Multi Domain Operations (MDO) is not new. All five domains (Land, Air, Sea, Space, and Cyber), as a combined battlespace, have been in existence for at least the past six decades. Advancements in technology, with AI as the latest addition, have exponentially expanded each domain in terms of time and space. Soon, Cognitive AI will introduce Cognitive Space as the “Sixth Domain.”
Before crystal-gazing into the future through the present, I will examine the history of warfighting, governed by man, machine, and digital infrastructure (interconnected space—voice to visual to wireless to analog to digital, and now AI-enabled infrastructure). The interconnecting network infrastructure connects commanders (decision-makers in operations and logistics) with intelligence, surveillance, and weapons grids.
Initially, innovations were primarily driven by defence and security needs. The industrial revolution, followed by the computer age and now the AI and Cyber explosion, has led to economic strength becoming a major war-winning factor, enhancing strategic advantages in today’s global village. Technology has taken the shape of dual-use technology. The only technology that continues to remain exclusive is kinetic weapon systems. Economic power and soft power to influence the world order are essential for becoming a world or regional power. There is a 24×7 worldwide, never-ending conflict in the world. Alignments are governed by these factors, and the growth of soft power is also determined by them. Consequently, weapons targeting the cognitive domain have, in recent years, become dual-use. Dual-use technology is not confined to this domain alone; technologies that enhance the efficiency of business houses as well as governance are also witnessing significant investments by public and private agencies.
As technology advanced and offered better ways of conducting business—both military and civil—the rules, methods, and procedures had to undergo refinements for better utilisation and exploitation of technology. In the defence domain, networks and associated data infrastructure gave rise to new doctrines. Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) was refined into Network-Centric Operations (NCO). Perpetual economic and geostrategic conflict introduced Effect-Based Operations (EBO). EBO saw the addition of industry, national infrastructure, R&D, government, financial banking, and marketing into the warfighting domain. The capability to integrate all these elements into one cohesive whole became a necessity. Based on the desired effect, the necessary verticals (military, civil, and government) were activated.
India stands at the threshold of a transformative shift in its defence strategy. Multi-Domain Operations promise to integrate military and non-military assets across five domains to achieve strategic dominance in an increasingly interconnected and contested world
New concepts, yet with the same old objectives, were introduced, such as Low-Intensity Conflict, No War No Peace, Hybrid Operations, Grey Zone Warfare, and now MDO. Five aspects underwent changes:
- The upgradation of underlying technology.
- The addition of new players with enhanced capabilities and reach.
- The required degree of interconnectivity in decision-making and logistics.
- The extent of each domain in terms of space.
- The time needed to act/dominate all these domains simultaneously.
On closer analysis, the changes were primarily in SOPs, methods of interconnection, and the adoption of technology. To achieve this, two aspects are paramount: network infrastructure and cyber security (protection against DOS attacks, destruction, or unauthorised control). This paper briefly touches on these two critical factors and attempts to dispel the myth that MDO is a new concept. In India, we must focus on transitioning from partial integration across the five domains to full integration and coordination in MDO, while preparing for the addition of the cognitive domain as Cognitive AI matures.
Let us not allow NATO countries, led by the US, to dictate our approach to MDO. We must tailor our MDO roadmap to align with our strategic interests and operational areas in terms of time and space. Simply imitating them could result in time and cost overruns and significantly increase the complexity of solutions as well as the underlying AI-capable network infrastructure.
How Strong is India’s MDO Fabric?
My experience and study of the various materials (Task Forces, Road Maps, Challenges/Problem Statements) available in the open domain convey two tendencies or urges in the higher hierarchy:
- To understate the voids and project that all is under control.
- To hurriedly tick all boxes, often resulting in roadmaps riddled with fault lines.
These tendencies lead to many missed opportunities and frequently overstate the degree of preparedness and progress.
The four most important ingredients of MDO into an omnipresent whole are:
- Digital networks that interconnect and integrate all C2 structures and entities of MDO.
- Cognitive decision support facilitating the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop.
- Organisational structures like Joint Multi-Domain Operation Command and Control (JMDOC2).
