“A mistake in strategy cannot be undone in the same war,” said German General Erich von Ludendorff at the end of World War I. In the Ukraine War, Russia had all the advantages – a numerically stronger army, superior weapons and a large cyber force that was able to take control of the electromagnetic spectrum – but instead of going for the killer blow with overwhelming firepower, Moscow chose to get bogged down in scrappy shootouts that favoured the defenders. Instead of targeting the Ukrainian political leadership with saturation aerial bombing and devastating missile strikes, Russia held back its air force. Due to this strategic blunder the war that should have been over in a month is likely to complete its first anniversary in February 2023. With the Russian Army forced to retreat in several places, and the Ukrainian Army lacking the capability to defeat Russia, the war has entered a stalemate.

Russia’s primary objective of the war was to prevent Ukraine from joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and becoming a permanent security threat – similar to Pakistan on India’s western border. With Ukraine now a dysfunctional warzone, you could argue that goal has been achieved. Plus, Ukraine’s mineral rich eastern areas and a sizable portion of the country’s Russian speaking population are in Russian hands. Daily Ukrainian casualties are estimated at around 500 killed a day. Even with many fanatic mercenaries from the West prepared to die for Ukraine in the trenches of Donbas, the alarmingly high casualty rate is hardly sustainable in the long run. But these statistics won’t satisfy the Russian public which – despite its legendary capacity for absorbing hardship – wants a quick and resounding victory. Plus, the longer the war continues, it prevents the Russian economy from returning to normalcy while also diminishing Russia’s reputation as a military power in the eyes of the world.

How not to win a war

The importance of timing in the execution of military operations has been a constant refrain in the works of military strategists through the ages. More than 2,300 years ago, Chanakya, the strategist of the Mauryan Empire, wrote in ‘The Arthashastra’, “Whenever the king is superior, he shall not waste any time and should proceed against the enemy whenever by doing so the enemy can be weakened or crushed.”

Prussian general and military strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) wrote in ‘On War’ that time is less likely to bring favour to the victor than to the vanquished. “An offensive war requires above all a quick, irresistible decision. Any kind of interruption, pause or suspension of activity is inconsistent with the nature of offensive war.”

Unfortunately, since the three axis invasion of Ukraine began in February, the Russians have avoided going in with all guns blazing. Unlike the West which raided Iraq in 2003 with unstoppable 1,000 bomber raids that dismantled Saddam Hussain’s high command, Moscow did not follow the classic Russian strategy of swift offensive operations despite having the ability to do so. Rather, the plan was to seize the southern and eastern Russian speaking regions and bring the Ukrainians to the negotiating table.

Moscow also picked the wrong time to go to war. Traditionally, Russia’s biggest ally is winter during which it has ground down military juggernauts including Napoleon’s 6,000,000 Grande Armee and Adolf Hitler’s Wehrmacht. And yet Russia chose to invade Ukraine in the final days of February when spring was just weeks away. The result – when the snow started thawing in April, Russian armour got stuck in the slushy terrain.

The mistake in strategy was due to the Russian thinking Ukraine – being a fellow Slavic nation – should not be crushed. As a result, Kiev was spared crippling blows on its political command centres. This is why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is able to strut around in his official residence wearing his ridiculous t-shirt instead of cowering like a rat in a bunker.

Major General (retired) GD Bakshi, in an interview with Republic World, referred to this blind not just in the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin but right down to the ordinary Russian soldier. “There was a genuine feeling that the Ukrainians are our Slav brothers and fellow Orthodox Christians, and we will not use indiscriminate force against them. Therefore Putin had strictly ordered his forces to ensure that collateral damage was reduced to the minimum possible.”

The emphasis on avoiding collateral damage got in the way of the classic Russian way of attacking cities with heavy artillery, as they had used in World War II, Chechnya and Aleppo in Syria. This became such an obsessive limitation that in the early phase of the war, there was very little use of artillery against Kiev, where Zelenskyy and his American advisors were allowed to plan out war operations with zero danger of being attacked.

On the other hand, the one sector where Russian forces notched up early and notable success was in the south, near Crimea, where the Russian Army was led by Gen Aleksandr Dvornikov, described as an “old school” general and a “blood and soil nationalist”. Trained in Soviet military doctrines of quickly obliterating the adversary as a means of gaining battlefield momentum, Dvornikov is the only commander who disregarded Putin’s orders to fight a limited war. Ironically, he has been relieved of his command, a pointer that not all is well in the Russian leadership.

Lessons for India

According to Clausewitz, “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”

Moscow may have started this war with clear objectives, but it wasn’t clear how it would conduct it. To be sure, initially the war was going well for Russia. Though it did not take the quickest route to victory (the decapitation of the Ukrainian political leadership), Moscow relied on its traditional strengths in artillery to hit Ukrainian forces from safe standoff distances. The war in the east, where Russia is focussing its attention, became an artillery duel in which Kiev was severely outgunned. Within a few weeks, the Russian forces completely destroyed the adversary’s military arsenal including all his tanks and artillery pieces. But the decision to spare Zelenskyy and his Western-backed Neo-Nazi cabal would cost them big because the West decided to create a second Afghanistan.

