India Must Revisit its Grand Strategy as Donroe Doctrine Sets in Global Order

The Donroe Doctrine 

Under the Trump Administration, the Monroe Doctrine was reshaped into an offensive deterrent tool rather than a quiet diplomatic, soft-power, and collective-security construct in which the US relied on pragmatic calculations to address security and strategic issues. The Obama Administration declared that the Monroe Doctrine was over, but preferred soft power and preventive diplomacy to ensure the US’s sphere of influence. However, in the Trump Administration, the Monroe Doctrine was dubbed the Donroe Doctrine, which seeks not only to secure the US’s sphere of influence but also to assert the US’s America First mindset through dominant tactics once popular during the Cold War. Even during Trump’s first administration, when the US gradually began to rethink the Monroe Doctrine and prepare to incorporate it into its strategic calculus, the efforts were not accelerated, unlike in the second administration, where the Donroe Doctrine is followed under three strategies.

Under the Trump Administration, the Monroe Doctrine has been reshaped into an offensive deterrent tool rather than a quiet diplomatic, soft-power, and collective-security construct in which the United States relied on pragmatic calculations to address security and strategic issues

First, Transactionalism, in which the US focuses solely on maximising interests through power bargaining, leaves less room for diplomatic manoeuvres. Trade negotiations during Trump’s second administration are a salient manifestation of transactionalism, which has become increasingly aggressive.

Second, Credible Threats: Sanctions and credible threats of the use of force, as forms of coercive diplomacy to ensure the US’s security and strategic space. Although it has long been a central feature of the US security calculus, it has become more direct and stronger under Trump’s second administration, as evidenced by Operation Absolute Resolve against Venezuela and the tariff war.

Third, Unilateralism: Withdrawal from international organisations, tariff politics, military actions, and power politics during conflicts. All were designed and executed to put an American-first approach on the table rather than collective or multilateral engagement. The only reason for the sharp unilateral actions by Trump’s second administration was to send a strategic message to the global order about the US hegemonic revival.

None of these features resembles the original Monroe Doctrine, yet its core purpose remains intact — to protect the US sphere of influence. To sum up, Donroe’s version of Monroe is a blueprint for blitzkrieg-style diplomacy to globalise an American-first approach, akin to a ‘preponderant power’, a concept popular in the US security and strategic community during the Cold War. It holds that a single dominant state (hegemon), such as the US post-Cold War, prevents major wars by possessing overwhelming military, economic, and political strength, deterring rivals and fostering stability.

Withdrawal from international organisations, tariff politics, military actions, and power politics during conflicts are designed to put an American-first approach on the table rather than collective or multilateral engagement, and send a strategic message to the global order about the US hegemonic revival

India’s Grand Strategy 

India has placed strategic autonomy at the forefront of its strategy for navigating the contested world order. The strategy is based on multi-vectoring diplomacy and diversification, moving beyond superpower orbits while working towards what is best for India’s interests, while remaining committed to superpower engagements. While important lessons have been learned from the shortcomings of the Non-Aligned Movement, India’s strategic autonomy strategy is now akin to a grand strategy in the global order, which it uses its hard and soft power to assert and negotiate India’s strategic and security interests. However, as the Donroe doctrine sets the tone for the global order and India prepares to confront a more hawkish US diplomatic posture in the coming period, it must recalibrate and revisit its grand strategy to assess whether it passes the three crucial upcoming tests.

First, Fresh US Blitzkrieg: Threat of more and heavier sanctions, dry trade negotiations, and repeated episodes of Trump’s belittling tactics against world leaders, especially the Prime Minister, while exploring effective re-engagement options and withstanding the US diplomatic onslaughts.

Second, Diplomatic Cushions to mitigate damage: India’s grand strategy should now also focus on finding diplomatic cushions to contain the damage inflicted by the Donroe doctrine and geopolitical spin. To this end, it must reassess how far India can leverage to strategically normalise relations with China, reassure Russia, and explore alternative strategic mechanisms for Russia-India-China engagement or initiatives, at least at the clandestine level. This will help India manage superpower engagements and leverage these cushions not only as buffers but also as bargaining chips in negotiations.

Third, Sharp Diversification: India must reassess its readiness to pursue sharp diversification beyond routine diplomatic measures, moving away from buying-selling engagements and focusing more on co-creating technologies, issue-based alignments, and engagement with minilaterals and multilaterals, with fewer balancing acts and a willingness to accept a certain level of risk to pursue interests aggressively. Shallow-level engagements should not be the default, but they should be leveraged effectively to build deeper strategic partnerships.

In short, diversification, normalisation, and re-engagement tests should be applied to re-evaluate strategic autonomy and make it more resilient to headwinds.

During the Cold War, India missed opportunities to diversify with France, Germany, and Japan, especially after withdrawing from NATO’s integrated command in 1966. This ultimately failed its grand strategy when put to the test

Learning From Kissinger’s Gamble

India must draw important lessons from its Cold War failure, when it struggled to diversify and normalise. In the 1970s, Kissinger employed triangular diplomacy against India, using Pakistan as a proxy and China as a strategic partner to limit India’s regional ambitions and check Soviet influence in South Asia. This doctrine is similar to strategic encirclement, employing clever power tactics to challenge and counter a country’s influence and ambitions in a region. Even then, India pursued elements of strategic autonomy within the Non-Aligned Movement, but this proved ineffective, as its strategic response was constrained by overreliance on the USSR and limited diversification. India missed opportunities to diversify with France, Germany, and Japan, especially after withdrawing from NATO’s integrated command in 1966. This ultimately failed its grand strategy when put to the test.

Similarly, India’s grand strategy now faces a crucial test, and this time not the Kissinger doctrine but the Donroe doctrine, which should not rely on limited approaches to steer its grand strategy but instead be upgraded to such an extent that it could not only take calculated risks but also withstand a US blitzkrieg and the anxiety-heightened global order.