- Cyber threat protection in the digital cyberspace mandatory for MDO.
Harnessing cutting-edge advancements in AI, cybersecurity, and quantum computing is critical for India’s MDO vision. By combining technological prowess with cohesive command structures, India aims to transition from isolated operations to fully integrated warfare capabilities
All allied services, both military and non-military, have their own service-specific networks, application processes, procedures, security and encryption algorithms, SOPs, technology, and primary domains. Creating a knot-free fabric of all services and stitching them into a uniform canopy covering all of them is a difficult task.
In the Indian context, each service has its own service-specific networks. Prominent defence service networks are:
- Army: ASCON
- Indian Navy: Naval Enterprise Network
- Indian Air Force: AFNet
- Tri-Service Network: Defence Communication Network
- Network for Spectrum (NFS).
Their reach and degree of interconnectivity are highly inadequate to achieve even a low level of interconnectivity. Non-military networks compound the problem to levels of insolvability.
State of MDO in India
Upfront, I state that MDO in India is at the conceptualisation stage. Based on experience, the Indian hierarchy has a tendency to introduce changes in concepts or SOPs by defining a new acronym without substantial structural or systemic shifts. For instance, in the 1990s, Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) operations were progressively given new labels like Hybrid Warfare or Grey Zone Warfare with every passing year. While these are often treated as distinct concepts, a holistic analysis reveals they are fundamentally the same, with the primary difference lying in the participants, actors, and resources involved.
Technological advancements will continue to necessitate refinements in processes and end-states, particularly in terms of time-space-effect dynamics. However, considering the current level of interconnectivity among Indian stakeholders, even basic physical networks remain largely non-existent. This presents a significant barrier to achieving data, process, and procedural interconnectivity—a prerequisite for transitioning to higher levels of multi-domain integration.
The journey from our current state to meaningful multi-domain integration is both long and arduous. At present, we are not in a position to achieve higher degrees of interconnectivity, let alone full-scale integration.
Up Front: Transition or Transformation?
India must make a clear distinction in her approach—should it be a transition or a transformation? Considering the current state and the urgent need to bridge the gap in Cyber and Digital Space, catalysed by Artificial Intelligence (AI), India needs to adopt a parallel approach. This involves, first, transitioning from a state of inadequate interconnectivity among various allied agencies to a framework of interconnected data, resources, and Command & Control (C2). Second, it involves formulating a vision, defining concepts, creating plans, and establishing organisations to transform into Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). The decision to execute the MDO plans (roadmap) can be taken at an appropriate time, which will be governed by the progress of the transition. A cautionary note: the organisational structure and roles must neither suffer from turf wars nor be governed by equitable distribution of work. The organisation should be based upon the competence and capability required to lead the various verticals of MDO.
Timelines: MDO in the USA
A saving grace for India is that achieving MDO is inherently challenging and a lengthy process. Even the USA and allied countries, which committed to MDO approximately four years ago, are still grappling with issues of incompatibility while interconnecting the sensors of their three services into a unified network. NATO Allied Command Transformation, established in 2002, prepares NATO forces for MDO by anticipating changes in the operational landscape. The USA has created the JADC2 system to oversee MDO efforts, with progress monitored by the US Congress.
Should India transition gradually or leap toward full-scale transformation? Experts argue for a balanced approach, simultaneously addressing immediate gaps in interoperability while laying the groundwork for long-term multi-domain integration
NATO vs. India’s MDO Path
There is a significant difference between the paths NATO and India must take toward MDO. Geostrategically, NATO faces an urgency to transform into MDO with a global reach, yet interoperability challenges persist, requiring time and extensive coordination to resolve. Conversely, India is at the other end of the spectrum, with its MDO entities evolving in a disjointed manner—both procedurally and technologically. India’s global MDO ambitions are unlikely to materialise in the near future. For now, India should focus its MDO efforts on regional space and Indian agencies. However, the standards and processes adopted must be forward-looking, enabling scalability and future alliances with other nations.
What Needs to Change?