Today, the latest military hardware and vast quantities of ammunition are coming in from the US and all over Europe, including Norway, Sweden, the UK, Poland, the Baltic countries and Czechia. Western allies as distant as Australia are sending advisers and weapons. The US is sourcing 100,000 artillery rounds from South Korea, and even dirt poor Pakistan is supplying some ammunition. This massive inflow of military supplies has no doubt contributed to Russian setbacks and casualties, and the blame can be pinned entirely on the Russian strategy of pursuing limited war.

India is no stranger to Western interference in its wars which prevented it from delivering the knockout blow to its adversaries. In the 1965 War, it was Britain and the Soviet Union that pressured it to abandon its vast territorial gains, with the Indian Army stationed just outside Lahore and Sialkot. In the 1971 War, India again defeated Pakistan but its plan to destroy the Pakistan Army in the west didn’t happen because the US threatened to bomb India if the Indian Army crossed the international border. In 1999, the US asked India to stop its round the clock bombing of the Pakistan Army in Kargil, allowing Islamabad to extricate itself from the Indian Army’s clutches.

During Kargil India displayed a defensive mindset, with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee issuing an order that the Indian Air Force must not cross the LoC. The Indian Navy was denied any role in the conflict and only in the final few days was a lone Indian submarine stationed off the Pakistan coast in order to strike Karachi if peace talks failed.

Not only did India’s defensive mindset allow Pakistan to get away with just a few thousand soldiers dead, it denied the Indian armed forces a chance to strike deep into the adversary’s homeland as the IAF finally did on Balakot in February 2019.

Days before the Balakot strike, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had commented that India’s military arsenal was not for Diwali. We need such clear headed thinking at all levels of the political and military leaderships. War is expensive, it costs lives, and it takes a toll on the economy. So if India is pushed towards war, it should go all the way. The sole aim should be the enemy’s capitulation and degradation of his war fighting capacity.

Clausewitz defined victory as the destruction of the enemy’s forces, whether by death, injury, or any other means. “Direct annihilation of the enemy’s forces must always be the dominant consideration.”

In Chanakyan terms, a nation needs to skillfully employ its strengths against an enemy’s weakness. Chapter 9 of The Arthashastra deals with preparation for war and describes the kinds of troops that should be mobilised for an expedition, the proper seasons for starting an expedition, the precautions to be taken and the dangers to be guarded against before starting, and so on.

According to Chanakya, the most important factor in planning and decision-making for conducting a military campaign is power. This includes an analysis of the military and economic strength of the adversary, as well as his intellectual power. He stressed on the ability of the army to carry out an objective analysis and not to be swayed by emotion. He even lists out the order of the three constituents of power — intellectual power, military strength and morale — in decreasing order of importance.

Endgame in Ukraine

The high Ukrainian casualty rate is a pointer to the fanaticism of Kiev’s political elites who are sending poorly trained youth into a meat grinder. The last time this happened was during the Battle for Berlin in the closing days of World War II when Hitler and his fanatic Nazi generals sent 15-17 year old children armed with bazookas to die against the Russian Army. This shouldn’t surprise anyone since the current Ukrainian leadership comprises leaders who are ardent admirers of the Nazis.

However, any way you slice this, there is no way Ukraine can win this war. For, Russia’s ability to absorb sanctions and tighten its belt is far greater than the West’s ability to suffer economic losses. Moscow has endless resources to fight a drawn out war. On October 10, 2022, it launched a massive missile strike that wiped out 30 per cent of Ukraine’s electrical and other infrastructure. The barrage consisted of 84 missiles and 24 loitering drones and was in retaliation for the October 8 Ukrainian attack on the Crimean Bridge. History has shown the longer the war, the more likely it is that Russia’s adversaries will lose.

Even Cold War demagogue Henry Kissinger – who was once bitterly opposed to Russia – has implored the West to throw in the towel and get back to the negotiating table. At the World Economic Forum in Davos he said that ideally, the dividing line should be a return to the status quo ante. But if that isn’t possible, Ukraine should cede territory to Russia. “Pursuing the war beyond that point would not be about the freedom of Ukraine, but a new war against Russia itself.”

Putin doesn’t have to take Kiev to declare victory. He has done enough to deter NATO from signing up Ukraine as its next member. If he can get an assurance that his annoying neighbour will not become a staging ground for anti-Russian activities and Neo-Nazi propaganda, he should allow a truce and call back his army. As Clausewitz said, “The aim of war should be the defeat of the enemy…. The conquest of his whole territory is not always necessary, and total occupation of his territory may not be enough.”

–The writer is a globally cited defence analyst. His work has been published by leading think tanks, and quoted extensively in books on diplomacy, counter terrorism, warfare and economic development. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda