are crucial to swiftly procure the necessary submarine quantities. The urgency is underscored by the Chinese dynamic, emphasising the critical need for sufficient numbers to strategically outmatch potential adversaries.
Fast-tracking Project 75(I)
The key to achieving parity at sea is Project 75(I) which is aimed at augmenting the Indian Navy’s undersea capabilities. The project, costing around Rs 43,000 crore, was cleared by the Defence Acquisition Council in June 2022. It envisages indigenous construction of six modern conventional submarines (including associated shore support, engineering support package, training and spares package) with contemporary equipment, weapons and sensors, including fuel-cell-based AIP (Air Independent Propulsion), advanced torpedoes, modern missiles and state of the art countermeasure systems.
This would provide a major boost to the indigenous design and construction capability of submarines in India, in addition to bringing in the latest submarine design and technologies as part of the project. According to the Defence Ministry, “For the first time, a marine diesel engine will be made in India. The industry partner will get a grant of up to 70 per cent.”
However, the project has faced significant setbacks. Originally planned to be completed much earlier, the project has been marred by delays, technological hurdles, and challenges in effective technology transfer.
Slow progress
Initially criticised as being stagnant and unachievable, Project 75(I) has recently gained momentum with renewed interest from international contenders. Companies like thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and Navantia, in partnership with Indian shipyards MDL and Larsen & Toubro respectively, are now competing fiercely for the contract. This competition has taken on geopolitical significance as foreign governments actively support their respective companies, underscoring the strategic importance of India’s submarine procurement.
Evaluating technological superiority
The Indian Navy is currently in the midst of evaluating submarine technologies from thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and Navantia. Factors such as technological transfer capabilities, the cost per submarine including additional features, and the proven effectiveness of AIP systems will heavily influence the final selection. AIP allows submarines to remain underwater for longer periods, making them more difficult to detect in the vast expanse of the ocean. Acquiring this advanced technology will enhance the Indian Navy’s underwater endurance and stealth capabilities.
A decision to potentially sign initial contracts with both contenders, each for three submarines, will not only expedite fleet augmentation but also facilitate hands-on experience for Indian defence entities.
Strategic partnerships
Past collaborations with thyssenkrupp and Naval Group have not yielded substantial technology transfer benefits for India. Hence, the current strategy emphasises exploring unconventional avenues to acquire critical technologies. By engaging with multiple international partners simultaneously, India can mitigate risks associated with technology dependency and enhance its indigenous submarine design capabilities over the long term.
The competition between thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and MDL vs Navantia and L&T for India’s Project 75(I) submarine programme is having a significant impact on the acquisition process. Firstly, it has generated momentum for the project, which was previously considered “still born and dead”. The revival of the project has brought hope for the Indian Navy to acquire the required number of submarines.
The Indian Navy will need to innovate beyond traditional methods to navigate budget limitations. Effective fund management and astute planning are crucial to swiftly procure the necessary submarine quantities
The competition between the two contenders is poised for a close finish. Both thyssenkrupp-MDL and Navantia-L&T have stepped up lobbying for the project.
The Indian Navy has completed field evaluation trials of the submarines offered by both contenders. In March 2024, they evaluated the thyssenkrupp submarine in Germany. Simultaneously, a team from Indian Navy visited Spain in the last week of June, 2024 to evaluate Navantia’s S80 class submarine.
The competition has added geopolitical and strategic implications to the project. Foreign OEMs now have their government’s backing – Germany for thyssenkrupp and Spain for Navantia. The submarine deal is expected to figure when German and Spanish leaders visit India in the coming months.
Both contenders have offered over 60 per cent “Make in India” content, exceeding the Indian Navy’s requirement. This demonstrates their commitment to technology transfer and indigenous manufacturing.
The competition is a test bed for the new strategic partnership model, where foreign OEMs tie up with domestic producers to build submarines in India.
Clearly, the close competition between thyssenkrupp-MDL and Navantia-L&T has revived the Project 75(I) programme, added geopolitical significance, and pushed both contenders to offer high levels of technology transfer and indigenous content. This will ultimately benefit the Indian Navy in acquiring the required number of modern submarines to counter the growing Chinese maritime threat.
Potential down sides
At the same time, there are potential risks for India in choosing one of these bids over the other. First up, there are the logistical challenges of operating multiple submarine platforms. The Indian Navy currently operates three classes of conventional submarines (EKMs, HDW and Scorpene). Adding a fourth class of submarines (either from thyssenkrupp or Navantia) will further strain the navy’s dockyards and logistics support, which are already stretched. Creating additional infrastructure to support a new submarine class will increase the overall project cost.
The Indian Navy has completed field evaluation trials of the submarines offered by both contenders. In March 2024, they evaluated the thyssenkrupp submarine in Germany. Simul-taneously, a team from Indian Navy visited Spain in the last week of June, 2024 to evaluate Navantia’s S80 class submarine
Technology transfer concerns: Past experience with thyssenkrupp (HDW) submarines did not yield significant technology transfer gains for India. MDL has also repeatedly failed to bring in the required technology through its partnership with thyssenkrupp and Naval Group for the Scorpene project. The extent of technology transfer will be a key factor in the Indian Navy’s final selection.
Geopolitical implications: The competition has added geopolitical and strategic significance, with the German and Spanish governments backing their respective OEMs. This could lead to the submarine deal becoming a bargaining chip in broader diplomatic negotiations between India and these countries.
Delays in project execution: The Project 75(I) program has already been two decades behind schedule. Choosing one bid over the other could potentially lead to further delays in the project’s execution, impacting the Indian Navy’s capability development.
To mitigate these risks, the Indian Navy and the Government should consider signing contracts with both contenders – thyssenkrupp-MDL and Navantia-L&T. This approach could help fill the submarine capability gap in a shorter timeframe and provide hands-on experience to Indian companies and the Navy’s design bureau, ultimately aiding the development of indigenous submarines.
In summary, the close competition between thyssenkrupp Marine Systems -MDL and Navantia-L&T has revived the Project 75(I) programme, added geopolitical significance, and pushed both contenders to offer high levels of technology transfer and indigenous content. This will ultimately benefit the Indian Navy in acquiring the required number of modern submarines to counter the growing Chinese maritime threat.
Toward Aatmanirbharta
A key long-term objective for India is achieving ‘Aatmanirbharta’ or self-reliance in submarine construction. By exposing Indian shipyards and the Navy’s design bureau to diverse submarine platforms (French, Russian, German and Spanish) India seeks to build indigenous capabilities through hands-on learning and adaptation. Despite initial logistical challenges, akin to the Indian Air Force’s management of a varied aircraft fleet, strategic planning can harmonise the operation and maintenance of diverse submarine types.
Strategic Shift in Indian Naval Doctrine
India’s quest for an enhanced submarine fleet underscores a strategic shift in its naval doctrine. Overcoming budget constraints and project delays requires innovative thinking and proactive management of resources. Project 75(I) not only aims to bolster India’s defence capabilities but also serves as a testbed for new strategic partnerships and technology acquisition models. As the evaluation process progresses and contracts are awarded, India moves closer to securing its maritime interests in the Indian Ocean, driven by the aim to counterbalance regional powers and ensure national security in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.
–The writer is a keen observer of national security, geopolitics and military history. He has a passion for informing and engaging readers on critical defence-related issues through his articles. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