Technology evolves rapidly, and many advancements remain experimental or fail to find widespread adoption due to inefficiencies or lack of strategic advantage. India’s mantra for MDO should be: “Interconnect → Integrate → Enter MDO → Security as the Packaging Agent.” To achieve this, India must clearly define organisational structures, processes, procedures, and security protocols for military and non-military agencies. Each agency must first interconnect its resources, followed by prioritised interconnections between allied agencies. Integration through standardised processes, procedures, technology, and skill sets within a defined geopolitical space should precede the final step of MDO implementation.
Organisational Restructuring
While the author refrains from naming specific lead agencies, certain organisational structures and their roles are proposed. A National Joint All-Domain Transformation Committee should serve as an apex body reporting to Parliament, tasked with formulating interconnection processes, allocating budgets, resolving conflicts, and monitoring progress. An empowered Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) with financial and directive authority should oversee these efforts.
The Allied Multi-Domain Command and Control Working Group would include representatives from Indian military and non-military agencies, academia, industry, and R&D establishments. Sub-working groups could be created as needed to address specific challenges. Intra-Ministry or Agency MDO Management Organisations would focus on interconnecting and integrating intelligence, operations, and logistics functions across the services. Meanwhile, the Joint Allied Multi-Domain Command and Control Agency (JMDC2A) would manage networks, procedures, and processes essential for MDO, ensuring compatibility and integration across all entities.
Security Imperatives: Including Post-Quantum Cyber (PQC)
The importance of networks and security in achieving MDO capabilities cannot be overstated. The Cyber Space in a battlefield context includes synchronised entities such as surveillance systems, weapon systems, decision support systems, commanders, logistics, and defensive/offensive cyber systems operating across multiple domains. These components must be interconnected and secured.
India’s MDO network fabric should address two key communication categories: intra-communications for specific applications and inter-communications linking intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), operations, and logistics. Homeland security will also play a significant role, depending on the conflict’s nature and geography. The envisioned MDO environment would function as an omnipresent data link, with access governed by the entity’s role and operational requirements.
The complexity of the networking challenge is heightened by security requirements. Differences in processes, procedures, and security classifications among allied services further complicate integration. The solution lies in establishing an omnipresent data link that ensures verified connectivity for friendly entities. The existing Network for Spectrum (NFS), with appropriate architectural and security adjustments, can provide a foundation for this. Key policy modifications include extending the NFS to integrated theatres, utilising shared overlays from defence and civilian satellites, and supporting cloud and AI functionalities. Encryption systems must incorporate Post-Quantum Cyber (PQC) capabilities, ensuring resilience against quantum computing threats.
While the US and NATO have made significant strides in MDO, their experiences highlight the complexities of interoperability and integration. India’s strategy, shaped by regional priorities, offers an opportunity to adopt a customised, scalable model tailored to its unique geopolitical landscape
Recommended Security Solutions
MDO can be achieved if allied agencies work in unison, trust deficits are addressed through technology, human intervention is minimised, and AI is extensively utilised in security and decision-support systems. The following steps are recommended:
- Implement MDO under an empowered JPC.
- Establish a National All-Domain Transformation Committee.
- Create a Joint Multi-Domain C2 Agency and an Allied Multi-Domain Command and Control Working Group for military operations.
- Organise Intra-Agency MDO Management Organisations to integrate non-military agencies into MDO efforts.
Bridging the Gap: The Transition to MDO
India is yet to achieve net-centricity, and the gap between Net-Centricity (NC) and MDO is too wide to bridge in a single leap. A transitional approach is essential. Until a minimum level of interconnectivity and integration is achieved, all suggested agencies should focus on interconnecting entities within limited domains while concurrently developing roadmaps with clear timelines and resource allocations.
Takeaways
MDO should be implemented in manageable portions, particularly in the military context, as part of Integrated Theatre Commands. The progression from interconnection to integration and finally to MDO should follow a structured path. Once validated within these theatres, non-military allied agencies can be incorporated.
-The writer possesses over 37 years of hands-on experience in military operations, including Electronic Warfare (EW), Tactical C3I integration, ASCON, NFS, JCES/HQ IDS, and Cyber Security. Post retirement he continues to be associated with MESH MANETS, AI, Deep Technology and Asymmetric Encryption solutions. The views expressed are of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
