The winning strategy of war is: “If you want to shoot; shoot, don’t just talk”. What it means is to go for the “Total Kill” right from the beginning, with no moral strings tied. Operation Sindoor, like any other previous military conflict, unfortunately, was started with a confused state of mind. It is strange to know that on one hand, it was claimed that full authority was given to the armed forces to select their objectives and strike with full might.
On the other hand, the initial directive was limited to strike only “terrorist hubs” in Pakistan. This limitation had bound the army to refrain from addressing military assets or war-making machine of Pakistan. Further, it was falsely assumed that Pakistan would not retaliate.
Thus, in the initial stage of Operation Sindoor, military targets were spared, which led to unwanted escalation and created confusion on alleged Indian losses of fighter jets. Pakistan could, thus, enact a drama of retaliation and claim a charade of victory .
Full freedom means Full Liberty – no hands tied at the back. A Policy of Gradual escalation does not mean full freedom. It implies “strike & wait for a reaction”. This is what I call hands tied at the back.
When you say “Full freedom given to the armed forces to choose their targets and achieve them with full might”, it should literally be FULL FREEDOM – as the saying goes: Political leaders choose the time and date of war; military decides what, how and when”.
When you violate a nation’s sovereignty by striking deep, whether terrorist camps or its military targets, then, don’t tell him you only wanted to destroy their “terrorist assets”. As it does not consider them as terrorists, we know it very well.
In the initial stage of Operation Sindoor, military targets were spared, which led to unwanted escalation and created confusion on alleged Indian losses of fighter jets. Pakistan could, thus, enact a drama of retaliation and claim a charade of victory
In fact, they are his FORCE MULTIPLIERS for a “Proxy war” or what I call WOM (War By Other Means). Whatever you may say , these so called non-state actors are Pakistan’s military assets. How will she not retaliate, if they are targeted? What made India think that by labelling these strikes as strikes on its so called terror network, Pakistan would not retaliate?
India has always been too cautious in its conduct of war. It is, characteristically, bitten by the morality bug, and thus it makes half-hearted efforts. Its overdose of belief in “Vasudevaya Kutumbkum” is the cause of its undoing.
History bears testimony to the fact that military leaders were never allowed a “free hand” in conduct of military aspects of war, even previously. This is why it suffered more than desired, whether it was 1947-48, 1962, 1965 , 1971, Kargil-1999 or even May-2025 wars or military conflicts with its enemy.
India’s love affair with half-hearted efforts during military conflicts, owes itself to undying appetite for peace and harmony, even at the risk of disgrace and humiliation. Its magnanimity towards its ruthless enemies was the cause of its getting enslaved for over 1200 years or even more.
History bears testimony that King Dahir of Sindh had paid the price of sheltering relatives of Prophet Mohammed, which led to invasion by Mir Qasim, who had killed him in 712 AD, and took away his daughters as slaves. Again, Prithvi Raj Chauhan of Delhi, paid the price in 1192 AD for sparing Mohammed Gauri 16 times, after defeating him.
And when Gauri snatched victory on the 17th attempt, he did not spare Prithvi Raj. Besides this, there are many other such examples of betrayal and soft-pedalling with enemies, who went for the “kill”, whenever an opportunity came their way.
Independent India’s architect of soft-pedalling on military conflicts is its first Prime Minister Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. It is said that in 1947, when General Robert Lockhart presented a strategic plan for India’s defence, Nehru reportedly reacted strongly, stating, “Rubbish! Total rubbish!! We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is Ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. Scrap the Army! The police are good enough to meet our security needs.” It reflected a view that India’s focus should be on non-violence and diplomacy, rather than a significant military buildup.
India has always been too cautious in its conduct of war. It is, characteristically, bitten by the morality bug, and thus it makes half-hearted efforts. Its overdose of belief in “Vasudevaya Kutumbkum” is the cause of its undoing
Air Marshal KC Cariappa, son of Field Marshal KM Cariappa, who wrote his father’s biography, says that ignoring military advice was a common attribute of political mindset of those times. He recalls, his father often being asked why the Army did not evict the frontier tribesmen who, supported by the Pakistan Army, had attacked India.
The General used to reiterate that the government dictated policy. The Army was quite confident of clearing Kashmir. But the orders were to “cease fire midnight 31st December/1st January 1948-49.” General Sir Francis Roy Bucher, second British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, from 1948 to 1949, authenticates this when he was told by Sardar Baldev Singh, India’s Defence Minister to go for “ceasefire” during the Kashmir Conflict of 1947-49.
In 1951, Chinese troops were caught with maps showing parts of the North-East Frontier Agency as part of China. General Cariappa cautioned Nehru of the likely attack by China. Nehru ridiculed him, “It is not for the Army to decide who the nation’s enemies would be.”
Even in 1959, the then army chief, General KS Thimayya, warned of the Chinese threat, it was ignored. Again, in 1962, when China attacked India, Nehru did not employ the Indian Air Force, to checkmate China. It may be noted that the Indian Air Force was much stronger than the Chinese Air Force, then. It was the fear of escalation, which allowed this blunder by the apostle of peace.
Earlier, in 1948, India had failed to reinforce Skardu Garrison, held by J&K state forces, under Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa, who had to surrender in April 1948 to the Pakistan Army. In the 1965 war, India had captured strategically located Hajipir pass. But as a gesture of magnanimity, it was given back to Pakistan under the Tashkent Agreement.
1971 war was no different. A Pakistani author Tariq Ali, in his book “The Duel” quotes his conversation with Prime Minister Indra Gandhi, which took place just some months before her assassination in October 1984. He goes on to write; “……..Let me tell you something,” she said, “And this is about our generals. After Pakistan had surrendered, General Manekshaw walked into this very office and saluted me.”
Independent India’s architect of soft-pedalling on military conflicts is its first Prime Minister Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. It is said that in 1947, when General Robert Lockhart presented a strategic plan for India’s defence, Nehru reportedly reacted strongly, stating, “Rubbish! Total rubbish!! We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is Ahimsa”
Tariq Ali continues. “ Mrs Gandhi, like Zulfiqar Bhutto, was a good mimic, and her description was very diverting. What she then described, surprised me a great deal. After the salute Manekshaw asked her whether the military high command had permission to “finish the job.” This meant crossing the border and taking West Pakistan. Given the demoralised state of the Pakistan army, the outcome was preordained unless the Chinese and the United States entered the conflict. “This being India,” Mrs. Gandhi continued, “I thanked the general and said the cabinet would consider the suggestion.”
He further quips, “She then summoned an urgent cabinet meeting and told him: When I reported the military request, the ministers were initially very excited and many of them were prepared to go along with it. When the meeting began, I was alone. When it ended, I had a unanimous vote for an immediate ceasefire.”
Not only she refused to listen to the sound military advice and, at least, allow military to recapture POJK (Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir), instead under the Shimla Agreement of July 2, 1972, she returned 93,000 Pakistani POWs, without asking for the 54 Indian POWs held by Pakistan.
In fact, it is alleged that there was a secret but unwritten Clause in the Shimla Agreement, which had accepted LoC (Line of Control) to be recognised, at an appropriate time, as the International Border (IB) between India and Pakistan.
Accordingly, under this clause, she had allowed in 1974, ZA Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, to place Gilgit-Baltistan region, directly under Pakistan Government as FCNA (Federally Controlled Northern Areas). Significantly, India, then had made no protests. If so, this was the biggest fraud on India’s current claim on entire Jammu & Kashmir of 1947 vintage.
Kargil-1999 conflict was again a carbon copy of India’s cautious and a non-escalatory approach to a military conflict. The fear of escalation to an imaginary nuclear level, forced it to restrain its military operations. This fear and caution of India encourages Pakistan to continue with its “war of attrition” against India.
Though Operation Sindoor was a bold action to say “enough is enough” but it had lots of “non-escalatory” strings tied. Frankly speaking, it was not a proactive but a reactive response to the Pahalgam incident with a pronounced objective, only to hit the terrorist camps
Though Operation Sindoor was a bold action to say “enough is enough” but it had lots of “non-escalatory” strings tied. Frankly speaking, it was not a proactive but a reactive response to the Pahalgam incident with a pronounced objective, only to hit the terrorist camps.
When you go to war, you don’t assume enemy reactions for sure but you realistically anticipate the worst case scenario. Why no pre-emptive action was taken against enemy’s war machine first, as was later done on the night of 09-10 May 2025? Why was Pakistan given a window of opportunity to respond on 7-8 May 2025? What is worse, we claim that we had informed Pakistan after our air strikes on 06-07 May 2025. It gave the option to the enemy to react or not to react. It was an initiative lost.
Thus, the spirit of magnanimity continues to haunt India at the cost of its dignity, honour and security. After the Pahalgam carnage, our honourable PM had thundered in the rally at Madhubani in Bihar that perpetrators and the backers of Pahalgam carnage will be chased and brought to justice. Did he achieve this? Who does not know that Pakistan Army and its Chief, General Asim Munir were the backers of terrorist organisations in Pakistan?
In fact, Pakistan claims victory, because it managed to escape a devastating defeat due to India’s reluctance to be merciless with its enemies. To further rub salt on India’s agony, the chief architect of Pahalgam incident, had got himself promoted as a Field Marshal
In fact, Pakistan claims victory, because it managed to escape a devastating defeat due to India’s reluctance to be merciless with its enemies. To further rub salt on India’s agony, the chief architect of Pahalgam incident, had got himself promoted as a Field Marshal.
India may have lost another opportunity to settle score with Pakistan. And Jihadi backers have survived to strike again on a better day. Lord Krishna, in Heaven’s above, might be pulling his hairs to witness a tremendous disregard to his sermons of “Geeta”, during “Mahabharata”, when he had pontificated Arjuna on how to treat your enemy!
-An ex-NDA and Wellington Staff College graduate, Col Rajinder Singh is a renowned author and security analyst. He has authored four books, two individually and two in collaboration. His best-selling books are Kashmir – A Different Perspective and The ULFA Insurgency. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
