As the US-Iran war rages on, there are no strong visible signs of disengagement or an exit from the conflict; both sides seem to be following a risky escalation strategy aimed at reaching a peak to force de-escalation phenomena. However, even these escalatory tactics are failing to impose caution on both sides, as Iran is ensuring its survivability despite facing severe blows on one end, while on the other hand maintaining sustainable power to retaliate and counter-strike US and Israeli strategic positions to destabilise the region and inflict economic pain on the adversaries.
The Escalatory Tactics
The common strategy for finding an exit through superior power is to dominate and establish superiority over the enemy, forcing the enemy to sit at the table and negotiate. The risky gamble begins with the full escalation of the conflict to a level where the enemy cannot sustain it and its will to fight is exhausted. This escalatory tactic has been the US’s key exit strategy whenever it is stuck in a conflict.
Sledgehammer tactics and gaming the escalation ladder to dominate have often led to successful, honourable exits from conflict for the US. In the Iraq War, when the US toppled Saddam’s regime and a power vacuum was soon filled by sectarian tensions—culminating in sectarian violence—the US was stuck in that violence. By 2006, the US was desperately seeking an exit, and the Bush administration, instead of pursuing a negotiating approach, chose the hard way: escalating to dominate and stabilise the exit.
The strategy, which was earlier focused on rapid and hasty withdrawal and negotiations, turned into a calibrated offensive campaign, pumping more forces and backing one sect against the other in the case of Iraq. Sunnis were backed by the US against the Shia militants, which led to the Anbar Awakening; this drove Al-Qaeda and other hardliners out of Iraq and created a space for the US’s responsible exit. Though this awakening facilitated the rise of ISIS in later years, tactically, it was a success.
Similarly, in the Bosnian War in 1995, when peacekeeping missions and negotiations with the Serbs seemed to be going nowhere, the US-NATO alliance switched to offensive measures by launching a sustained and massive air campaign. Similarly, the US backed the Croats to launch ground operations to further dominate and recapture areas from the Serbs. This organised offensive operation and sudden escalation of the conflict by the US and NATO forced the Serbs to sit at the table for negotiations that led to the Dayton Accords, which ended the war.
However, these escalatory tactics backfired when the US misread the ground realities and the exits seemed like a “forever-war” scenario. The most notable failure was the US-Vietnam War, where Americans launched a massive war and air campaign to protect their sphere of influence from Soviet-backed communist influence, which was gradually increasing its footprint in Southeast Asia. The US’s Operations Linebacker and Rolling Thunder aimed to deliver a “shock and awe” effect on the Vietnamese people by launching massive bombardments, including chemical bombs.
The risky gamble begins with the full escalation of the conflict to a level where the enemy cannot sustain it and its will to fight is exhausted. This escalatory tactic has been the US’s key exit strategy whenever it is stuck in a conflict.
Along with air operations, the US adopted a “madman approach” by threatening to use nuclear weapons as well. But such massive sledgehammering against Vietnam did not break the will of the people in North Vietnam, as they saw the conflict as a struggle for national survival, independence, and identity. Therefore, the massive attrition campaign did not break their strategic will, which prolonged the war; the US was stuck in a bloody battle that led to one of the biggest failures in its military and operational history.
A Christmas That Never Came
The US had a clear plan in the Korean War: to escalate the conflict through major offensive operations, unify the peninsula, and end the war by Christmas. But as the US escalated further, China entered the war in massive numbers and fought the US and UN forces. This placed the US in a quagmire where it had neither the ability to escalate the conflict further to achieve its strategic objectives, nor the ability to take an exit. As a result, the US was stuck fighting a two-year bloody, static trench war. Even in this situation, the US had misread the situation of conflict expansion and the strategic possibilities on the ground.
US-Iran War: Gambling Exit
The ongoing US-Iran war presents another case of a quagmire-like situation, where the US and Israel had some implicit strategic objectives of regime change that were camouflaged in the age-old issue of Iran stockpiling and enriching nuclear materials. However, neither the implicit nor the explicit objectives seem to be on the horizon, as both the US and Israel are stuck in the fog of war, where a responsible exit seems to be another strategic struggle.
The US and Israel initially thought that large-scale strikes, coupled with targeted strikes, would not only assassinate Iran’s leadership but also strategically erode Iran’s will to respond. They believed this would eventually weaken Iran internally and lead to regime change. But that did not happen; the US was stuck as Iran’s massive and expansionary retaliation closed the immediate exit door.
A recent statement by US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth noted that the US did not anticipate the exact nature of Iran’s retaliation in the Gulf, suggesting that the US misread Iran’s response and its approach to conflict management. The plan of exit here for the US is to stage a big attack on Iran that will cause a significant setback to Iran’s strategic will, allowing for a responsible exit by stating that the US’s strategic objective was to weaken the Iranian regime and its capability to fight. On the other hand, Iran’s goal for an exit is to force the US to the negotiating table by continuing sustained missile and drone strikes across the Gulf and blocking the Strait of Hormuz.
As history has shown, the US’s misreadings and quick, knee-jerk reactions to certain security and geopolitical developments have blurred the lines between a sensible strategy and one driven by power and a strategic superiority complex.
Recently, Iran laid out three conditions of war, which show that Iran is willing to negotiate, but only through strength rather than from a losing position. However, larger questions still loom: is the US’s strategy to “escalate to dominate and de-escalate” really working? Will the exit really be based on fulfilled objectives, or will it be just a face-saving move by the administration?
Answers to both questions are most likely negative, as the US’s escalation is not working effectively and is only inflicting tactical damage to Iran. The only difference is that the power and damage are high. The exit, too, would be a face-saving gamble rather than a genuinely substantive move. In short, it would be an end that closely resonates with a strategic stalemate.
However, things would have been quite different if the US had reconsidered its strategic moves by revisiting the “Powell Doctrine.” Envisioned by General Colin Powell, this doctrine showcases a path of military engagement where the use of force is a last resort—used only when it helps to achieve vital interests, and must have clear objectives with a defined exit strategy.
But as history has shown, the US’s misreadings and quick, knee-jerk reactions to certain security and geopolitical developments have blurred the lines between a sensible strategy and one driven by power and a strategic superiority complex. Such a complex always judges the enemy through strength rather than strategic foresight.
The writer is a national security analyst specialising in intelligence and strategic affairs. He has worked extensively with national security and foreign policy think tanks of repute, and has written for publications including The Telegraph, The Print, Organiser, and Fair Observer. He has also been a guest contributor to the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU).
